150. Memorandum From Secretary of Commerce Hodges to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1
SUBJECT
- Quid Pro Quo from the Soviets
Following our conversation of yesterday I would like to specify for you the nature of quid pro quo which we might obtain from the Soviets for a relaxation of our trade restrictions—such as in the area of agricultural machinery.
To begin with, we would couch this shift in terms of a real, far-ranging objective of assisting the Soviets in conquering their agricultural problems through techniques, new seeds, and machinery, including plants for production of fertilizers and agricultural and food processing plants.
For this shift in policy, which would certainly be desired by the Soviets, we could gain little in the agricultural field save possibly their agreement to purchase larger quantities of various agricultural items (if we can decide on a real policy) or we might seek a specific quid pro quo on matters on which they are close to coming to an agreement with us but have not found the means of doing so, such as
- (1)
- patent and copyright protection in the USSR,
- (2)
- their participation in international commodity agreements,
- (3)
- opening of their markets to the less developed countries,
- (4)
- an agreement on a much wider policy on civil aviation extending further than the bilateral agreement which we have been working out with them for some time,
- (5)
- agreement on methods of handling commercial arbitration, and
- (6)
- participation in United Nations technical assistance committees.
These and other suggestions are included in a study by the State Department, May 25, 1961,2 and they have been under consideration by various administrations for some time, but we seem to make no headway on them.
I do not even mention the numerous other concessions which the Soviets might make in the political area which it would be useful for us to [Page 450] have. You know these from your vantage point better than we do. They could include lend lease, etc.
A longer range program of achieving an even wider agreement on trade with the Soviets was, of course, discussed interdepartmentally last year and a recommendation was made by President Kennedy and approved by him in August.3 It is within this wider framework of attempting to gain some political advantage for our relaxations that we feel some significant quid pro quo should be obtained if we agree to ship items which assist in solving their agricultural problems.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Trade, East-West, Vol. I [2 of 2], Box 49. Secret.↩
- Reference may be to an updated Department of State paper, “US Economic Relations with the Soviet Bloc,” which is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume V.↩
- See the memorandum from the Export Control Review Board to President Kennedy, August 15, 1963, ibid., vol. IX, pp. 733–737, and President Kennedy’s memorandum to the Export Control Review Board, September 19, 1963, ibid., p. 740.↩