Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

51. Memorandum¹

Washington, January 28, 1966.

DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL FACTORS AFFECTING THE RESUMPTION OF BOMBING

A. Third Country Situation

1. We have sent a circular message during the week which has now been delivered to all countries with which we have had any meaningful exchanges during the suspension. This has covered every country except for the Soviet Union and two other very minor ones. We have every indication that the Soviets have received word of the contents through the Poles or Hungarians. In essence, this message served notice that we had not had a response and that we could not continue to refrain from steps required to protect our forces. It has been widely construed as our notice of imminent intent to resume.

2. We have had even closer exchanges with such key countries as the UK, Canada, and Australia.

3. Our various messages have been received with remarkably little protest and with considerable understanding. The British and Australians are solidly aboard. Among significant countries, only Japan, Canada, Poland, Pakistan (a very fervent plea from Ayub),² and about five lesser countries have expressed the hope that we could continue the pause to give something a chance to develop. None of these has indicated that they have any concrete expectation or grounds for belief that it will.

U Thant fully understands that we may be resuming shortly. However, he has appealed publicly for a virtually indefinite continuation, and will doubtless be critical in almost any event.

4. There is no pending third country initiative which hinges on delay in resumption. U Thant is working on a proposal to have the ICC members propose a conference, and the Japanese and Canadians are considering sending high-level emissaries to key countries. Nkrumah has also concocted the idea of his going to Hanoi. However, all of these are well aware that we may resume before these actions were underway.

B. Status of Contacts with Hanoi

1. Rangoon.

We had originally delivered a message there on December 29 simply informing Hanoi that the suspension was underway and could be extended if there were a response. The message was accepted. On January 21, we sent Byroade back to see the Hanoi man, who said he had no instructions and made certain other comments, not calling for reply.³ On January 24 the Hanoi man sent Byroade a written aide-memoire, pre-dated January 21, which simply repeated the same points.⁴

On January 26, Byroade acknowledged the written message. He asked again whether the Hanoi man had any instructions, and said he would remain available.⁵ There has been no response.⁶

2. Moscow.

Based on Shastriʼs report that Kosygin had suggested direct contact in Moscow, Kohler sought an appointment with the DRV Charge on January 19, and the DRV Charge finally accepted the meeting on January 24. We gave Kohler substantive instructions,⁷ particularly inquiring whether this confidential contact might be used for Hanoi to make clear what military actions it was taking. Kohler also raised Hanoiʼs Four Points but was able to make only general comments.

The over-all reaction of the DRV Charge was completely negative.⁸ He reiterated the Four Points and standard statements of Hanoiʼs position and attacked the sincerity of our suspension.

At the end of the conversation, the Charge said that he had nothing further to add. Kohler replied that he still had points he could discuss, but the DRV man showed no enthusiasm for a further meeting. He finally suggested twice that we could talk in Rangoon if we wished. The initiative was left to the DRV man to request a further meeting, and there has been no further word.

The DRV manʼs mention of Rangoon led us to the Byroade reply of January 26, nailing Rangoon down tight as well.

3. Vientiane.

On January 17, the DRV Charge called on Souvanna at the Chargeʼs request. Speaking from notes, he raised rather niggling questions about the meaning of our Fourteen Points. Souvanna pressed him whether Hanoi was asking Souvanna to act as an intermediary, and the Charge replied that he had no instructions.

On the 20th, Souvanna went back to the Charge with a message from us commenting briefly on the questions raised concerning the Fourteen Points, and saying that we would accept Souvanna as an intermediary, or that Ambassador Sullivan could meet directly with the DRV man. The DRV man then made certain “personal observations” about accepting the NLF and the Four Points.⁹

On the 25th, Souvanna conveyed to the DRV man a fairly substantial statement on the NLF and Four Points, pointing out among other things that we were prepared to negotiate on the basis of the Geneva Accords and that this might be the answer if Hanoi insisted that its Four Points were “authentic interpretations” of these Accords. Souvanna himself thought this response quite “forthcoming.”

The Hanoi man continued to say that he had no instructions. On January 28, he took the ICC plane to Hanoi but did not return. The next regular plane would not return until February 4.¹⁰

This episode remains puzzling. The substance of the original remarks was quite peripheral, although Souvanna thinks that there was some serious intent behind it. Since we have now waited twelve days with no validation of any message, it seems hard to believe that anything significant was intended. Although the Charge has only limited air communications, we know that he has available cable communications and has used them. Souvanna himself on the 26th, asked only that we hold off to the end of the week.

There are some complications to the Vientiane matter in that Souvanna indiscreetly mentioned it to third country representatives on January 18. U Thant and the British definitely know about it, and we believe the Soviets, French, and probably the Poles and Thai also do. However, none of these probably know more than the first conversation.

In sum, we have clear deadlines in both Moscow and Rangoon, and only an unvalidated nibble, now eleven days old, in Vientiane. The fact that the Moscow and Rangoon negatives were both received after the Vientiane approach give us a tremendously strong public case, if it should ever be required, that the total picture was negative.

C. Saigon

Ambassador Porter talked to the Foreign Minister on the 25th, telling him about the Vientiane matter and saying that it might hold us up for a few days to make absolutely sure. The Foreign Minister expressed understanding, but also concern that we should not be drawn into a delaying gambit. Our over-all reading is that Saigon would begin to get seriously edgy if we waited many more days, but that we are not under pressure in terms of 1–3 days. We would plan to let Saigon know a day in advance of the planned date of resumption.

1. Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron. Top Secret. The source text is unsigned but the memorandum was presumably prepared by William Bundy.
2. See Document 49.
3. See Document 33.
4. Byroade transmitted the text of the aide-memoire in telegram 370 from Rangoon, January 24, which is printed in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 138–139. McGeorge Bundy forwarded telegram 370 to President Johnson at 10:45 a.m. on January 24 under cover of a memorandum stating that Byroade had “received a very tough memo from the Hanoi Charge which pretty well closes that circuit.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—McGeorge Bundy, vol. 19)
5. Byroade reported this information in telegram 374 from Rangoon, January 27, printed in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, p. 139.
6. The DRV representative responded on January 31, presenting an aide-memoire to Byroade during a meeting that began 10 hours after resumption of the bombing. Byroade transmitted the aide-memoire in telegram 392 and reported on the meeting in telegram 394, both dated January 31. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET S; printed in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 140–142) William Bundy analyzed the timing of the January 31 DRV approach in a memorandum to Rusk, February 3. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S; printed in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 150–151)
7. See Document 25.
8. See Document 37.
9. Sullivan reported this conversation in telegram 788 from Vientiane, January 22. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
10. The DRV Charge did not respond until his meeting with Souvanna on February 8, during which he read a lengthy demarche. The meeting was reported in telegram 870 from Vientiane, February 8. (Ibid.)