Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

86. Notes of Meeting¹

Washington, February 26, 1966, 1:10 p.m.

PRESENT

• President, Rusk, McNamara, Vance, Wheeler, Marks, Bundy, Vice President, Raborn, Helms, Gaud, Johnson, Rostow, Unger, Komer, Valenti²

President: Want to meet in limited time on Vietnam—maybe every Saturday—during week—(make) sure weʼre doing everything we need to do.

Going to pick someone to be assistant to President or Secretary (of State) to be Porterʼs counterpart on peace. Special Assistant to Secretary, probably. Assume no irritation from Pentagon. Will pick him in next three or four days.

Lots of talk about pacification. Thrilled about General Walt. What heʼs doing makes you proud. Work being done by Marines on health, reconstruction, schools.

General Greene was very cooperative. Tribute to military. Need this special assistant in Washington to carry out peace plans.

Any requests from Freeman?

Bundy: Will come in Monday.³

Need organization to match Porterʼs. We need that here.

Marks: Gaud will put up money to get TV going in Vietnam.

President: What about TV sets?

Marks: Hope to assemble sets there. Hope Japanese will contribute sets.

Bundy: Need senior American to advise on economic (matters) and inflation. Robert Nathan is our choice.

President: Vice President talk to him.

Bundy: He ought not to be under Charles Mann. Report directly to Lodge and Porter.

Rusk: President of Security Council at UN has letter to U Thant—amounts to resignation of UN from problem.⁴

Had hassle over paragraph on mutual reduction of arms. Africans didnʼt want mutual because of our bombing. That is now out.

Morse will call for meeting of Assembly but Assembly will do exactly what Security Council did.

President: Let Goldberg find forum to explain this.

Rusk: Would be inopportune to hold debate.

Bundy: Get Goldberg to hold press conference next week with State Department auditorium.

President: Think it ought to be this afternoon, otherwise newsmen will draw conclusions.⁵

Bundy: One loose end in public opinion. Hanson Baldwin article.⁶

McNamara: Statement will be ready Monday. Have to get Times. To be printed in entirely.

Vice President: If statements are ready ahead of time, I can do work quietly with key Congressmen.

Bundy: Resolution matter—President put rose on Morse—willing to have that issue joined.

Raborn: Meeting didnʼt go as planned.⁷ Committee members interested in what I had to say. But Chairman cut it off and asked questions aimed at finding out how we got our intelligence. Need to equate intelligence with sources of intelligence. McCarthy tried to get me to admit that F.R. (Foreign Relations) members ought to be on Russellʼs committee. Pell interested we didnʼt overdo covert action. Hickenlooper and Symington came to my rescue.

Gaud: Have you read my memo?⁸

President: Havenʼt read it yet. Didnʼt want to predict at press conference any length of time—or victory.

Wheeler: Military actions at same tempo in past. Several satisfactory events—though nothing dramatic to herald a change.

Rolling Thunder in North hampered by bad weather lately.

President: Want Goodpaster to be in touch with Ike. Want Goodpaster to know what you know. Ridgway seemed to support us. Yet Fulbright used Ridgway letter to hit us.

McNamara: I think Ridgway letter is a difference.

President: Why donʼt we send bright colonels to see Bradley and others—and get their statements out.

Wheeler: Gavin wants no part of this anymore. Heʼs ready to retire. Itʼs one of these things where heʼs a writer and didnʼt realize it was going to cause a stir.

President: He thinks heʼs an authority or geo-political expert. Thinks we canʼt afford to keep commitments around the world.

Rusk: Kennan had the same view when he was on Policy Planning Staff. Believes Asia is not worth it.

Bundy: He got in trouble with Russia and Yugoslavia. Wholly unfit for operational duty.

President: Why donʼt we do a real study on brown men—and Asia—Task Force on Asia—heavy thinking on Asia—potentialities and solutions—build it up—Asian Task Force. That group ought to be getting up recommendations on what we ought to be saying and doing.

Rostow: In wake of Asian Development Bank—Asia CIAP—ought to challenge that group of Asian planners. Would force this Asia CIAP over and above the bank. Need challenge from you to get it going.

President: Perhaps a number of Asian leaders coming here could request us to join with them. Have our group staff an Asian Task Force. Then try to allow Asians to do these things on their own.⁹

Rusk: Might want to bring in Arthur Dean, and let him take over.

Komer: New York business community feels if we are going to spend $10 billion—let elections take place—and then bug out—then we ought to get out now.¹⁰

President: It was shocking to RFK that after conferring with LBJ aides, he was judged to be wrong.

Vice President: Jack and I agree with Rostowʼs assessment—they want to do something on their own. Maybe by the time Black goes out, the Task Force will have something to give him.

McNamara: Russell feels strongly about three things:

1. Resolution giving President the power.

2. Calling up the Reserves.

3. Bombing Haiphong POLs.

Rusk: First thing in Korean war to unleash Stu Symington.

Vice President: Morse repeal resolution will not get four votes. Morse, Gruening—maybe Burdick, Young. Counter-resolution will lose more votes.

Moyers: Latest in Harris Poll. American people want honorable end. Two to one to see it through. More in a split—hawks and doves. Support has dwindled—63 per cent to 49 per cent.

Fifty-one fair or poor handling. Policy fails to satisfy either group. Sixty-seven (January) to sixty-two (February) in job rating.

Gallup—59 to 62 in job rating.

Doves—10 per cent. Hawks—16 per cent, up from 12 per cent.

Great bulk are in between. As result administration is being criticized from both ends.

President is either not moving strong enough or too strong.

• January ʼ65—41 per cent excellent or good.
• March ʼ65—60 per cent. Pleiku.
• May ʼ65—57 per cent.
• July ʼ65—65 per cent.
• September ʼ65—66 per cent.
• October ʼ65—65 per cent.
• December ʼ65—66 per cent. Dec. pause.
• January ʼ66—63 per cent.
• February ʼ66—49 per cent.

In February:

• Disagree with policy (carry war to North Vietnam)—16 per cent.
• Agree with policy (increased military effort in South)—33 per cent.
• Agree with policy (negotiate)—34 per cent.
• Disagree (pull out)—9 per cent.
• Not sure—8 per cent.

Those who changed—big shift: those who agree but want more bombings—those who agree but want negotiations.

First signs of American impatience with long war.

President lost five points in popularity:

• —Vietnam
• —Cost of living

1. Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. The time and place of the meeting is from the President Daily Dairy. (Ibid.) For Bromley Smithʼs notes of the same meeting, see Document 85.
2. “Johnson” refers to U. Alexis Johnson. According to the Presidentʼs Daily Diary, Moyers and Bromley Smith also attended. (Ibid.)
3. February 28.
4. See footnote 2, Document 85.
5. See footnote 3, Document 85.
6. See footnote 4, Document 85.
7. See footnote 5, Document 85.
8. Not further identified.
9. See footnote 6, Document 85.
10. Komer summarized the views of the New York business community on Vietnam, as reported by Arthur Dean, in a February 23 memorandum to McGeorge Bundy. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos)