Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

39. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson¹

Washington, January 24, 1966, 5 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Pros and cons of immediate resumption of the bombing

I think this question narrows to one of timing. The arguments for a complete end of the bombing are unacceptable, and no one wants to bomb Hanoi tomorrow morning.

The real question is whether it is better to resume within the next two days or to wait another week or two.

The argument for prompt resumption has the following elements:

1. We can get started just ahead of a chorus of restraining voices which talk of delay but which really will always oppose any resumption.

2. The Saigon cables tell us that we will have real trouble with the GVN if we wait much longer.

3. The enemy has it within his power to give us a troublesome and ambiguous signal any minute, and it is a wonder he hasnʼt done it already.

4. The Republicans will begin to make headway if we keep hesitating.

5. Every day of delay is that much of trouble to our own troops.

6. We have already done more than we set out to do, and we will show weakness in patience if we continue.

The arguments for a delay are more subtle but they are not feeble.

1. There are still a lot of people of genuine good will who think that another week or two might show real progress. They cite the discussions on prisoner exchanges, the Vientiane open wire² the pressure from nearly all our friends abroad. (Goldberg rehearsed these points on Saturday.)³

2. It is quite possible that Hanoi really wants us to resume the bombing and is trying to push us into that position while pretending to keep the Vientiane line open.

3. There has not been any important military action by Hanoi in the South, and until there is, we can easily say to our friends in Saigon that the suspension of bombing has in fact lowered the rate of aggression.

4. The country knows very well that the President is not weak, and is quite ready to stay with him another two weeks on the present peace effort.

5. It is quite possible to delay from day to day with no real loss and to wait for the Communists to stir up the fighting by a more impressive outrage than the one in Danang today.

Whenever the bombing resumes, it seems to me that the case is persuasive for a very carefully selected set of targets which should combine, as far as possible, the following characteristics: (a) low risks; (b) consistency with previous bombing patterns; (c) immediate relationship to the aggression against South Vietnam.

McG. B.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—McGeorge Bundy, vol. 19. Secret. The memorandum was attached to a note from Juanita Roberts, the Presidentʼs secretary, dated January 24, 6:10 p.m., that reads: “For your meeting at 6:15 p.m.”
2. The following words were typed after “Vientiane open wire” but then crossed out: “(a pretty feeble one).”
3. January 29.