34. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson1
SUBJECT
- Your noon meeting today
I think we have three basic problems, two of which need not concern us much today. The first is whether to resume bombing. The second is when to resume bombing. The third is what targets to bomb.
I think question one should clearly be answered in the affirmative, and that question three can be pushed ahead of us, although I think it would be helpful to decide today that this is a very important question and should be most carefully reviewed. The easiest way to do this is to resume bombing on a pattern very much like that which existed before the pause. The Chiefs will not like this, but they will sit still for it in the context of a definite decision to resume.
The immediate problem and the hard one for today is when and how to start the bombing again. My brother Bill is bringing a timetable of diplomatic and political actions.2 I have not seen it, and he has been so busy that I have not wanted to interrupt for an advance description. But I think that the following questions are those that need to be considered.
- 1.
- Have we given adequate public warning that the pause is failing? I do not think we have, and I attach a paragraph3 that Harriman or Rusk or both might work from tomorrow, on television.
- 2.
- Are we doing everything we can to close all the circuits? It is already clear that Hanoi is trying to pretend that its Vientiane demarche was a serious response. Joe Kraft telephoned me this morning to say that he has reliable information from Paris that there has been a request for clarification from Hanoi on the 14 points. This can only refer to Vientiane and he admits that it comes from a Frenchman (whom he refused to name) who has talked to Bo in Paris.
- 3.
- How much private warning should we give to friends before the bombing actually begins? I think it is most important that men like Wilson and Pearson and Sato have advance notice even at the risk of leaks. This diplomatic advantage conflicts with the desire of CINCPAC and [Page 104] others to catch Hanoi off guard with a surprise resumption, and thus hit some rewarding targets in daylight.
- 4.
- What degree of Congressional consultation should there be before resumption? My own suggestion is that we should make it very clear that the pause has failed through such devices as the Tuesday leadership meeting but not engage in any formal consultation about any resumption any more than we did about starting the pause.
- 5.
- In addition to special friends who get a day or two of advance notice, we must have diplomatic notice to everyone at the time the bombing resumes. I assume this item will be in Billʼs scenario.
- 6.
- There should probably be a major statement on the results of the pause and on our continuing purpose of peace by the Secretary of State as it is on the record that the bombing has begun.
This memorandum does not address the question of the date of resumption. I think you will want to keep a free hand on that. I think you will find that Goldberg and Harriman are strong for another two weeks of delay and that Bob McNamara wants to get cracking. My own view is that once we have made the definite decision that we will resume, we are not in a hurry about the particular day. On the other hand, if you donʼt give the State Department a deadline, I doubt if they will get all their homework and wire closing done as fast as you want. So I think I would tell them today that I wanted to be free to send out the bombers by Thursday,4 and that in fact I would plan to hold my hand for another few days and tell no one.