Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IX, International Development and Economic Defense Policy; Commodities

6. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson¹

Washington, April 2, 1964.

SUBJECT

• The Administration’s Argument on its AID Presentation

After the Rusk-McNamara lunch last week² you asked me to talk with Dave Bell about the AID presentation and the relation between his argument and Bob McNamara’s.³

Bell tells me that his own presentation was in line with your message and his talks with you: that there is no difference in principle between this year’s request for $3.4 and last year’s request for $4.5. His main argument is that this year we are asking only for what we know we will need, while last year our request was tailored to meet the possible requirements of countries with incompleted plans. The $1.1 billion difference is explained by $400 million in military aid, $150 million in the contingency request, $350 million in tighter estimates of the effective level of commitment, and $200 million by not respecting last year’s request for the addition of this amount to the Social Progress Trust Fund. So on his side Bell sticks to the notion that this is a lean budget which nevertheless will do what we now know to be necessary. He also sticks to the formula that we will come in for more money if and when we need it (and we well may in Brazil, for example).

Bell also reports that as soon as he learned of McNamara’s proposed testimony, he called Bob to raise the question whether it was consistent with your position. McNamara said he had already made his argument in the Armed Services Committee and would have to repeat it before the Foreign Aid Committee. The Washington Post editorial this morning shows the difficulty this puts us in, but Bell concedes that McNamara’s position may well protect the military side of the AID budget in political terms.

The hazard is, however, that the weight of any budgetary cutting will fall on the economic side, where the budget is lean indeed. Bell hopes that you will be ready to weigh in at the appropriate moment with the Committee Chairmen on this point. Unless instructed differently, he will continue with his own line of argument, and he leaves it to you whether McNamara’s special argument should be continued or modified.

My own view is that Bob has done what he quite often does—made the case his own way without checking with everybody else—but that we should not try to change his position for him right now.

The next question is what you should say if you get this one at a press conference. My suggestion is that your answer might be something like this:

1. The AID request as a whole is the bare minimum which is essential in the national interest. We will ask for more if events compel it.

2. Secretary McNamara has correctly stated that if we had any hope of getting any more money now from the Congress for military assistance, it would serve the national interest to have such additional funds. You have no reason to quarrel with Secretary McNamara’s estimate of the readiness of the Congress to provide such additional funds.

3. Neither the military nor the economic portions of the AID program can safely be cut this year. You decided to submit an AID program without padding, and that is what you have done.

McG. B.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Bundy Memos to the President, Vol. 1–4, 11/23/63–5/27/64, Box 1. No classification marking. A handwritten note on the source text by a White House secretary reads: “Rec’d 4/2/64.” The source text also bears the President’s initial.
2. President Johnson, Rusk, and McNamara met at 1 p.m. on March 24 at the White House for lunch. (Ibid., Rusk Appointment Books, 1964)
3. On March 23 and 24, Bell testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on H.R. 10502 to amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. McNamara testified the next day. For text of the testimonies, see Foreign Assistance Act of 1964: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 88th Congress, 2nd Session, on H.R. 10502, March 23–25, 1964, Part I, pp. 15–37 and 39–97.