Office of the Historian

155. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam1

Washington, October 30, 1968, 1850Z.

263813. This cable is to confirm the following points made in Secretary Rusk’s secure telephone conversation with Ambassador Bunker at 1300 (Washington time) Wednesday.2

1.
The President is prepared to give Ambassador Bunker the extra time requested by ordering cessation of bombing to take effect 2400 (Saigon time) on Thursday October 31, if—(a) Ambassador Bunker thinks there is a 50-50 chance of improving the situation with the additional time; and (b) Thieu can be prevented from “blowing the situation” with the speech he is taping on Thursday evening or in some other manner. Otherwise the President is prepared to order cessation of bombing at an earlier time.
2.
In discussing the situation with Thieu Amb. Bunker will be able to give him assurances that:
(a)
The secret minute requirement has been withdrawn by the DRV in Paris today;3
(b)
We are prepared to give him the extra time needed until the first expanded meeting in Paris next Wednesday November 6;
(c)
We will make public that our view of the NLF is the same as Saigon’s;
(d)
We are prepared to give the GVN the leading role in all matters which come up in Paris involving SVN internal affairs; and
(e)
We are prepared to work with the DRV on procedural matters for the November 6 meeting in advance of that meeting.
3.
At the same time you should make clear to Thieu that “if he breaks with us, we are finished.” “The American people will not take this.”
4.
Having received your views on the foregoing by phone already, we will attempt to convey to you the President’s views on these issues in time for your next meeting with Thieu, which we understand will be at “daybreak”.
Rusk
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-October 1968. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/HARVAN Double Plus. Repeated to Paris for the delegation as Todel 1412. Drafted from a telephone conversation between Rusk and Bunker, cleared by Read, and approved by Rusk.↩
  2. According to Rusk’s appointment book, he spoke briefly with Bunker over secure telephone from Read’s office beginning at 12:45 p.m. (Johnson Library, Dean Rusk Appointment Books, 1968-1969)↩
  3. In telegram 41539 from Saigon, October 30, Bunker noted that he had not told Thieu about the secret minute because of suspicions about U.S. motives that would arise among the GVN leadership. He also recommended that the Department instruct the Paris delegation to request that the DRV modify the secret minute, “for unless the last sentence is removed the secret minute could blow up on us in the most dangerous manner.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-October 1968)↩