Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968–January 1969

119. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State¹

Paris, October 24, 1968, 2332Z.

22913/Delto 876. From Vance.

1. I met briefly with Oberemko evening October 24 at Soviet Embassy. Negroponte was also present. Oberemko had met with North Vietnamese delegation and appeared well informed on the present state of play.

2. I told Oberemko we had met for four hours in a very difficult session and that there was sharp disagreement between us at the end of the meeting centering on: (A) The time of cessation; (B) DRV insistence on inclusion of words “without conditions” in proposed minute; (C) Description of participation. I told Oberemko that we had reported to our government what had transpired at today’s meeting and were awaiting further instructions from Washington.²

3. Oberemko then said that, although there was disagreement, he believed that we were not so far apart that it was impossible to reach a compromise. Oberemko said he thought that the United States should agree to latest DRV formulation on participation issue, i.e., naming of four participants without reference to two sides or four parties. I responded by repeating what we had proposed and said I felt our position was a reasonable one.

4. Upon the inclusion of the term “without conditions,” Oberemko urged that we agree to this in a secret minute. Oberemko said that agreement to “without conditions” should be viewed in overall context of the proposed minute which, as a result of today’s meeting, would include “on the basis of our discussions.” Oberemko said he had been shown the exact wording which we had supplied the North Vietnamese. He said, “I know your position. You’ve got it there. Everyone knows what it means.”

5. On the issue of date, Oberemko said that previously the DRV position on the interval between the cessation of bombing and the start of conversations was two weeks. Now it was ten days, and he thought it would be possible to find a compromise which would be acceptable. I said that as I had told him previously, this was a matter of the utmost importance to my government and that our position was two or three days.

6. Oberemko said that he thought we were very close to a solution and that he hoped we would be able to find a way to reach it. He said, as I knew, his government was deeply interested in finding a solution and that he was acting under the instructions of his government. I said we appreciated his efforts and that I would be in touch with him when there was something to talk about.³

Harriman

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-October 1968. Secret; Flash; Nodis/HARVAN Double Plus. Received at 8:11 p.m.
2. See Document 116.
3. A report by Read on a telephone call from Vance at 5:30 p.m. noted: “Oberemko said he had visited the DRV delegation after the private meeting today. Vance started to say that they had had some tough bargaining and Oberemko cut in to say that he knew all about the meeting. Oberemko told Vance that when we got agreement on including the words ‘on the basis of our discussions’—‘You (Vance and Harriman) have got it there. Everyone knows what that means.’ Oberemko urged us to find a middle ground on the remaining language and time differences.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. II [2 of 2]) In a covering note transmitting Read’s report to the President, October 24, 6:05 p.m., Rostow wrote: “This fellow Oberemko really knows what the negotiation is about.” (Ibid.)