174. Memorandum From Secretary of Commerce Connor to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1
SUBJECT
- NSAM 333: Follow-up on the Miller Report
We have reviewed, from the overall standpoint, State’s proposed East-West Trade Bill, as well as Tom Mann’s memorandum to you of June 17 and his accompanying summary and analysis of the bill.2
We agree that the Miller Committee’s report is fundamentally sound and offers a practical blueprint for achieving the President’s goal of increasing the flow of peaceful trade between Eastern Europe and our country.
On this basis we have no difficulty with State’s draft bill, in principle, since it is designed to carry out several of the Miller Committee’s important recommendations. I refer particularly to the proposals that the President be given authority to grant MFN treatment to imports from selected East European Communist countries, and that ways and means be found for developing Congressional public understanding and acceptance of the President’s program.
[Page 502]As I see it, there are two sensitive problems which this bill and Tom Mann’s memorandum raise at the threshold. They concern the highly important matters of timing and advance preparation.
The decision as to when this bill ought to be presented to Congress will, I presume, need to be attuned to the status of the hostilities in Viet Nam, along with reports on related activities and attitudes of the USSR and other East European Communist countries. Furthermore, since progress and fate of the bill in Congress could hinge on reports from Viet Nam or Eastern Europe which are not now foreseeable, there must be a delicate assessment of the risk that a delay or other setback could have on long-term implementation of this policy.
It is evident that passage of the Export Control Act extension must be accomplished before an East-West Trade Bill is discussed with Congress.
The other problem—that of advance preparation—brings up what I believe you will agree is one of the Miller Committee’s most significant recommendations. This is No. 14, which reads as follows:
“If trade with Communist countries is to be used for these objectives, the U. S. public, the Congress and the executive branch must have a thorough understanding of the problem, the opportunities that trade affords, and U. S. national objectives in this field. The U. S. Government should take every opportunity to make explicit what it intends to do and what it seeks to accomplish. It should act to remove any stigma from trade with Communist countries where such trade is determined to be in the national interest. The foreign policy advantages of such trade to the United States are not widely enough appreciated. With greater public awareness of both facts and objectives, the United States will be in a stronger position to use this trade as it must be used—for national purposes and to support national policy.”
I have noted State’s suggestion of the potential usefulness of the bill as a vehicle for developing Congressional and public understanding and acceptance. I believe its key provisions are too important, however, not to precede introduction of the bill by a substantial, thoroughgoing and carefully planned educational program. Indeed, I would like to see this recommendation of the Miller Committee developed, carried out, and its results tested before the bill is submitted to Congress.
If anything were needed to underscore the importance of this Committee recommendation regarding advance preparation, it is, I believe, the unfortunate events that led to Firestone’s withdrawal from negotiations with Rumania for the synthetic rubber plant.3
We note Mr. Mann’s comments that “business is solidly on the side of facilitating East-West trade.” While this is true among certain of the larger international corporations in this country, there are wide differences [Page 503] of opinion throughout the business community as a whole. We cannot assume that the entire business community will understand and support the objectives of this proposed legislation.
I have here limited my comments to what I consider basic matters. In addition, my people have already noticed a number of points of law and policy, which, I am sure you would want them to take up with State and the other interested agencies after the President has decided whether and when to go forward with a bill.
- Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316. Confidential. Copies were sent to Mann and Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance.↩
- Document 173 and footnote 4 thereto.↩
- On April 16, Firestone announced that it was withdrawing from these negotiations.↩
- Printed from a copy that indicates Connor signed the original.↩