72. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)1

[Here follows discussion of a telegram from McGeorge Bundy concerning the U.S. Mission in Vietnam.]

LBJ: I would wish that you would put the best lawyer—this Meekerʼs been spending his time over here worrying about whatʼs gonna to happen to the Visa Division. I wish that heʼd get busy on something substantive like analyzing the testimony as a lawyer and making the basic points that Gavin made and that Kennan made.2 And they both seem to be unaware that we have a treaty3 at all or that we have a resolution4 at all or that we have a commitment at all. And they both would just rather not be troubled with Asia. And theyʼd just like to be content in Honolulu if somebody would leave them alone.

UAJ: Yes, yes.

LBJ: And I would like for Meeker or some real expert to prepare for me forthwith today or tomorrow at the minimum, first—I asked for it yesterday—the shifting positions on the loyal opposition.

UAJ: Yes, Bill Bundyʼs doing that.

LBJ: Then second, I want somebody to analyze the opposition testimony and just take their whole thing and say, “Now hereʼs what a lawyer would brief it as and a rejoinder—hereʼs what they have said.” And take the toughest things theyʼve said and say, “Now here is the answer to ʼem as we see it.” And I would sure see that somebody follows these television things very, very carefully. I doubt that anybody with any political sensitivity in the State Departmentʼs doing that. Do you know?

UAJ: I donʼt know if anybodyʼs looking at the television, weʼre getting the transcripts.

LBJ: Well now, itʼs very important to watch that and watch the hearing, watch the reaction to it and what the folks are doing and things like [Page 221] that. [Senator Frank] Church takes the position that we are [in a] very dangerous position and that weʼve got to surrender. Thatʼs his position this morning on the “Today” show, Frank Church.

UAJ: Oh, he was on this morning?

LBJ: Yeah and rather effective. Theyʼre doing a real job each day now. I donʼt think that, when you analyze, if they [were] ever answered—I think itʼd just go over like a puff of wind can blow ʼem over. Everything that he said can be just answered in one sentence [which] is that we have a SEATO treaty and Senator would you ignore it?

UAJ: Yes, yes, yes.

LBJ: And if so, how and what do you do about it? And what effect does it have on the world? And he acts like he never heard of it. I think that also somebody ought to brief that SEATO Treaty for me. So letʼs get about three things for the President and get some staff officers busy doing that instead of interviewing the press. First thing Iʼd have ʼem do is give me the shifting positions. The second thing Iʼd do is have ʼem take the position of Gavin and the position of this guy [Kennan ?] and answer ʼem. And the third thing Iʼd like for ʼem to do is brief the SEATO Treaty hearings, particularly for any comments of members, who are now members of that, with quotes.5 And particularly people like Fulbright and Sparkman and folks who apparently were members of the committee at the time it was adopted. And along with that Iʼd like to have a good brief of the resolution and what they said about the resolution. I would gather that weʼre getting—if weʼre not, we ought to get—a brief that Rusk or somebody can put in the record on our legal position. And I think our legal position ought to be that the Commander in Chief has a right to respond when his forces are attacked and that the Commander in Chief powers—weʼve taken that position all along. But then we got the treaty commitment, then we got the resolution specifically. And we ought to have that legal position ready to put in the record. But in developing that, I want to see what Fulbright said when SEATO was up. I want to see if he ever asked a question or answered one. I want to see what questions he asked and what he answered and what he said on the floor of the Senate when the resolution was up.

UAJ: We started work on that yesterday.

LBJ: And I think that you ought to have the most astute politician youʼve got in the Department watching this thing very, very carefully. Theyʼre out to destroy Rusk and destroy the Department and destroy our position. And theyʼre taking the position that what theyʼre doing is going to change the foreign policy of this country. Now I donʼt know how [Page 222] theyʼre gonna change this treaty or change this resolution. But Gore says that we are going over the Presidentʼs head to the people, that the President has gone over the Senateʼs head to declare war without our declaration.

UAJ: I saw him on that yesterday.

LBJ: Weʼre going over the Presidentʼs head, too.

UAJ: Yes, yes.

LBJ: Now, thatʼs what theyʼre doing and I think that weʼve got to take a little time and develop this position. First, I think weʼve got to develop it pretty clearly in Ruskʼs statement.6 And before he goes heʼs gonna have to background people on what heʼs going to say. Heʼs gonna have to summarize what Kennan said and what Gavin said. “Now this is the substance of what these two men have said and here are the transcripts, if you want ʼem, of what theyʼve said. Now hereʼs the answer to ʼem” and let ʼem have their stuff before they go up there. And when he goes in he ought to give ʼem copies of his statement so they can really write because, by and large, these writers up there are unfriendly to our position.

UAJ: Yes they are.

LBJ: The infiltration in the networks and in the press on this is rather serious, I think, and I think itʼs more serious than any of us realize.

UAJ: Yes, yes. Wonder about motives on some of this.

LBJ: Yes, I think thereʼs no question but what [1 minute 58 seconds deleted by the Lyndon B. Johnson Library under the donorʼs instrument of gift]. I think that they think—the opposition to our system—that theyʼre gonna win this thing right here in Washington.

UAJ: Yes, yes. I feel that very deeply, Mr. President, as I told you yesterday. Thatʼs what theyʼre betting on.

LBJ: Well now, do you think weʼve got our first team out working on it?

UAJ: I do sir. Dean got some of these assignments made yesterday. He was already working on this.

LBJ: Thatʼs sure what I want done.

UAJ: I think that heʼs gonna be well prepared to handle them, insofar as they can be handled.

[Here follows further discussion of Vietnam.]

  1. Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and McNamara, Tape F66.05, Side A, PNO 1. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared by the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.
  2. See Document 64.
  3. Reference is to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, September 8, 1954; for text, see 6 UST 81–86. The treaty established the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.
  4. Reference is to the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, Joint Resolution 1145, “To Promote the Maintenance of International Peace and Security in Southeast Asia,” passed by the Senate and the House on August 7, 1964, and signed by the President on August 10, 1964. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 991–992.
  5. The Department of Stateʼs 18-page memorandum, February 11, responding to this request was forwarded to the President by Bromley Smith on February 12. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—McGeorge Bundy, vol. 20)
  6. Rusk testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 18; see Document 64.