Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968–January 1969

270. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, January 4, 1969, 1230Z.

154. Ref: A. Paris 0038 (Delto 1116);² B. Paris 0042 (Delto 1117);³ C. State 00954 (Todel 1911).⁴

1. I realize the need to get more flexibility into Vance’s instructions and will do what I can. I do not think it advisable for me to see Thieu as the next step here. Instead this morning I sent Berger and Herz to talk to Foreign Minister Thanh and Presidential Assistant Duc on the results of the Vance-Lau meeting (see septel)⁵ and this afternoon I called on Ky, accompanied by Berger.⁶ I thought it better to prepare the ground with them before seeing Thieu, and let them work on him for a day or so.

2. I don’t think we shall be able to get Thieu to agree to the full authority we asked for in the original statement we submitted to the GVN, but it may be possible to get him to agree on a continuous circle without baize, and perhaps go a little further on the speaking order in the direction of including ABAB, as an additional alternative. Ky remarked that the difference between a piece of baize and no baize is hardly something we can fight for, and he also mentioned that the easiest solution to the speaking order problem is simply toss a coin, or let the other side speak first. He said he would discuss both with Thieu.

3. At the morning meeting with Thanh and Duc, they at first took the position that the other side was intransigent and we should wait before making any further move. By the time the meeting ended, however, they saw the danger of this course. Berger asked them to take another look at our original proposed instructions to see how much further they could go, arguing that the greater Vance’s flexibility the better would be the outcome. They promised to have another look, particularly at the unbroken circular table and at the ABAB formula, and to discuss the whole matter with Thieu this afternoon, if they could get to him.

4. I hope to hear something from the Foreign Minister or Ky tomorrow, but if by Monday morning we have heard nothing I will ask to see Thieu, or ask for a joint meeting. I told Ky, and Berger told the Foreign Minister, that we would like a joint meeting on next steps as soon as they have finished studying the Vance-Lau exchange, and the NLF statement.

5. Given Thieu’s past performance, his caution and stubbornness, he may land us, and himself, in trouble again by taking too long to come to a decision. Even if we can persuade him to give Vance more room for bargaining, he may feel he cannot do this without first going to the NSC and the leaders of the Assembly.

6. There is a feeling here in top GVN circles that we have not sufficiently publicized to the American public the importance we attach to the two-sided nature of the new talks, and that in the argument over table shapes this fundamental issue is being lost. I think we should be making a strong public case that the war in Viet-Nam is between two sides and not between four sides, and that the conference arrangements must reflect this. If we make this public case, if we show why the enemy’s attempts to put the NLF on a basis of equality with the GVN go the heart of the conflict, I think the GVN will find it much easier to go along in accepting the round table because they will be better convinced that we stand with them on the principle that is involved in the current impasse. The Secretary’s press conference, just received, is very helpful in this connection.

7. I have two further thoughts. I think we might propose to Thieu that as between the circular table divided by baize, and the unmarked table, this is not an issue on which we can long stand, and we might propose to Hanoi that we draw lots on the two. My second proposal is to push Ky’s thought that the other side can start on the AABB formula. Would like Paris and Washington views.

Bunker

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-January 1969. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/HARVAN Plus. Received at 6:20 a.m. Repeated to Paris for the Vietnam Mission.
2. See footnote 2, Document 268.
3. Document 269.
4. Dated January 3. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, HARVAN Paris Todel-Paris Delto, Vol. XVIII)
5. Regarding this meeting, see Document 268.
6. Bunker reported further on this meeting in telegram 160 from Saigon, January 5. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, HARVAN Chronological, Vol. XXVI)