Attached is a copy of the minutes of our Strategy Discussion Group Meeting
last Tuesday. I thought that this was a very useful discussion as it enabled
us to get on the table some of the issues that have been concerning all of
us with respect to the future direction of the Special Committee.
I was particularly struck by the fact that we face a very real dilemma as we
proceed with future meetings of the Working Groups. On the one hand, if we
are to make the Special Committee a useful and meaningful activity, which is
an objective we share, we will have to engage the other members in a
thorough discussion of current nuclear planning ultimately focused on the
question of specifying how the Europeans can become more effectively
involved in nuclear planning and crisis consultation. On the other hand this
seems certain to involve not only the release of sensitive military
information but also disclosure of sensitive political relationships between
heads of government; most importantly, it will require our coming to grips
with the question of just how much of a voice we are prepared to give our
allies in the planning of nuclear forces and in consultations regarding
their use. Although in general we want to be forthcoming, there is obviously
a point beyond which we are not prepared to go. Moreover, the decision as to
the extent to which it is in the US national interest, both generally and
specifically, to so engage our allies, can only be made at the highest
levels of government.
On the basis of the foregoing considerations, it seems to me the following
guidance should be applicable for all US personnel in the conduct of
meetings and discussions under aegis of the Special Committee and its
Working Groups:
If you agree with the preceding suggestion, I propose that our Group meet
again early in March to conduct the review suggested in 3. above, as well as
to consider other related business.
Attachment
Washington, February 15, 1966, 4
p.m..
Memorandum of Conversation3
SUBJECT
- Strategy Discussion Group Meeting
PARTICIPANTS
- State:
- G—Mr. Johnson
-
G/PM—Mr. Weiss
-
G/PM—Mr. George
-
G/PM—Mr. Sloss
-
EUR—Mr. Leddy
-
EUR—Mr.
Schaetzel
-
EUR—Mr. Spiers
-
EUR—Mr. Baker
-
EUR—Mr. Gilman
-
S/P—Mr. Owen
-
DOD/ISA—Mr. McNaughton
-
DOD/ISA—Mr.
Wyle
-
DOD/ISA—Gen.
Seignious
-
JCS—Lt. Gen. Goodpaster
-
JCS—Capt. Matthews
-
JCS—Col.
Donaldson
- DCA—Gen. Starbird
1. Working Group I.
Colonel Donaldson of the Joint Staff reported on the
first meeting of Working Group I (Intelligence and Data Exchange) which
was held in Paris on February 7–8. He characterized the meeting as being
generally very successful, and no major issues arose. Agreement was
reached
[Page 347]
on a questionnaire to
be sent to the Standing Group, SACLANT and SHAPE which
would develop information on current arrangements for exchange of
intelligence and related data. The initial scope of the Working Group is
to consider data related to the use of nuclear weapons in the NATO area only. The terms of reference of
the Working Group were broadened to include data on allied forces as
well as intelligence data. At the next meeting the members of the
Working Group will exchange papers on what data they believe their Heads
of Government will need for consultation regarding the use of nuclear
weapons. In response to a question by Mr. Johnson,
Colonel Donaldson indicated that the data to be
exchanged will include political as well as military information.
Mr. Johnson noted that it appeared that this Working
Group will quickly get into issues involving high level political
relationships between Heads of Government which would directly concern
the President. He asked whether the Working Group was receiving adequate
political guidance. Colonel Donaldson noted that
Mr. Gannett of EUR
was working with the US representatives of the Working Group. Mr.
Johnson noted that it was important that we did
not start down paths which would commit the President to provide
information, or to enter into consultations which he might not be
willing to undertake. He noted that, based on his experience with crisis
situations, he felt sure the President will want to maintain freedom of
action as to whom he consults with, about what, and under what
conditions. For example, the President would not be likely to relish the
idea of 14 colored phones ringing in his office during an acute
international crisis. General Goodpaster noted that at the military level also the
question of exchange of military information will require very careful
looking at; he would not want exchange of military information to be
automatic.
2. Working Group II.
General Starbird reported on the initial meeting of Working Group II
which was held in Paris, February 8–10. The Working Group agreed to
submit three questionnaires designed to obtain an inventory of current
communication resources in NATO. The
first questionnaire is directed at Supreme Commanders and is designed to
elicit information on the communication capabilities which they have
between each other and to the NAC, the
Standing Group and national authorities. The second questionnaire is
directed to national authorities, and is designed to elicit information
on communication capabilities between national authorities and NATO civilian and military bodies. The
third questionnaire is directed to communications capabilities between
member nations. Questionnaires are being addressed to all 14 NATO countries. They will not go into
communication capabilities below the level of the
[Page 348]
Supreme Commanders. Working Group II hopes
to hold a meeting with Working Group I once the questionnaires are
completed to provide the results of their survey and to obtain guidance
from Working Group I as to what data Heads of Government may wish to
exchange.
