Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

303. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, November 11, 1966, 1 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Swedish Diplomatic contacts with North Viet-Nam

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • Secretary Rusk
  • Deputy Asst. Secretary Leonard Unger
  • EUR/SCAN—David McKillop
  • EA/VN—Heywood Isham
• Sweden
  • Minister of Foreign Affairs Torsten Nilsson
  • Director of Political Affairs, Foreign Ministry R. Hichens-Bergstrom
  • Ambassador to United States—Hubert de Besche
  • First Secretary, Pol.Div., Ministry For.Affairs—J.C.S. Oberg

After preliminary exchange of greetings, Foreign Minister Nilsson read a report of two recent conversations between Swedish diplomats and representatives of North Viet-Nam which took place in Warsaw and Hanoi (The text of this paper is attached).² Having read the paper, the Foreign Minister summarized the salient points of what DRV Foreign Minister Trinh had told Ambassador Petri in Hanoi: North Viet-Nam preferred a political to a military solution and was interested in a climate favoring a political settlement provided certain conditions were fulfilled; withdrawal was not specifically mentioned; the National Liberation Front was described as one of the spokesmen for the South Viet-Nam people although the most valid one. Regarding the possibility of reaching a final settlement, the NLF and Hanoi supported the formation of a National Coalition Government in South Viet-Nam founded on a broad basis including all political and religious groupings as well as all social classes generally desiring to achieve national independence. Moreover, conditions should be created permitting moving in the direction of future re-unification.

The Foreign Minister commented that it was difficult to judge the significance of the talks although it was interesting that a moderate tone characterized both of them. It was impossible for the Swedish government to assess the value of the information given to Ambassador Petri. An analysis of these exchanges in both Warsaw and Hanoi, however, might show them to contain elements justifying carrying on a discreet dialogue with the North Vietnamese government. The DRV Foreign Minister had concluded his conversation with emphasizing that he expected the conversation to be handled with absolute discretion. Foreign Minister Nilsson observed that although they had contacts with the Front and Hanoi since 1965, until now they had received nothing of interest but that a study of the recent exchanges had led them to feel that the atmosphere had begun to change and they felt it their duty to inform us.

The Secretary prefaced his reply by underscoring the need for extreme accuracy in reporting such conversations and knowing the exact language that was used on the other side. Great issues were at stake. We receive many reports about Hanoiʼs attitudes and positions which when tested proved to have no substance. The Secretary went on to note that there were one or two positive and one or two negative elements in what had been told to the Swedish representatives. On the positive side, Hanoiʼs interest in a political rather than a military solution represented a small step forward.

Foreign Minister Nilsson, describing the background of Ambassador Petriʼs mission, said he had been received by the head of the political department of the DRV Foreign Ministry and had several two-hour conversations and three dinners all within the space of three days. These had revealed nothing new in Hanoiʼs position. After all this, Trinh had sent him an invitation to come see him; Petri had not asked to be received by Trinh. While there was no discussion of conveying Trinhʼs remarks to the United States, neither did Trinh say Petri could not do so and he emphasized the importance of maintaining secrecy. The Swedes interpreted Trinhʼs attitude as a tacit indication that his remarks could be conveyed to the United States.

The Secretary, continuing his commentary on Trinhʼs remarks said the missing element was what Hanoi would in fact do on the military side. At least 19 regular North Vietnamese regiments were in the South and three North Vietnamese divisions were in the DMZ and north of it. They could attack our Marines at any moment. If we committed ourselves to stop bombing permanently, we must know what would happen on the ground militarily. We could not possibly make a commitment on the ground unless we knew what Hanoi would do with those 19 regiments. Trinh had used the phrase, “We know what we will have to do” in the event their conditions were accepted. The Secretary said we would want to know what that phrase means.

Mr. Bergstrom, noting that Petriʼs report had been in the form of one written and one telegraphic message, said they had queried him for clarification on the formulation regarding the National Liberation Front and the paper read by Foreign Minister Nilsson represented as accurate and precise a summary of Ambassador Petriʼs reports as they knew how to prepare. Ambassador Petri had observed to Trinh that if the two conditions were fulfilled, the North should follow suit. Bergstrom did not indicate whether there had been any comment to his remark.

The Secretary said that Hanoi had denied, even to the Soviets, that they had troops in the South. However, we must have corresponding action on the ground; we could not be children in this matter. As to the role of the Front, we knew who their leaders were including North Vietnamese Generals in the South using a variety of names. The Liberation Front is Hanoi. Some southern individuals with other associations were included in the Front, but they had no influence. When Trinh said the Front was the most valid spokesman for the South Vietnamese people and that the situation must be consistent with moving toward reunification, he was expressing Hanoiʼs political objective of permanently unifying the country on a Communist basis. We were prepared to have South Viet-Nam decide on a solution through elections but so far Hanoi was not prepared to do so. The Secretary said we could not impose a coalition government on the South; we could not turn our men around and start them shooting in the other direction to impose a coalition government. If the South Vietnamese people were to decide on this it was up to them and we would abide by the result, but a coalition would not be imposed by our arms and our power.

