Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968–January 1969

194. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas¹

Washington, November 4, 1968, 2214Z.

CAP 82683. I have just returned from a meeting of over an hour with Sec. Rusk and Sec. Clifford on the China matter.

1. With respect to the passage of the transcript which I had them read, they agreed that Nixon appeared clear in mind that the talks might not begin and you had made clear that they might not begin. We noted, however, that the immediately following statement could have induced some further ambiguity which Nixon did not follow up at the time: “Dick, the talks will be held. We have a firm agreement that the North Vietnamese will bring the NLF in and the South Vietnamese will be permitted to attend.”²

2. With respect to McCloskey,³ pursuant to your instructions Sec. Rusk and Sec. Clifford agreed to instruct him to say to Saville Davis: “Obviously I’m not going to get into this kind of thing in any way, shape or form.” He was so instructed in the presence of the two Secretaries and myself. Having returned to my office, I have just received a report from McCloskey on his interview with Saville Davis. Saville Davis began by saying: “I assume you will not be able to comment on this.” He then showed McCloskey the story which was along the lines familiar to you. The story was headed by Beverly Deepe: “This must be checked with the Nixon people before publication.”⁴

Saville Davis volunteered that his newspaper would certainly not print the story in the form in which it was filed; but they might print a story which said Thieu, on his own, decided to hold out until after the election.

Incidentally, the story as filed is stated to be based on Vietnamese sources, and not U.S., in Saigon.

3. With respect to the body of information that we now have available, all three of us agreed to the following propositions:

• —The information sources must be protected and not introduced into domestic politics.
• —Even with these sources, the case is not open and shut. On the question of the “public’s right to know,” Sec. Rusk was very strong on the following position: we get information like this every day, some of it very damaging to American political figures. We have always taken the view that with respect to such sources there is no public “right to know.” Such information is collected simply for the purposes of national security.
• —So far as the information based on such sources is concerned, all three of us agreed: (A) Even if the story breaks, it was judged too late to have a significant impact on the election. (B) The viability of the man elected as President was involved as well as subsequent relations between him and President Johnson. (C) Therefore, the common recommendation was that we should not encourage such stories and hold tight the data we have.

Immediately following is a further item which just came in. (I assume that Bui Diem brought her in to tell her about Saville Davis’ visit.)

“On the morning of November 4, 1968, Mrs. Anna Chennault traveled in her Lincoln Continental from her residence to the Vietnamese Embassy where she remained for approximately thirty minutes and thereafter went to room two zero five, seventeen zero one, Pennsylvania Avenue, arriving shortly after eleven am.

Room two zero five, seventeen zero one Pennsylvania Avenue is unmarked; however, pretext inquiry of a nearby office elicited response that room two zero five is a Nixon office.

A source who has furnished reliable information in the past advised that at eleven thirty five am, a representative of the Vietnamese Embassy talked with Mrs. Chennault and said that the Ambassador would like to see Mrs. Chennault in ten or fifteen minutes. Mrs. Chennault stated she could be reached at telephone number two nine eight nine zero one six.

Shortly after noon, Mrs. Chennault departed seventeen zero one Pennsylvania Avenue and proceeded via cab to the Vietnamese Embassy where she remained for approximately ten minutes. Upon leaving the Vietnamese Embassy, she walked to the Chinese Embassy, twenty three eleven Massachusetts Avenue, arriving twelve twenty pm.

A second source who has furnished reliable information in the past advised that at twelve twenty one pm a representative of the Chinese Embassy summoned a cab. The same source advised that several minutes later, Mrs. Chennault contacted her own office stating that she would come to her office in a few minutes.

A cab picked up Mrs. Chennault shortly after twelve thirty pm and took her to the Investment Building, fifteen eleven K Street, Northwest.

A third source who has furnished reliable information in the past advised that telephone number two nine eight nine zero one six is listed to the Women’s Advisory Committee, Suite ten forty two, Investment Building, fifteen eleven K Street, Northwest, and is an auxiliary line from a private branch exchange (switchboard) at seventeen zero one Pennsylvania Avenue, Northwest. It is an unlisted number.

Ten forty two Investment Building is the office of the Claire L. Chennault foundation.”

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. IV [1 of 3]. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only; Deliver Direct to the President. Received at the LBJ Ranch at 5:10 p.m. The notation “ps” on the telegram indicates that the President saw it.
2. See Document 166.
3. Robert J. McCloskey, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs.
4. Telegram 268107/Todel 1500 to Saigon and repeated to Paris, November 7, transmitted the Department’s analysis of an article entitled “Recalcitrant Saigon Hopes for Better Deal” by Beverly Deepe, Saigon correspondent for The Christian Science Monitor. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Paris Peace Conference, Todel Chron., November 1968)