Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume VIII, International Monetary and Trade Policy

301. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 15, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Kennedy Round discussions regarding antidumping

PARTICIPANTS

• Treasury Department
  • Mr. Joseph Barr, Undersecretary
  • Mr. W. True Davis, Assistant Secretary
  • Mr. Merlyn Trued, Assistant Secretary for International Affairs
  • Mr. Joseph Bowman, Assistant to the Secretary for Congressional Relations
  • Mr. James Hendrick, Deputy Assistant Secretary
  • Mr. Ralph Hirschstritt, Deputy to the Assistant Secretary for International Affairs
• Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations
  • Mr. William Roth, Deputy Special Representative
  • Robert A. Burt, Assistant General Counsel

Mr. Roth stated that at a meeting on December 10, Secretary Fowler, Undersecretary Barr, Ambassador Blumenthal and he had discussed the question of the Kennedy Round discussions regarding dumping laws, and that he suggested the meeting today as a result of that earlier meeting.²

Mr. Roth explained that he believed an international agreement regarding dumping could be in the U.S. interest, since other countries, particularly the EEC, were now indicating greater interest in dumping laws, and since pressures for restrictive use of those laws could develop if, at the conclusion of a successful Kennedy Round, traditional trade barriers were substantially reduced. Serious international negotiation on dumping would also help persuade the Ways and Means Committee, particularly Chairman Mills, to postpone any action on the restrictive amendments to our dumping law.³

Mr. Barr asked the history of previous international discussions on dumping. Mr. Hirschstritt responded that over the past few years, several meetings have been held at which U.S. practices have been criticized. Mr. Roth stated that in the past other countries have insisted that we unilaterally change our dumping law, but that we have persuaded the U.K. in particular that the best possibility for U.S. action is a multilateral agreement to which a number of countries would be bound. The U.K. decision to submit a draft international code is therefore a significant change from the past.

In responding to this draft code, Mr. Roth continued, we have felt that all issues should be open for negotiation and that our discussions should not be limited to justifying our present dumping law. We are aware, of course, of the difficulties in getting Congress to change our present law. But these difficulties are no reason to refuse to discuss possible changes internationally. We have taken the same position regarding international discussion of other non-tariff barriers, such as American Selling Price. We can decide whether to accept any changes in our law when we arrive at a final negotiated package. For example, other countries have criticized our withholding of appraisement practices, and want these changed; whether we can agree to this should depend on the final terms of a proposed international agreement. But the only acceptable negotiating position at this stage is freely to discuss all issues. In this connection, we wanted to submit a paper at the next Working Group meeting raising fundamental questions regarding dumping without suggesting to the U.K. that we were ignoring their Draft Code.

Mr. Hirschritt stated that he had some difficulty with our proposed paper, because he felt that some of the questions appeared to prejudice the answers. Mr. Burt responded that we intended the questions to be wholly neutral, and that any apparent prejudgment was only a drafting problem.

Mr. Davis asked STR’s view of the timing of the negotiations. Mr. Burt replied that we hoped other countries would respond positively to our suggestion regarding exploration of basic questions, and that, if such response was forthcoming, the next several meetings of the Working Group would be devoted to further exploration possibly on the basis of other countries’ submissions in addition to ours. But there was a risk that the other countries would think we were merely stalling, and they might be reluctant to agree to such exploration. We must persuade them that we are serious.

Mr. Roth stated that we hoped at this meeting today to make sure that STR and the Treasury were on the same wave-length, and to reach mutual agreement that international discussions should be carried out as we proposed.

Mr. Barr stated that, in his view, Mr. Roth’s position was reasonable, and he was sure that agreement could be reached on a paper such as Mr. Roth had in mind.

Mr. Hendrick asked why a paper raising questions about dumping shouldn’t also include questions based on U.S. law. Mr. Roth replied that we didn’t want our paper to appear as simply a justification for present U.S. law, but that we should certainly discuss U.S. law, as background to the fundamental questions we raise, at the Working Group meeting.

The question was then raised regarding the manner in which any change in U.S. law would be sent to Congress, whether by treaty or direct amendment. In the course of discussion, it was noted that the Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee have more understanding of dumping questions than the Foreign Relations Committees, through which a treaty would go.

Mr. Barr asked whether White House clearance was necessary to submit the proposed paper and embark on these international discussions. Mr. Roth responded that STR had general White House approval to discuss internationally the entire area of non-tariff barriers. Further White House clearance was not necessary until we came close to an agreement.

Mr. Barr asked whether the U.S. paper would be made public. Mr. Roth responded that the paper would be a negotiating document restricted to GATT member governments, and that the record of confidentiality has been generally good. In addition, Mr. Roth stated, we don’t give the texts of U.S. submissions to our Congressional delegates, but rather give them summaries of the status of negotiations in particular matters.

1. Source: Kennedy Library, Herter Papers, Antidumping, Box 5. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Robert A. Burt on December 17. The source text bears Herter’s handwritten initials.
2. No record of this December 10 meeting has been found.
3. Regarding the antidumping law, see footnote 3, Document 231.