The Secretary asked what resources the Swedes had to continue this conversation; would the Ambassador be returning to Hanoi? It would be useful to get greater precision on the meaning of Trinhʼs phrase “they knew what they must do.” The Secretary told the Foreign Minister for his personal information that last fall the Soviets suggested that we suspend the bombing for 15–20 days in order to permit further explorations of Hanoiʼs positions. We had suspended the bombing twice as long as the Soviets had requested. During this time, Hanoi multiplied the number of trucks it was sending South and poured men and arms into the South on a 24 hour a day basis.

On the 34th day of the pause, Hanoi had asked us to accept the four points, recognize the Liberation Front as the sole spokesman of the South Vietnamese people and get out of South Viet-Nam. Hanoi had not even used dilatory tactics as they might well have to embarrass us; they had simply asked us to surrender. This had been stupid of them. They could have made considerable problems for us if they had been more sophisticated or clever. Every week since January, we had tried to get an answer to the simple question: if we stopped the bombing as step 1, what would be step 2? Of course things would be better in the North, but what would happen in the South? We were vitally interested in this. Any further clarification as to the meaning of Trinhʼs phrase would be of some interest. The Secretary added that the other side had made clear we must end the bombing permanently, since they insisted that a suspension would imply an ultimatum. This represented an increased demand on their part and we must have something in exchange for a permanent cessation.

The Swedish Foreign Minister noted that they had contacts with the Front or Hanoi in Algiers, Warsaw, Moscow and Hanoi as well as Peking. The Secretary noted that the only serious interlocutor was Hanoi—not the Front. The Secretary said that we did not discount the importance of any third party channels. In past crises, we never knew which channel would be important. In this case, we did not know whether Hanoi would say something important through the Swedes rather than through someone else. We did not wish to close any channel of communication but we did wish to know what Hanoi meant by the particular formulation Trinh had used. The Foreign Minister said that they also did not know about Hanoiʼs intentions in this respect, but were certainly prepared to ask for greater precision. The Secretary commented that since Hanoi was terrified of being caught by Peking talking with us it would be important for the Swedes to stress they were seeking these clarifications solely on their own.

The Secretary went on to say that the Eastern European countries would probably be interested in settling for the status quo ante at the 17th Parallel but on account of Peking, were unable to move forward. We are prepared, he said, to accept the Communist worldʼs interest in North Viet-Nam if they are prepared to accept our interest in the South. Until Hanoi abandoned its objective of seizing South Viet-Nam, there could be no peace. It was as simple as that. We were prepared to cooperate in finding ways for Hanoi to abandon its effort to take over the South but not in finding ways to abandon our own effort in the South. The Swedish Ambassador commented that Petriʼs impression was that the North Vietnamese were deeply concerned over developments in China, were essentially North Vietnamese patriots and that because of these Chinese developments there were better prospects of negotiating than before. The Secretary said that Hanoi undoubtedly did not desire to be taken over by China nor did the Soviets wish this to happen. But they could not expect us to do anything about this if it meant giving South Viet-Nam up to them. If the Chinese wanted war over this, they could have it. We would not abandon South Viet-Nam under any circumstances. The Secretary continued that two things were vital: (1) Hanoi must abandon its attempt to seize South Viet-Nam by force, and (2) the people of South Viet-Nam must have a chance to decide what government they want and to express their views on reunification without being subjected to force by the North. This principle was true for Korea, for Germany and for Viet-Nam. The Swedish Ambassador pointed to Trinhʼs implication that reunification could be a long term proposition and the Secretary countered that the thrust of that passage meant a Communist regime for the South. This was one of the negative aspects of Trinhʼs remarks. The Secretary pointed out the lack of reciprocity in the position of the other side. If we were to say we would not negotiate until the North stopped bombing in South Viet-Nam, people around the world would protest that we were being belligerent. We had suspended bombing in the DMZ to see if there would be any response, but there was none and the ICC had been denied access to the area under the North. Nevertheless the Trinh statement could be important if we had more precision.

Ambassador Unger called attention to the reference by the North Vietnamese in Warsaw to “no military action being undertaken in the demilitarized zone.” He suggested, and the Secretary agreed, that this was also a point on which the Swedes might make further soundings in Hanoi. We were certainly ready to see the zone truly demilitarized and would welcome an end to violations of it by North Viet-Nam.

The Foreign Minister mentioned possible differences of opinion between the Front and Hanoi and pointed out that all elements of the Front were not Communists. The Secretary responded there was no problem about contact with the Front; the South Vietnamese were able to communicate with its representatives. South Viet-Nam could take care of the indigenous problem through reconciliation and bringing the dissidents back into the body politic. United States troops had only entered when North Viet-Nam regulars had come down. If the Swedes were in the same position, they would not accept a coalition government thus imposed on them.

