181. Editorial Note
At 9:18 p.m. on November 2, 1968, President Johnson telephoned Senator Everett Dirksen. The Daily Diary records that “Secy. Clifford suggested the President call Sen. Dirksen re stories going around that Nixon people spreading rumors to wait on peace negotiations.” (Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary) The President explained to Dirksen that he had called him because “we’re skirting on dangerous ground, and I thought I ought to give you the facts and you ought to pass them on if you choose. If you Don’t, why then I will a little later.” He emphasized that several times during mid and late October Thieu had agreed to the bombing halt understanding, but pointed out to Dirksen that actions on the Republican side had impacted upon the negotiations: “Then we got some of our friends involved, some of it your old China crowd, and here’s the latest information we got. The [FBI] agent says that she’s—they’ve just talked to the ‘boss’ in New Mexico, and he says that ‘you must hold out’—just hold on until after the election. Now, we know what Thieu is saying to them out there. We’re pretty well-informed on both ends. Nixon’s man traveling with him today said quote ‘that he did not understand that Thieu was not aboard.’”
Johnson stressed that he had requested that both Dirksen and Nixon have Republican supporters cease their overtures to the South Vietnamese Government. “Now, I’m reading their hand, Everett,” Johnson noted. “I don’t want this to get in the campaign. And they oughtn’t to be doing this. This is treason.” He criticized Republicans like Bryce Harlow for making the public statement: “We had the impression that all the diplomatic ducks were in a row,” a statement that implied a political motive on the administration’s part. The conversation continued:
“President: Now I can identify them because I know who’s doing this. I don’t want to identify it. I think it would shock America if a principal candidate was playing with a source like this on a matter this important. I don’t want to do that. But if they’re going to put this kind of stuff out, they ought to know that we know what they’re doing. I know who they’re talking to and I know what they’re saying. And my judgment is that Nixon ought to play it just like he has all along, that I want to see peace come the first day we can, that it’s not going to affect the election one way or the other. The conference is not even going to be held until after the election. They have stopped shelling the cities. They have stopped going across the DMZ. We’ve had 24 hours of relative peace. Now, if Nixon keeps the South Vietnamese away from the conference, well, that’s going to be his responsibility. Up to this point, that’s why they’re not there. I had them signed on board until this happened.
[Page 524]“Dirksen: Yeah, OK.
“President: Well, now, what do you think we ought to do about it?
“Dirksen: Well, I better get in touch with him, I think, and tell him about it.
“President: I think you better tell him that his people are saying to these folks that they oughtn’t to go through with this meeting. Now if they Don’t go through with the meeting, it’s not going to be me that’s hurt. I think it’s going to be whoever is elected, and may be—my guess—him. And I think they’re making a very serious mistake, and I don’t want to say this, and you’re the only one I’m going to say it to.
“The conversation concluded:
“President: I know this—that they’re contacting a foreign power in the middle of a war.
“Dirksen: That’s a mistake.
“President: And it’s a damn bad mistake. Now I don’t want to say so, and you’re the only man I have confidence in to tell them. But you better tell them they better quit playing with it. And the day after the election I’ll sit down with all of you and try to work it out and be helpful. But they oughtn’t to knock out this conference.
“Dirksen: Whoever they are, I’ll try to get ahold of them tonight.
“President: Well, there are two things they ought to do. One is—they ought to stop this business about trying to keep the conference from taking place. It takes place the day after the election. The second thing is—we can all sit down and talk about it after that time. And I’m not a bitter partisan here. You know it.
“Dirksen: I know. Well, I’ll try to find them, wherever they are tonight.
“President: Well, you just tell them their people are messing around in this thing, and if they Don’t want it on the front pages, they better quit it, number one. Number two, they—we better sit down and talk about it as soon as this thing is over with, and we’ll try to work it out. And they ought to tell their people that are contacting these embassies to go on with the conference.
“Dirksen: Right.
“President: OK.
“Dirksen: I agree.
“President: OK. Bye.”
This transcript was prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Dirksen, November 2, 1968, 9:29 p.m., Tape F68.09, PNO 1)
[Page 525]In a note to the President, November 2, 5:55 p.m., Special Assistant Jim Jones noted that Secretary of State Rusk believed that the press should be given a background briefing on the China Lobby’s interference as the reason for the uncertainty regarding South Vietnamese participation at the Paris conference. He also recorded the view of Special Assistant Walt Rostow:
“Walt’s opinion is that: a) there should be a press backgrounder tonight; b) then if the story is played significantly tomorrow, Mansfield and Dirksen should be brought in and shown all the evidence we have concerning Saigon playing the U.S. political game; and that someone in the Nixon entourage (but not accuse Nixon himself) is playing with South Vietnam. Mansfield and Dirksen should be told this is a most serious national and constitutional problem and both Senators should be asked to go to Nixon and urge him not to press forward saying he was misled by the President. They should tell Nixon that if he does press forward in this, then he will reveal the evidence which will destroy him and any effectiveness he would have if he’s elected. His first duty is to tell Saigon to get their delegation to Paris as fast as possible.” (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. IV [2 of 3])