298. Editorial Note
At 2:51 p.m. on November 9, 1966, Secretary McNamara telephoned President Johnson at the LBJ Ranch regarding the proposal of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to expand the air war (Document 295). The President indicated that he had not yet seen it but had received Rostowʼs cable (Document 296). McNamara stated he had just discussed the proposal with Secretary Rusk and would send to the Ranch a memorandum containing their recommendations (Document 299).
At the Presidentʼs request, McNamara outlined the differences between the JCS proposal on the one hand and his and Ruskʼs recommendations on the other, stating that the differences were “very substantial, I think. We recommend that we do more than we are presently doing but not nearly as much as they recommend.” The following exchange then took place:
“RSM: Iʼd say we did about a third of what they recommended.
“LBJ: Well, weʼll have to look at ʼem. How long can this wait?
“RSM: It shouldnʼt wait until after you come out [of the hospital after surgery scheduled for the following week]. Some parts of it, at least, they and Dean and I are all in agreement on, and I donʼt see any reason, if you agree, why we shouldnʼt start that immediately. The remaining portions that weʼre in disagreement on can certainly wait. The weather is not too good at this time of year and we couldnʼt get all this in immediately anyhow. If you wished, I know that Buzz Wheeler and Iʼd be very happy to come down. He would appreciate an opportunity at some point to talk to you about it anyhow.”
The President decided that they should come down the next morning, bringing McNamaraʼs memorandum (Document 299) with them. The following exchange then took place:
“LBJ: My feeling on this is roughly this: I think we should and must use every hour, every day, every week, and every two months between now and January that we can. Number one, effectively, all around the clock. Two, I think that this pressure must be as steady but—this looks like a contradiction but I donʼt want it to be—steady but undramatic as we can make it. I think weʼve got to bear in mind that weʼve got the Browns [George Brown] going to Moscow and that we donʼt want him to feel we donʼt give him decent opportunity for that and if we caused this mission to fail, that could be dangerous. And I would feel that we ought to make clear to these folks the seriousness of our future intent without rubbing their nose in it in front of a television camera. And I would think of some of the unstruck ones that weʼve played around with sometime before and our POLs and some of these other things, but I wouldnʼt get into something that is so dramatic that you have a headline every day that youʼre really changing your policy. I would—
[Page 817]“RSM: Thatʼs exactly the character—
“LBJ: Iʼd have it trotting but I wouldnʼt have it running right now from a walk.
“RSM: Thatʼs exactly the character of the recommendations that Dean and I will make to you. Weʼll be there about 9 to 9:30 in the morning.
“LBJ: In other words, I want a limited, very quiet, expanded program, but I think it could serve to give Moscow a little leverage on ʼem if it werenʼt so damn violent that it forced ʼem to react otherwise. Do you follow me?
“RSM: Yes I do. Iʼm not sure I agree with the conclusion that it would give Moscow more leverage. I donʼt believe it would. But, in any case, I believe we arrive at the same conclusion.
“LBJ: Well, what I think is this: I think if weʼre causing ‘em damage and theyʼre hurtin’ but we havenʼt got their childrenʼs hospitals afire and so forth, I think Moscow can say to Hanoi, ‘Goddammit, this thing is gettin’ awfully costly on you and on us and on everybody else. Letʼs try to find an answer here.ʼ If itʼs not being costly, I donʼt think maybe they got any real desire to stop the bombing if itʼs not hurtinʼ. But, we can debate that tomorrow.
“RSM: Sure. Weʼll be there, Mr. President. Thank you very much.” (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and McNamara, Tape F66.30, Side B, PNO 3)