81. Telephone Conversion Between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk1
Rusk: I will call Mac [Bundy] and see whether he feels that heʼs been over the testimony and knows your view on these matters.
President: Whatʼs your evaluation of the Kennedy statement?2
Rusk: I think itʼs bad myself. I was surprised at what it had after Bob told me that he thought it wouldnʼt cause us much trouble.
President: I think itʼs tragic. I just think itʼs tragic. Everybody Iʼve talked to thinks the same thing. Itʼs so presumptuous. Some of the things he says—one of the first things is, he says that he doesnʼt want the Russians and the Communists to be over-gleeful and expect him to be elected President because if he were elected President it wouldnʼt mean that heʼd have an easy surrender himself. Ever hear of anything that presumptuous? Listen to this [reading]:3 “The Senator in effect warned Russia, China, and North Vietnam not to anticipate a turn of events in which he would become President and quickly end the war on terms more favorable to the Communist side.” Well hell, he donʼt have to become President to do that—thatʼs what heʼs trying to do now.
Rusk: No, I think it has greatly weakened our position with Hanoi and it prolongs the war actually. Itʼs another one of those things that keeps the other side going.
President: And I think it means a majority in the Senate against us, Dean. I honestly think that. I think that the Bayhs, and the Tydings, and the two Kennedys, and the Muskies—the general Catholic operation there—when the chips are down they will pick up enough Cases and perhaps a Javits, with the New York Times leveling that way, and maybe a Scott, he hasnʼt yet, but I see the way the ADA and the liberals and how it flows—the ball—and if the Times keeps hitting us this way, why weʼre just really going to be murderous [murdered]. I talked to Clark Clifford a long time last night. He thinks that we would just be idiotic to ask for a new resolution. He says that that resolution4 cannot be plainer than it is, that it is unlimited, that what you do, you imply that you have questioned yourself about what youʼve been doing. You imply to the people that well, hell, you didnʼt have authority all along. I [He] said that first [Page 242] thing youʼve got to do is make abundantly clear that youʼve got all the authority you need as commander in chief—160 times youʼve gone in. Number 2, youʼve got to make it clear that this treaty5 requires you to stand up to your commitment. Number 3, youʼve got to make it clear you wouldnʼt exercise any of these troops—wouldnʼt put them out there, wouldnʼt start the bombing until they said theyʼd go in with us and weʼre all together and weʼre one nation united indivisible. Now then, he says, you come along and say, well, I want a new resolution. You imply that thereʼs something wrong with this one and [he ?] said would this [new] one just last 18 months like the last one? And where the hell would you be?
Rusk: Well in the floor debate in the Senate, it was pointed out that the President has this authority and that this is the case of the Congress joining with the President. A hell of a lot of them made that point.
President: Thatʼs right. I think that would be one good thing though, for George to point out—that there are 160 times the President has gone in without a declaration of war to protect the interests of the United States—the President has this constitutional power.
Rusk: The figure I have is 125, Mr. President.
President: Well whatever it is—they told me 163—or 23, I donʼt care. Just assert that he has it, number 1; then, number 2, that the treaty comes along and everybody debates that. Foster Dulles—the liberals that were against him are not ever going to be with us anyway but weʼve to show that this was some of his handiwork, that he says that we have got to stop subversion and weʼve got to stop the Communist aggression and if we notify them ahead of time, weʼve got a chance to do it. May not do it. We may have to stop them finally in their boots but we ought to tell them ahead of time so theyʼll know what theyʼre doing. And that was generally his position.
Rusk: And that is what the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said in its conclusion.
