Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume VIII, International Monetary and Trade Policy

365. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Japan¹

Washington, June 19, 1967, 9:05 p.m.

212730. GATT. Refs: A) Geneva 4261;² B) Tokyo 8962;³ C) Tokyo 8885.⁴ Please deliver following letter from President to Prime Minister Sato immediately, with request that Japan lift its reservation on food aid.

“Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Some months ago your Government and mine joined with other nations to meet the threat of famine in India. Together we were able to avoid disaster. The Government of Japan played a most positive and enlightened role in this historic effort.

Now, as you know, our representatives in Geneva are working on a grains agreement that would provide a more dependable mechanism for meeting the urgent food needs of the developing countries while they are taking the steps necessary to increase their own production. Not only would this agreement represent a long step toward the goal of providing reliable and substantial aid to countries in need of food, but it is for the United States an indispensable element in the balance of the entire negotiation.

I understand that Japan alone among the major participants in the negotiations has yet to pledge its quota in grain or cash equivalent. The failure of Japan to contribute to the program could, I fear, cause other countries to reconsider their position, and place the entire agreement in jeopardy. Moreover, it is now clear that none of the major parties accepted or will accept the proposed Japanese reservation.

The time is now very short for the further consideration which it was agreed would be given the question of Japanese participation when the Kennedy Round agreements were concluded in mid-May. I very much hope that your Government will find it possible to reconsider its position as a matter of urgency. I believe that a strong and active Japanese role is essential to a successful Kennedy Round and to an equitable and effective program to meet the urgent needs of the developing nations.

Accept, Mr. Prime Minister, my warmest personal good wishes.

Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson”

Discussion

At meeting of major participants Geneva June 16 all those present including EEC, UK, Canada, Nordic Countries, Director-General of GATT, as well as US, said the Japanese reservation had not been accepted either tacitly or explicitly. In light of the position other major participants took at this meeting regarding Japanese reservation on food aid, it appears that entire Kennedy Round is jeopardized by Japanese reservation (ref. A). While alternative proposed in State 202165⁵ would be acceptable to US we have no assurance it would be acceptable to other participants. Since time is very short and Japanese decision needed if possible for Wyndham White meeting in Geneva Tuesday, suggest you urge Japanese to meet their quota either in grain or cash equivalent ($14 million). Japanese benefits from overall Kennedy Round fully justify such move.

We could not accept Japanese access offer as substitute for food aid commitment and doubt that other major participants would.

Background info requested ref. C transmitted by separate cable.

Rusk

1. Source: Johnson Library, Bator Papers, Kennedy Round, May–June 1967, Box 12. Confidential; Immediate. The text of letter, drafted by Hedges, was received from the White House. The telegram was cleared by Hamilton (White House) (in draft), Katz (E/OT), Enders (M), and Sherrod McCall (S/S-S). Repeated to Geneva for the Mission.
2. Telegram 4261 from Geneva, June 16, provided a summary of a meeting between the heads of cereals delegations and Wyndham White on June 16. (Department of State, Central Files, AGR 15)
3. Telegram 8962 from Tokyo, June 17, described a meeting between the Embassy’s Economics Minister and Tsurumi, Director of Economic Affairs in the Japanese Foreign Office, on the food aid question. (Ibid., FT 13–2 US)
4. Telegram 8885 from Tokyo, June 13, requested guidance for making the most persuasive case to Miki on food aid. (Ibid., AGR 15)
5. Telegram 202165 to Tokyo, May 25, summarized Japan’s stated reservation on food aid in the agreement and its rejection of a proposed U.S. amendment in the Geneva talks, and urged Ambassador Johnson to make another personal appeal to Miki to reconsider Japan’s position. The first U.S. preference continued to be for Japan to contribute cash or grain in the full amount of its quota, which on the basis of 5 per cent of 4.5 million metric tons would be 225 thousand metric tons or about $14 million. Alternatively, it believed that other countries could be persuaded to accept the Japanese offer with the proposed U.S. amendment. (Ibid., FT 13–2 US)