Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume VIII, International Monetary and Trade Policy

233. Letter From the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (Herter) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, April 8, 1964.

Dear Dean:

We have reached the point in our preparations for the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations where we must begin formally the process of deciding which products the United States may have to except from the linear tariff reductions. I am writing to describe the procedures by which I think we might best undertake this task, which is so critical in terms both of the negotiations’ success and of domestic sensitivity.

There are several general considerations about exceptions which I would also like to mention, since this subject will loom increasingly large in the months ahead. First, as you know, the GATT Ministers agreed last year that exceptions should be confined to “a bare minimum” and should be subject to international “confrontation and justification.”² No numerical ceiling has been placed on countries’ exception lists, but I feel that we must limit our exceptions to cases of clear and pressing necessity if this round of negotiations is to be successful. If we should submit a substantial list of exceptions, we cannot doubt that some countries would seize this opportunity to undermine the scope of the negotiations even further, placing the blame on us. As you know, the United States has played the leading role in bringing these negotiations about and moving them forward. It would be a severe blow to the negotiations themselves and to our prestige as a leader in trade liberalization if we were to undercut all we have said by tabling an extensive exceptions list.

Therefore, I think it is imperative that each agency, in suggesting items to be expected, should make every effort to keep its list very short and should prepare thorough written justifications for any products which they do recommend. These justifications must be persuasive and well documented, because they are essential to support our position in the “confrontation and justification” procedure.

The security problem regarding exceptions will inevitably be severe. We plan to limit documents on exceptions to the narrowest possible distribution, and I hope that in each agency the number of people who come into contact with exceptions lists can also be carefully restricted. One important point in this connection was made in the President’s memorandum of December 20, 1963, to you on this subject: The exception lists will not be definitive until after the process of confrontation and justification, and no official of the Government should make or imply any commitments on specific products.³ You can imagine the extreme difficulties that would be caused if our initial exceptions list were to become prematurely known, either to other countries or to domestic interests, especially in a period just prior to a Presidential election.

With these points in mind, I am establishing the following procedure to draw up our initial exceptions list:

1. The Trade Staff Committee (TSC) will begin consideration late this month of proposed exceptions, which your agency will be asked to submit, along with written justifications, in advance. The Chairman of the TSC will have available a single copy of the Tariff Commission’s advice to the President, which he will make known to the TSC as each proposed exception is discussed.

2. After the TSC has acted, its recommendations will be submitted to this Office and considered by the Trade Executive Committee (TEC).

3. After consideration by the TEC, this Office will prepare its recommendations, of which you will be notified before they are transmitted to the President. The initial U.S. exceptions list will subsequently be subjected to international confrontation and justification, but final determination will always rest with the President.

I hope that we can begin work on this problem soon.

Best, as ever,

Chris

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, FT 13–2 US. Secret. Attached to the source text is a memorandum from Trezise to the Acting Secretary of State, April 16, indicating, among other things, that identical letters were sent to the Secretaries of Defense, Commerce, Agriculture, Labor, the Interior, and the Treasury. Also attached to the source text is a letter from Acting Secretary Ball to Herter, April 20, assuring him of the Department of State’s “full cooperation in the preparation and handling of these lists.”
2. Reference is to the resolution adopted at the Ministerial meeting of the GATT Contracting Parties at Geneva, May 21, 1963; see footnote 2, Document 228.
3. The President’s December 20 memorandum has not been found.