General Starbird noted that the committee effort so
far is largely “marking time” until they can receive inputs from Working
Groups I and III. Nevertheless, the following issues have already
emerged:
- (a)
- There is a problem with respect to release of data by the US
on the capabilities of secure voice equipment. General
Starbird has requested USIB to reexamine a previous
decision not to release such data to NATO.
- (b)
- It is clear that certain countries will not be in a position
to release data on certain sensitive communication facilities
(e.g., Heads of Government communication capabilities between
the US and the UK cannot be
released unilaterally by the US).
- (c)
- The UK, supported by Canada,
took the position that consultation would obviously be centered
in NAC and was initially opposed
to sending out a questionnaire relating to communications
between governments. General Starbird
convinced them that the effort to elicit information would not
prejudge the means of consultation, and they finally agreed to
the third questionnaire.
Mr. Johnson asked what the US philosophy was on the
use of NAC for consultation. Mr.
McNaughton and Mr.
Spiers replied that it is considered as an
option, but not the only one and this is one of the questions to be
explored by the Special Committee. Mr. Johnson
noted that he considered secure written communications to be generally
preferable to secure voice, General Starbird
pointed out that Ambassador Cleveland had noted the possible requirement
for secure voice between the NATO
PermReps and their Heads of Government.
3. Working Group III.
Mr. McNaughton summarized the
arrangements being made for Working Group III which meets February 17–18
in Washington. He pointed out that ISA
already had recommended to Mr. McNamara against the inclusion of substantive
conclusions in the report from Working Group III to the Special
Committee, and Mr. McNamara has
agreed. Mr. McNaughton said they
were not sure what bilateral discussions would take place, but clearly
Mr. McNamara would have to talk
with Minister Healey about F–111’s, and would want to talk to Minister
Von Hassel about German aid for Turkey. He would probably also want to
talk to the Turkish Defense Minister about Mr. McNaughton’s forthcoming visit to
Turkey.
As to where the Special Committee is to go from here, Mr. McNaughton acknowledged that they are
faced by a dilemma. On the one hand, there really is a desire on Mr.
McNamara’s part to get the
[Page 349]
Europeans (and when Mr.
McNamara says the Europeans,
what he really means is the Germans and, specifically, Von Hassel) more
heavily involved in the details of nuclear problems. But, as we get
further into detail, we run into areas where the US just doesn’t have
all the answers as yet, or if we do, the answers raise major policy
issues. For example, the problems involved in deploying ABMs and ADMs in Europe. Mr. McNamara wants a follow-on meeting in
April which would deal with tactical nuclear forces. Mr. McNaughton couldn’t predict where they
would go from here. They would probably want to establish groups of
experts to meet between meetings of the Working Group, but they had made
no final decision on this as yet.
Mr. Johnson asked what the philosophy was on the
approach to the meetings and specifically whether they want to string
them out or come to conclusions rapidly. Mr. McNaughton pointed out that here again
there was a dilemma. If Working Group III went on for too long, it could
become an institution and be subject to attack by the French. On the
other hand, they certainly wanted to extend its life beyond the June
Ministerial Meeting, again with the French in mind. How long the Working
Group III meetings are extended really depends on how well the first few
meetings go. He thought that Mr. McNamara and Minister Healey were optimistic. Mr.
Johnson said that he favored keeping it going
as a Working Group as long as it was productive.
Mr. Schaetzel said that it is important to make a
record to show that we really tried to make the group succeed, but if we
prolonged it indefinitely, it would play into French hands. Mr.
McNaughton’s view was we
should certainly keep the group going for a while, but not forever. He
also noted that it was the Germans’ clear view, as expressed in the
paper they sent us, that they do not want the Special Committee to
compete with the hardware solution. Mr. Spiers
noted that much of the problem arises from UK pressure to make the Special Committee a substitute for
a hardware solution. Mr. Johnson stated that this
UK position is counterproductive. Mr.
Johnson summarized the objectives as expressed
by the group as being “without prejudice to the hardware solution to
make the Special Committee as meaningful as possible and to keep it
going so long as it was being productive.” Mr.
Weiss noted there was a dilemma between
providing enough information and sense of sharing to keep the Europeans
engaged, while at the same time not committing the US government to
consultation procedures and planning that we are not prepared to follow
through on.
