237. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
6280. 1. DʼOrlandi had a meeting with Lewandowski Friday night.2 It started as a social affair on DʼOrlandiʼs invitation and on Lewandowskiʼs initiative became a discussion of the war. According to Orlandi, Lewandowski said the following:
2. The United States Government is not really interested in talks. He said he had reason to believe that the State Department is trying to promote talks elsewhere along lines having to do with the revision of the Geneva Convention. Therefore, he says, the United States doesnʼt care about talks in Saigon. He heard there might be another attempt by Ronning. This would be hopeless. What we do not need are messengers carrying bits of paper but men who are inventive and imaginative and out of whose conversations something creative could come. With this as a preface Lewandowski went on to say:
3. Obviously he cannot give any kind of guarantee and no one else can—“not even Kosygin”—but should any kind of a reasonable proposal emerge he would take the first plane to Hanoi and put it in the best possible way.
4. Averting to what the nature of such a proposal should be, Lewandowski said that it was very simple and very easy to agree on “immortal principles” and grandiose platitudes such as “we love peace in Viet Nam,” etc. It is the practical application which presents insurmountable difficulties.
5. If the Americans ever really cared, they should especially concentrate on Pham Van Dongʼs fourth point concerning “who is to speak for South Viet Nam.” This does not mean that Hanoi would be trying to ram the Viet Cong down our throats. We could consider the setting up of a coalition government, the bulk of which would be made up of “sensible South Vietnamese politicians.” To preserve appearances you could have “on the fringes” men from the “right” in one or two “unimportant Ministries” and from on the “left” fill one or two “unimportant Ministries with the so-called NLF.”
6. DʼOrlandi—this is unthinkable. If this is what you want to talk about, it is better for us to stop the talks.
[Page 643]7. Lewandowski asked whether DʼOrlandi realized that what he meant to say was that this would be the last step not the first.
8. DʼOrlandi said: What would be the ultimate goal? If it is to have the Viet Cong in the Government of Viet Nam, I wonʼt even submit such a proposal to Ambassador Lodge.
9. Lewandowski said that is not at all what he meant to put to DʼOrlandi. Plainly, the ultimate aim would be: “To make of South Viet Nam a second Cambodia.”
10. DʼOrlandi said that makes more sense, it is at least worth talking about.
11. Lewandowski said: “But I donʼt believe the Americans really wish to talk. They are trying to do two things at once: military escalation grouped with political proposals. You canʼt do both. So long that they wonʼt make up their minds, we canʼt do anything. We must wait until November.
12. Comment: It is clear that the criticism of the United States for engaging in military escalation and political proposals at the same time is thoroughly disingenuous. Orlandi senses that Lewandowski realizes that the only possible chance for significant talks is that our military success should grow. End of comment.
13. DʼOrlandi fixed on Lewandowskiʼs statement about waiting until November to say that the more you postpone the worse things will get for you. If you had started having discussions a year ago when the Americans were much less numerous you would be in much better shape today.
14. Lewandowski said what I have said is my considered opinion. The Americans should produce some evidence that they are using their imagination. Why should we do it all?
15. DʼOrlandi said—Doesnʼt this mean that you donʼt care any longer to be in touch with me?
16. Lewandowski said: No, I want to be in touch with you, but when it comes to our tripartite talks, thatʼs how I see it. That is why I say we may all be in a better position in November.
17. Comment: As the Department is aware I have been thinking that there would be no real talks until after our November elections although I have also considered and still do think that the time between now and then can be useful for the formulation and consideration of ideas. Lew-andowskiʼs technique seems to be to say how hopeless it all is and how there is no use in going on and then sliding something in sort of at an angle, in this case a status for Vietnam similar to that of Cambodia. As I understand it, the problem has never been any difficulty with the idea of South Viet Nam being eventually neutral. The trouble has been that she wasnʼt strong enough to be neutral. The very weak cannot be neutral. [Page 644] The second difficulty has been that North Vietnam did not want her to be neutral but wanted to conquer her. End of comment.