Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume VIII, International Monetary and Trade Policy

344. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator) to President Johnson¹

Washington, April 28, 1967.

SUBJECT

• Scheduling Kennedy Round Decisions

Roth and Blumenthal will be back from Geneva from this Sunday night until Tuesday afternoon. I think it important for Bill and Mike and myself to give you a short briefing on where we stand, next Monday afternoon or, better, early Tuesday. This would not be a decision session. During the last part of next week, or early the following, we will have to put to you what may be very tough decisions—and I think you will find it useful to have a few days to turn over the problem in your mind. Also, I will need to have your thinking about procedure, especially on consulting on the Hill.

Situation Report

The crucial Common Market Ministerial Meeting will be next Tuesday. Bill and Mike (who has been our negotiator in Geneva, and is first-rate) will be going back to Geneva to get the results on Wednesday/Thursday. These will face us with some major decisions. (I will probably ask for decision meetings with you for late next week, or early the following.)

It is too early to forecast where the EEC will come out. But I am afraid they might well stonewall on two critical issues: (1) tariff reductions on non-grain agriculture (fruits, vegetables, tobacco, etc.); (2) a two-part arrangement in chemicals, to permit us to deal with the American Selling Price problem (ASP) separately from the rest of the Kennedy Round. If they do stonewall, we will probably want to escalate to a Foreign Ministers Meeting in Geneva early in the week of May 8.

In the end, if there is really no give, the basic choice will be:

(1) Settle with what little we can get in non-grain agriculture from the EEC, plus a good industrial bargain. (We would have a reasonable grains agreement and fairly valuable agricultural offers from other than the EEC.)

(2) Pull agriculture out of the negotiations completely, and strike an industrial bargain—despite what we have said about insisting on agriculture as well as industry, and despite the legislative history.

(3) Let the Kennedy Round die with no bargain whatever.

I will not here waste your time spelling out the pros and cons. There is still a chance that the choices will be more palatable. We will know better next week.

Procedure

Orville Freeman may call you to urge a larger cabinet session on Monday/Tuesday. I would strongly vote against this as premature. I think it important that Roth-Blumenthal have a chance to give you a quiet and full report. Roth is genuinely committed to your interests—he is truly Presidential, and your quarterback. In briefing you, he should not be inhibited by Orville arguing the Agriculture case—especially since if we have Agriculture we would have to have Commerce and Labor too, and there would be a serious problem of leaks. (By now I have done all my homework on this, so you will have an independent judgment.)

The time for hearing the views of your other advisers with special concerns will come when we face decisions—after we have the news from the EEC, and after I have given you a meticulous presentation of the elements of the problem. If Orville calls in about this, you might wish to say that you do not plan to make any decisions on Monday/Tuesday and, at the right time, will give him a full chance to speak his piece. (Incidentally, I am sure that in the clutch Orville personally will be eminently reasonable, despite enormous pressure from his bureaucrats. John Schnittker has been playing a most constructive role in our little command group, which has been working very well.)

Francis

1. Have Marvin set up an appointment with Roth, Blumenthal and Bator on Monday afternoon, or early Tuesday morning. (If possible, Tuesday morning would be better. Roth-Blumenthal will fill me in on Geneva after they get here Sunday night, and I can do a paper for night reading on Monday.)²

2. Speak to me

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Trade Negotiations, Kennedy Round, “Potatoes,” [2 of 2], Box 47. Secret; Strictly Eyes Only.
2. This option is checked, and a handwritten note by the President’s personal secretary reads: “phoned Bator that Pres. checked #1 and that memo was being given to M[arvin] W[atson]4–28–67 5:40 p.m.”