Mr. McNaughton then noted several
possible proposals that had been made for involving the Allies in
nuclear planning. These include (a) placing national representatives at
SAC, (b) hot lines between national
governments, (c) joint studies of such subjects as MRBMs, ABMs and ADMs,
[Page 350]
as
suggested in Mr. Leddy’s
memorandum,4 and (d) examination with the allies of the
requirements for the next generation of weapons systems.
At this point, Mr. Johnson asked whether we were
trying to press our conclusions with respect to force structure and
strategy on the allies. Mr. McNaughton acknowledged that to some extent Mr.
McNamara does want them to
reach the same conclusions as we have reached. (For example, that there
is no need for additional MRBMs.) But,
he also said Mr. McNamara was
mindful of the need not to overdo this. Mr. McNaughton said that he very much agreed with the
approach suggested in Mr. Leddy’s
memorandum to set up groups of experts under Working Group III to
discuss specific problems. The problem was what subjects could we get
into and which subjects should we avoid because we didn’t have all the
answers, or couldn’t provide the necessary information. Mr.
Spiers noted that a number of useful proposals
had now been made which would involve the allies in nuclear planning and
suggested that we set up a US Working Group under the aegis of the
Strategy Discussion Group to examine these proposals and to develop a US
position on what we were prepared to offer.
Mr. McNaughton again emphasized
that Mr. McNamara thinks of the
objectives of Working Group III principally in terms of the Germans.
Ideally, he would like to see US–UK-German discussion of these issues for the principal purpose
of educating the Germans and of involving Minister Von Hassel more in
the details of nuclear planning. Mr. McNaughton noted the strong objections of the Italians
to trilateral meetings, and asked State how serious we felt these
Italian objections were.
Mr. Schaetzel replied that there is no question that
this a real problem and that we cannot ignore the Italian objections if
we want to keep them committed to NATO.
He pointed out that the people in Italy who raised these objections were
real friends of the US and supporters of European unity. Mr. McNaughton asked how can we proceed
fruitfully to achieve our objectives with the Germans? Mr.
Schaetzel suggested that we should meet with
the Germans bilaterally rather than trilaterally. Mr. McNaughton expressed the view that
this was not as effective. Mr. Johnson stated that
State had no question but that the Germans were the key target, but we,
nevertheless, had the problem of how to deal with the Italian objections
to trilateralism.
Further expounding on Mr. McNamara’s views with respect to the Special Committee,
Mr. McNaughton said that Mr.
McNamara does see it as a
possible alternative to a hardware solution, that he is anxious to push
on to conclusions as rapidly as possible but that he (Mr. McNaughton) has cautioned Mr.
McNamara about pushing too
fast.
[Page 351]
General Seignious, seconded by General Goodpaster, pointed out that this
first set of briefings would give the Europeans a great deal to absorb.
General Goodpaster went on to
express his view that this sort of discussion with the Germans was quite
productive based on their experience with the German military. However,
he pointed out that it was going to take time for them to absorb US
thinking on these complex issues. Mr. Weiss and Mr.
Johnson agreed that it was going to take time.
General Goodpaster also stressed
that the Joint Chiefs would want to take a very careful look at the
proposal to put national representatives at SAC.
Mr. McNaughton said that he
personally liked the idea of discussing the ABM problem with the Germans, but thought that their
conclusion would be that ABM was just
fine for Germany and what do we do then? Mr.
Schaetzel supported the idea of discussing
ABMs with the Germans and the
British and felt they would be most interested.
General Goodpaster said it was
his view that the important thing is not what we discuss, but to engage
the Allies in real discussions. He personally felt, based on his
discussions with the German military, that there were some real
possibilities in the Special Committee if we really engage the Allies in
detailed discussion. He also felt it was healthy for them to know that
we do not know all the answers.
Mr. McNaughton said that the idea
of technical experts groups was a good one and that we ought to discuss
this at the Working Group III meeting this week. General
Seignious suggested that the expert groups
might well occupy themselves in absorbing the material presented at the
briefings. In response to a question from Mr.
Sloss, Mr. McNaughton said that they were not in a position to
distribute the material from the JCS
briefings. Thus, it was agreed that it would be useful to bring experts
here from the other member countries to study the briefing materials in
greater detail.
4. Action
- a.
- Mr. Spiers was asked to take the leadership
in developing and analyzing proposals for involving the allies in
nuclear planning and consultation.
- b.
- Mr. Weiss was asked to participate with
Defense in developing the first draft of a paper on tactical nuclear
weapons to be presented to the next meeting of Working Group
III.
- c.
- Mr. McNaughton said he
would explore further with Mr. McNamara the idea of experts groups to meet between
meetings of Working Group III.
