Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

58. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Valenti) to President Johnson¹

Washington, January 31, 1966, 3:50 p.m.

I think that your statement² of today makes it all the more important to begin immediately on one peace move right after another. Meanwhile, at the same time, we keep up our military pressure.

Here are some suggestions about peace initiatives:

1. You write a letter to the Pope in which you thank him for his efforts and suggest your readiness to dispatch Goldberg or someone else to the Vatican to discuss with the Pope his idea about non-aligned nations taking an active role in peacemaking efforts.

2. Brief the members of the House and Senate in small sessions as you did in the early days of your Presidency. As Senator Clinton P. Anderson told me, there are many Senators and Congressmen who have not had the opportunity to hear the briefings of Secretaries Rusk and McNamara.

3. Begin almost immediately the series of task forces on-the-scene in Vietnam—Secretary Freeman and agricultural experts—Dr. Hornig and health experts—Secretary Gardner and education experts—some well-known U.S. Mayor and public administration experts. As I outlined in an earlier memorandum, these task forces could go into Vietnam at two-week intervals to do substantive studies of how to increase the civil effectiveness of South Vietnam.

4. Have Walt Rostow gather a group of political scientists like James McGregor Burns, Dick Neustadt, and others to develop a viable political party system in Vietnam.

5. The President travel to Honolulu and meet with General Westmoreland and Prime Minister Ky. Here the President could get first-hand information on the military campaign. But most important, the President could appear with Prime Minister Ky and stress the political, economic, and social future of South Vietnam once the fighting has stopped. Perhaps economic news could be announced here—some specifics on the Mekong River project—housing projects—land reform—such a meeting could serve as a focal point for showing how bright the future for South Vietnam could be—and indeed a future for all of Southeast Asia.

Moreover, it would be very helpful for the world to see the cordial relations between Ky and the President and their combined faith in the kind of world that can be built without fighting in South Vietnam.

6. Why canʼt the President write a personal letter to the heads of governments all over the world telling them why we are in Vietnam, what we hoped for in Vietnam and how the fighting can be stopped in Vietnam?

These are some ideas which may or may not be worthwhile.

Jack Valenti³

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLVI. No classification marking. Valenti sent a copy of the memorandum to McGeorge Bundy on February 2 at the Presidentʼs direction.
2. See Document 57.
3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. Below Valentiʼs signature the President wrote: “Talk to Bundy and get him to recommend & supplement.”