President: Thatʼs right. Now then they did that and Mansfield and all of them signed it. So we have an obligation there and the President wouldnʼt be worthy of his salt if he didnʼt do it or else why have a treaty. What would the Senate think about a President that wouldnʼt live up to a treaty. Thatʼs number 2. But this President says now he knows the Senate pretty damned well. I donʼt think any of you all [who] would want to be nice to them can afford to say this bluntly but the net effect is that he knows you so damned well, he knows youʼre going to run when the going gets tough and therefore he wants you tied, bound, and delivered beforehand and he says to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of [Page 243] Defense he will not pee a drop until you come in with a resolution that says, number 1, direct me to respond to armed attack; number 2, authorize me to enforce this treaty; and number 3, direct me to prevent any aggression. Now, thatʼs what they did; now he is in the process of doing that and if you donʼt want any of those things done, weʼve provided you a remedy. Anytime you want to change your mind and do a flip-flop, you can do it. But until you do, why weʼve just got to move. I think that ought to be stressed a good deal so that the people of the country know that this dammed Senate thatʼs wandering around—I was just talking to a good lawyer in New York and he says what theyʼre doing, theyʼre confusing the people. The people donʼt see their alternatives; they canʼt find what would you do. They donʼt get it one time. When you just say it once on television: what would you do if you were President of the United States—that doesnʼt get through to them. Youʼve got to repeat it like Hitler did, 20 times and then maybe they do. And I think weʼve got to repeat this resolution and say, now we donʼt say you canʼt debate, we donʼt say you oughtnʼt to debate, and we donʼt say you oughtnʼt to discuss it all you want to. But we do say this is what youʼve done. Now if you donʼt want to do this, if you want to seat Communists, if they want to surrender to the Communists, if you want to let them go on and have aggression, if you want to abandon the treaty, or if you do not think this is good national policy you enunciated, then repeal it. And the Presidentʼs got no voice in it. Now heʼll go on fighting if he wants to, because he has that power anyway. I donʼt know, but Iʼm afraid that Mac and George could today, with this thing as vicious as it is, with the Kennedy infiltration all over the place, Iʼm afraid that out of that will come some commitment that will be a little bit difficult for us. I have a hunch this morning that theyʼre going to say something like Averell said, that we ought to sit down with the Viet Cong. Now, I thought Averell just made a mistake but in light of Bobbyʼs statement, he may have kind of been paving the way a little because theyʼre awfully close and Joe Kraftʼs awfully close, and every damned time I call Averell to compliment him, heʼs at Joe Kraftʼs house. I donʼt know how much of this is kind of a wing. You know Bob McNamara has felt that while we ought to have limited objectives, that we ought to make it abundantly clear that we did not necessarily have to have everybody of our own choosing in this government, that it could be a Communist government and we could have some doubtful characters like we had in Laos. And heʼs said to me not once but I guess a dozen times that if we would moderate our objectives and what weʼre fighting for there, weʼd have more chance of succeeding. And heʼs also felt, which is a very dangerous position to me (and thereʼs not a man in the government Iʼd say this to but you, not another one), but he has said to me a number of times that he thought that we ought to give serious consideration to this. And then when he said the other day that we only have one chance out of three of winning, it just shocked me and furthermore it [Page 244] shocked everybody at the table. It shocked Bill Moyer
Rusk: Well Bob, quite frankly, Mr. President, he hasnʼt had too much experience in dealing with crises, and I just donʼt believe that, and I canʼt pull out a slide rule and prove it, but the boys out in the field are proving it and are proving that we can do better than that. I am absolutely sure myself that the other side is going to make some new decisions on this thing.
President: They must be getting great encouragement though. If this is causing us this much trouble, donʼt you know that theyʼre enjoying it.
Rusk: Yes. Well Iʼll get hold of George and Mac right away.
President: And what do you think that our official response is going to be to the Kennedy statement?
Rusk: Oh, I think we ought to go right back to your July statement,6 just stay with that.
President: Well, theyʼll just say “do you agree with Senator Kennedy that we ought [to] appoint some Viet Cong ahead of time?” Iʼm inclined to say—I may be wrong on this—but Iʼm inclined to say that we have made it abundantly clear that weʼre for free elections, that weʼre willing to let the United Nations supervise them or anybody else thatʼll give us an honest free election and weʼre not in the business, thatʼs just not our occupation of the moment, going around appointing Communist governments.
Rusk: Thatʼs right. Thatʼs right.
President: And we believe in self determination and we donʼt believe in trading with the Communists and appointing them. Now, whatʼs wrong with that?
Rusk: I think thatʼs right.
President: OK.
- Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between Johnson and Rusk, Tape 6602.05, PNO 8. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared by the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 80.↩
- What the President was reading has not been identified.↩
- Reference is to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution; see footnote 4, Document 72.↩
- Reference is to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, September 8, 1954.↩
- See footnote 3, Document 80.↩