Office of the Historian

302. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State1

Geneva, November 20, 1965, 1425Z.

TAGG 3611. For Governor Herter from Blumenthal. Brussels for USEC. Subject: Cotton textiles sector meeting Nov. 18. Ref: (A) TAGG 3506, (B) TAGG 3507.2

1.
Meeting continued discussion of Wyndham White package deal proposal (reftel A) started Oct 19 (reftel B). Amb Lall (India) supported by Amb Ayub (Pakistan) firmly maintained their countries earlier position: they unhappy with LTA, and not prepared to enter negotiations based on assumption that LTA would be renewed unchanged (i.e., WW proposal).
2.
US reiterated rationale for package deal stressing that no one committed to accept any one element of package unless satisfied on all [Page 749] elements. But we insisted that negotiating framework had to be established on balanced formula: what combination of tariff cuts and new, more liberal bilaterals aimed at improving access would permit renewal present LTA. This could also be stated inversely: on working hypothesis or assuming LTA renewed without change, what combination of tariff cuts and improved access through new bilaterals can be envisaged.
3.
India and Pakistan considered negotiating formula should involve negotiations on tariff cuts and liberalization after which negotiation would turn to question of whether LTA needed and if so what kind of arrangement; i.e., entire LTA would be opened up. Alternatively, they proposed simultaneous discussion tariff reduction, access and proposals for changes in LTA.
4.
Hong Kong position was more nuanced. It supported WW package deal but indicated text of LTA should not be sacrosanct. Package deal should envisage renewal of LTA “in its present essentials,” but not necessarily completely unchanged. HK rep indicated he recognized USG considered unilateral determination of market disruption as an essential of LTA. It remains apparent that HK anxious to push ahead with package deal, and that comments on LTA text aimed at achieving negotiating flexibility but not derailing package deal.
5.
Japan continued to support package deal but warned that negotiations aimed at improved access must get underway quickly.
6.
UK also continued to support package deal, although this support largely passive.
7.
EEC, in brief intervention, fully supported US position.
8.
US made clear inability reach agreement on package deal would affect ability importing countries discuss liberalization of administration at this time. Instead, we said, tendency would be to defer such action until after negotiations under Art. 8(d) of LTA, beginning not later than Sept 30, 1966.
9.
FYI—In separate conversations with WW, Hijzen and Ayub two points emerged:
A.
Ayub now sees advantages package deal approach and will attempt bring GOP along.
B.
Alternative to agreement now by all concerned on package deal would be for limited number of countries to start negotiations on basis WW proposal. This possibility becoming apparent to India and Pakistan, and may influence their positions. End FYI.
Tubby
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, INCO–COTTON GATT. Limited Official Use. Repeated to Brussels for USEC, Hong Kong, Karachi, London, New Delhi, Ottawa, Stockholm, and Tokyo and passed to the White House for Herter.↩
  2. Documents 289 and 290.↩