Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

290. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, November 4, 1966, 1:20 p.m.

78865. Literally eyes only for Ambassador from Secretary, SecDef and Komer. You have described the RD program as the heart of the matter in SVN. We agree. Also, you have reported and we agree that progress in the RD program so far has been slight and unsatisfactory. We all agree that progress must be made in this crucial area if the war is to be won in the South and if the North is to be persuaded to negotiate. It is clear to us that some organizational changes are required on the American side to get RD moving—to bring harder pressure on the GVN to do its job and to get solid and realistic planning with respect to the whole effort.

We had considered putting the entire program under COMUSMACV to achieve these ends; and this may ultimately prove to be the best solution. But recognizing certain objections to this approach, we are prepared to try a solution which leaves the civilian functions under civilian management. As we see it, the trial organization would involve the following changes:

1. The several civilian lines of command within U.S. agencies would be consolidated into one. Thus, line responsibility for all personnel assigned to RD civilian functions would rest solely with one high-ranking civilian. (We presume this man would be Ambassador Porter. If so, he would have to be relieved of all other duties, and you would have to have another deputy assigned to absorb the substantial other responsibilities now met by Ambassador Porter.) The authority of this civilian would be made clear and full to each constituent agency of the civilian RD team, including relocation of personnel, the establishment of priorities irrespective of agency priorities, and the apportionment of the funds allocated for RD by each agency to Viet-Nam (bounded only by statutory limitations).

2. To strengthen Porter administratively, it might be well to assign him a competent Principal Deputy and Executive Officer—a military officer of two- or three-star rank. If this officer is desired, General Westmoreland can supply him or, if he requests, the officer can be provided from here. This officer would not be to command U.S. military forces or operations or to perform MACVʼs functions of advising and prodding the ARVN, but would be to provide administrative strength on the civilian side and to serve as a bridge to MACV, ensuring efficient interface between the civilian and military structures.

3. We understand General Westmoreland is already considering a MACV Special Assistant for Pacification or a Deputy for Pacification. We presume that the appointment of such a Special Assistant or Deputy could be timed to coincide with the changes on the civilian side, making possible the highest-level command focus and consolidation to MACVʼs RD concerns and staff.

4. Careful definition and delineation of responsibilities of the U.S. civilian and U.S. military sides would be necessary in the whole RD establishment in South Viet-Nam to ensure that nothing falls between the stools and that the two efforts fully mesh.

We are most anxious, as we know you are, to make progress in RD. So this new organizational arrangement would be on trial for 90–120 days, at the end of which we would take stock of progress and reconsider whether to assign all responsibility for RD to COMUSMACV.²

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted in the White House, cleared by Katzenbach, and approved by Rusk. The President met with Rusk, McNamara, and Rusk from 10:35 to 11:20 a.m. on November 4. (Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary) No record of the discussion has been found. However, under a November 4 covering note in which he stated that reorganization of the revolutionary development program was on the agenda, Rostow forwarded to the President back-up papers for the meeting that included a draft of this telegram, which had originally been transmitted to the President for his concurrence in telegram 68390 to Wellington, October 18. (Ibid., National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 15)
2. Lodge responded in telegram 10204 from Saigon, November 6. He stated that the crux of the problem was security, not defective organization, and that the first priority was more U.S. troops allotted to pacification. He agreed that civilian functions should be consolidated under Porter but argued against creating another deputy ambassador to absorb Porterʼs other responsibilities. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)