Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

317. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, November 27, 1966, 2:18 p.m.

91787. Eyes only for Ambassador from Secretary. Ref: Londonʼs 4337, para 3.²

1. Following text message to me from George Brown delivered by UK Embassy here. “Gromyko gave me the thumbs up sign as I went aboard the ʼplane at Moscow this morning. I am not sure I can give the same to you, but I am satisfied that my journey was fully worthwhile. I would like to be able to tell you about it in detail at once but see no chance of doing so before Paris. If however you could spare one of your trusted people to come here within the next few days I would happily give him my impression whilst it is fresh in my mind.

On the first day³ I tried hard to get Gromyko to lay off his gramophone record and get down to the question of the three issues (paragraph 10 of your message).⁴ However, he gave no ground but his interest was sufficiently intent to encourage me to give him an outline of the package (paragraph 14 of your message).⁵ This I did orally before dinner on the first evening, giving it to him as my own proposal. Next morning, purely for the sake of clarity, I gave him a piece of paper. The actual words used are enclosed. He was pretty suspicious but promised to pass it on to Kosygin only.

It was on the basis of this piece of paper that I talked with Kosygin this morning. He was very friendly and after being at pains to establish my credentials and the status of the paper I had given to Gromyko we had a full discussion. I told him that in my view the time was ripe for progress, and given a little help from him, we could perhaps get the result we both wanted. He listened carefully but was totally non-committal. I had to satisfy him that what I had proposed was no substitution for negotiations on the substance but only a way in. On his side after a lot of the usual stuff, pretty muted, about American aggression, he said that they were prepared to make the North Vietnamese four points and the NLF five points ‘a basis for discussion.’ When I said that I had interpreted a basis of discussion as meaning that they would be flexible neither he nor Mr. Gromyko contradicted me. Their package would seem to be an unconditional stopping of the bombing, some de-escalation in the South and then negotiations on the basis as above. I reminded him that I would be seeing you in Paris in mid-December and that Christmas itself might give some opportunity. On leaving I asked him if I could expect to hear from them again. To this he was pretty cool and said that they would hardly have anything to add unless Gromyko had some foreign policy of his own. However, he characterised our discussions as ‘very useful.’

I cannot really tell what this music means. Greenhill, who was with me and has been at our other meetings with Gromyko and Kosygin over the past year, says that without being able to quote precise words from either Kosygin or Gromyko as a basis for his impression feels sure that their interest in what I had to say was both earnest and profound. He doubts if they have yet made up their minds where to go from here but would not be surprised if in the end we get some bonus. You may hear of this before I do.”

2. Text enclosure to message, headed “Text of Unsigned Piece of Paper Foreign Secretary Handed to Mr. Gromyko on 24 November, 1966,” reads “The following plan is suggested to meet the situation in which the North Vietnamese require the cessation of bombing to be unconditional while the Americans require some assurance that a measure of de-escalation would follow.

Consideration might be given to the possibility of the parties agreeing secretly on mutual measures of de-escalation which would be put into effect once the bombing had stopped. In this the first step would be to stop the bombing and the second step would be further action of de-escalation by the American side to which the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong would respond by similar acts of de-escalation: but with both phases forming part of a firm prior understanding.

The order of events would therefore be: phase A. stop the bombing, while phase B., which would follow, would see the execution of the other agreed measures of de-escalation by both sides.”

All this would require careful study in which you and I might have to help before there was direct contact between the two sides.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
2. The reference to telegram 4337 is in error; it should be to telegram 4377, paragraph 3, in which Bruce asked about Brownʼs message to Rusk. (Ibid., POL UK-USSR)
3. November 23.
4. Paragraph 10 of telegram 86196 to London, November 16 (see footnote 7, Document 300), introduced the following three issues, each of which was then discussed at some length: “What degree of assurance should there be that Hanoi will take appropriate reciprocal action? How soon might a response from Hanoi be expected (and, perhaps, how can it be verified)? And what sort of action would we regard as reciprocal?” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD)
5. Paragraph 14 of telegram 86196 discussed the Phase A-Phase B formula, using the same language as that used in paragraph 3d of telegram 83786, Document 305.