Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

42. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Valenti) to President Johnson¹

Washington, January 25, 1966, 1:15 p.m.

Let me capsule some thoughts on the problem confronting you.

Recommendation: That the bombing resume—on a surgical basis—picking out strictly military targets, and avoid, if we can, any target that summons up a direct response from the Chicoms or NVN Air Force.

Why Resume?

• —We lose an option, a bargaining point, when we stop the bombing without any equal concession on the part of the VC. Now, with resumption, we are back at the playing table, with chips to use if it looks like a conference table can be had.
• —If casualties mount or continue, we are hard put to explain our softening attitude, politically to our own people, when the VC still kicks us, refuses to talk with us.
• —Itʼs common sense, confirmed a thousand times in the history, that we never win at the conference table what we have lost on the battlefield. It is not now in the best interests of the VC or Hanoi to talk to us. The ChiComs want us to bleed—the VC believe we will tire and grow weary—and Hanoi remembers the story of the French. Unless we hurt them, why should they talk?

Dangers to the resumption:

The minute we resume, there will be two vital points we must nail down, else the doves, the Lynd-liners and the Times will shriek:

1. Did we have a response? The Secretary is on record as saying no “serious response.” What is serious? Does it mean we rejected something? Thus, it is absolutely imperative that we close every circuit, and close it tight so our record is visibly clean.

2. Did we have to start bombing again? We need evidence—hard, photographic, verifiable evidence that the infiltration, the reconstruction, the unimpeded training of troops really hurts us—and puts our own troops in jeopardy. This must be clear so that anyone who denounces the resumption is saying in effect, “I donʼt care what happens to American troops, I just donʼt want to bomb again.”

Whatʼs Ahead:

The Lynd-line—on page A7 of Tuesday Post² is going to be the new line, i.e.

Stop the bombing forever—recognize the Viet Cong—(and soon, it will be: organize a Popular Front or coalition government, then get out troops out and let the Vietnamese decide their own fate. This surely will come next as the line).

After this will come cries of anguish over our place losses, and ground casualties. I suspect we will hear a number of those who want the pause to continue, cite the horrible cost of resumption.

Then you will hear “why not accept the four VC points” because “they donʼt really mean what they say.” I have a hunch this will be the next real thrust on our position.

Pell, Fulbright, McGovern and Lippmann are advocating the Gavin “retire to the enclaves” thesis as well as the Lynd-line … more will take up this line because it looks like an easy way out.

So it is all of a piece. Slowly, but like lava pouring over a volcano, the flow is resistless—first, one concession, then another, and then another, and as we adjust to each new position, the Lynd-liners go onto the next retreat point.

Perhaps we must harden ourselves to the realism of the problem:

There is no easy way out. We can never achieve a settlement that is honorable until we have demonstrated to the VC and Hanoi they canʼt win—and we are hurting them.

If we resume, consider this as a scenario:

1. A re-statement of the long list of peace moves we have made.

2. A re-statement of our objectives: why are we there—what do we want to happen before we get out.

3. A clear declaration of what happens if we allow the Hanoi “Liberation Front” to win in Vietnam. As Mr. Durant said, the loss of S. Vietnam will lead to the loss of Malaysia and Singapore, restore the subserviency of Indonesia to China, weaken our positions in Formosa, Philippines and Japan, cause the Australians to live precariously, allow the funds of a strengthened Communist bloc to pour into South America, and for a long time force us to live with hostile governments.

4. The President, within a week (or earlier) after resumption, go before a TV press conference—and state our case to the nation. Only the President can really nail our case to the sticking point … and expose the phony arguments of the Lynd-liners.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLVI. Top Secret.
2. “Lynd Urges Talks With Viet ‘Front,’” Washington Post, January 25, 1966.