In answer to the Foreign Ministerʼs question as to how long the conflict might go on, the Secretary said that peace could be had by 6:00 this afternoon if the North told us they would stop trying to take South Viet-Nam by force. But we were not looking for a face-saving formula to permit us to abandon South Viet-Nam and some of the Communist states appeared at last to recognize this. The Secretary noted three channels to Hanoi: the direct one through which little was said because of Hanoiʼs fear of Peking; the channel through Moscow to which we attach importance because of Moscowʼs attitudes and influence—but here again Hanoi was probably afraid of Peking; and finally a channel through a third party, which could be Sweden. But, he continued, this represented perhaps 50% of the question; the other 50% was the possibility of resolving the problem by de facto action on the ground in the pattern of the Greek insurrection and the Quemoy-Matsu crisis. Ho Chi Minh might prefer to pull back troops rather than enter negotiations, calculating that Americans might go home and could not come back, although, the Secretary said, we can get back faster than they can. We would be prepared to try this route. There need be no confessions that they have 19 regiments in the South.

In response to an analysis by the Foreign Minister of Hanoiʼs problem, the Secretary noted that we had reports from Eastern European sources that confirmed this precisely: Hanoi feared the effect of negotiations on the morale of the Viet Cong and Hanoiʼs present leaders feared that they could not survive a failure to achieve their objectives. However, the Secretary said on this we cannot help them; they are in places they have no right to be.

Further, on the point of gradual de-escalation, the Secretary said that since January we had made clear our interest in responding to actions on the ground—what we call a process of “mutual example”—without evoking thus far any interest on Hanoiʼs part. If Trinhʼs phrase pointed in the direction of positive Hanoi response, this could be important.

As to Trinhʼs own alignment in the regime as between hawks and doves, Mr. Bergstrom commented that the French considered him pro-Chinese but that Ambassador Petri did not have that impression.

The Foreign Minister asked whether it would be necessary to specify how long we would halt the bombing. The Secretary said that under our system the press and Congress would force us to answer this question. A permanent bombing halt would require a very important reciprocal action. Ambassador Unger commented that Trinhʼs remarks implied some readiness to discuss now not only conditions for negotiation but also the terms of an eventual settlement. The Secretary agreed that Hanoi was hesitant about discussing the first step until they saw how the negotiations would end. He indicated that another reason for keeping further inquiries on the basis of a Swedish-DRV dialogue was to avoid having to bring Saigon into the picture, which we were disinclined to do at this stage.

The Secretary suggested as a technical point it might not be wise to pursue the dialogue with Hanoi through other capitals. In order to protect Trinhʼs position if there are divisions within the leadership it was important not to have communications from abroad available to too wide a group in Hanoi. Foreign Minister Nilsson agreed with this suggestion. The Secretary emphasized the importance of examining very carefully all indications bearing on Hanoiʼs position but as he had told the press on another occasion, we could only negotiate with those who could stop the fighting. If we entered into too great detail on our conditions for settlement, the other side would just put that in their pockets and then propose to split the difference. We were not worried about real southern insurgents—16,000 of them had defected this year—but the Northern Generals must go home. We would even be prepared to give them a villa on the Riviera!

Responding to a question by the Foreign Minister, the Secretary said that Premier Ky was not particularly popular as an individual but that the majority of the population had strongly rejected the Viet Cong and supported the move towards a constitutional government. Even Tri Quang, opposed as he was to Ky, wanted us to bomb China. The trouble with the Vietnamese was the influence of the French “fourth republic mentality” where every man had his own party.

Reverting to the paper given us by the Foreign Minister, the Secretary said we would wish to put it under a microscope and give a more systematic answer. Ambassador Unger would go to New York before Nilssonʼs departure next week and give him our further comments. In any event, these statements from Hanoi did have a certain resonance. Responding to a final question from the Foreign Minister about Hanoiʼs difficulty of believing that the United States could abandon such expensive United States bases, the Secretary pointed out that the United Statesʼ capacity in this regard should not be underestimated. We had built roads in India, over the hump, and Alaska during the war which we had never used, and we had demobilized 100 divisions after World War II. In the last five years we had closed 600 bases. As the President had said, we had no intention of leaving our soldiers in South Viet-Nam as tourists. Following the general conversation, Ambassador Unger privately mentioned to Minister Nilsson and Mr. Bergstrom our concern over reports that Ambassador Petri had spoken rather openly about his contacts in Hanoi. They agreed and said that recently they had twice communicated with Petri and instructed him to treat this subject with maximum discretion.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 141, Aspen. Top Secret; Nodis; Aspen. Drafted by Heyward Isham of EA and Unger. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 655–661. The meeting was held in the Secretaryʼs Dining Room. Documentation on Aspen, the codeword for the negotiating channel with North Vietnam through Sweden, is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14/ASPEN, and in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 141, Aspen. A substantial selection has been printed in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 655–715.
2. Attached but not printed.