190. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for
Economic Affairs (Solomon) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach)1
Washington, October 27, 1967.
SUBJECT
-
COCOM Technology Procedure
REFERENCE
- Secretary Trowbridge’s
October 23 Letter2
The proposed reply at Tab A to the Commerce letter at Tab B reiterates
the points we made to Paul Nitze
and Paul Warnke in your office October 19.3 We still think we are on the right track and that
withdrawal of our proposal at this point would be
counter-productive.
Commerce might be receptive to a compromise whereby we withdrew both our
technology procedure proposal and our objection to the Czech computer
technology case. Defense would probably not agree to that solution. We
might eventually wish to revert to such a compromise but we believe it
would be premature now. At this point it appears that Commerce is
primarily interested in building a record evidencing their support of
effective COCOM controls (unlike we
non-patriotic types!).
Recommendation
It is recommended that you sign the letter at Tab A.
[Page 539]
Tab A
Washington, November 1, 1967.
Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to Secretary of
Commerce Trowbridge4
Dear Mr. Secretary:
Your letter of October 23 suggested withdrawal of the technology
proposal the United States recently submitted to COCOM. You state that the initial
COCOM discussions of this
proposal indicate that other COCOM
participating governments believe that the existing exceptions
procedure and the rule of unanimity apply to technology and that the
proposed new procedure would result in less control of technology. I
do not share your interpretation of these discussions. Indeed I
believe that the COCOM record (as
described in the enclosure to this letter),5 while inconclusive on some points, demonstrates
that the United States proposal would strengthen controls.
Administrative Principle 5, the existing COCOM agreement on technology, was carefully drafted
and is still interpreted to reflect the lack of legal bases in
member countries upon which to enforce controls. In the discussions
on the United States proposal, a COCOM record is being established that technology is at
least as important as hardware. This has already led to increased
recognition of the need to control technology. If we were to
withdraw our proposal, we would not only lose this momentum but also
move backwards as a result of the reaction of the French and others
which would follow.
The United States proposal is also serving as the vehicle for
breaking opposition in COCOM to
the principle of a China differential. Since our China trade control
objectives can be furthered by such a differential, this incidental
benefit may be of even more significance than the technology
procedure itself.
We are not ruling out any future change in the United States position
which might strengthen existing COCOM controls on technology. However, we are
encouraged by developments to date and believe that withdrawal of
our proposal would be counter-productive.
Sincerely yours,
Nicholas de B. Katzenbach
6
[Page 540]
Tab B
Washington, October 23, 1967.
Letter From Secretary of Commerce Trowbridge to the Under Secretary
of State (Katzenbach)7
Dear Mr. Katzenbach:
I have been reviewing the developments here and in COCOM regarding the proposal
submitted by the United States Government for a prior consultation
procedure on technology exceptions cases.
As you know, on July 24, 1967, the EDAC Chairman wrote to EDAC
members, stating that prior consultation in COCOM for technology cases without
the veto would strengthen technology controls, and would constitute
a greater degree of control over technology than has existed or is
likely to exist in the future.8 Commerce’s EDAC member replied on July 27, stating
“I find that I am unable to agree with your basic premise that
COCOM controls on technology
are virtually nonexist-ent.”8
When we met on September 15 to discuss this proposed approach to
COCOM on the control of
technology for computers and other embargo items, I, and I believe
the others, were clearly given to understand that this proposal for
a consultative procedure would strengthen COCOM controls over technology because no such controls
exist at present.9 On this basis we all agreed to the new
procedure.
Now I find that the initial COCOM
discussion of the U.S. procedural proposal has caused a number of
the more important COCOM
participating governments to place on record their views that this
new procedure would not strengthen, but would actually weaken, the
COCOM controls over
technology. In their opinion, the existing prior exceptions
clearance procedure and the rule of unanimity apply not only to
commodities on the embargo lists but also to the technology relating
to them.
In the COCOM discussion the
representatives of those governments expressed their views that this
proposed procedure would constitute a departure from the rule of
unanimity for technology exceptions cases, that it would result in
less control of technology than of commodities, that it would weaken
COCOM controls of technology
relating to international
[Page 541]
munitions and atomic energy embargo items unless the U.S. proposals
are amended, and that adoption of this new procedure for technology
would require automatic approval of exports of related components
and production equipment. All of this clearly indicates that
adoption of the U.S. procedural proposal on technology would have
serious adverse effects on existing COCOM controls.
The foregoing developments, which are illustrated by the enclosure to
this letter,10 prompt me to urge you and your Department to
reconsider the proposal on technology and to withdraw it from COCOM. Our government could explain
its withdrawal action on grounds that the COCOM discussion has clarified the existing COCOM technology controls, has
revealed the views of the other participating governments regarding
them, and has indicated that no change in the existing controls is
necessary.
Sincerely yours,
