Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

235. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara¹

JCSM–594–66

Washington, September 17, 1966.

SUBJECT

• Proposal for Barrier Systems (U)

1 (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the concept for an infiltration barrier system which was forwarded to them by your memorandum, dated 3 September 1966,² subject as above, and they have noted your directive to Lieutenant General Starbird, Director, Defense Communications Agency, dated 15 September 1966.³

2. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize the historic use of barriers and the potential inherent in this concept. The imaginative use of technology and surprise can contribute considerably toward solving the infiltration problem. While the capability of the system to meet the objective established for the system is subject to determination, the development of its component parts and operational techniques will be useful regardless of the success of the entire project. Your directive to General Starbird provides adequate direction, flexibility, authority, and control. It is requested that the project definition as developed by General Starbird be submitted to you through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. (TS) The views of CINCPAC, incorporating those of his component commanders and COMUSMACV, have been received (CINCPAC 130705Z September 1966, JCS IN 99920).⁴CINCPAC affirms that any measure that will effectively impede and disrupt the flow of men and material into South Vietnam merits careful consideration, and he recommends the development of the components of the system regardless of the decision to proceed. CINCPAC questions the practicality of the concept as presented. The Joint Chiefs of Staff appreciate and share the concern behind his reservations but recognize that these issues could be resolved by rigorous determination of feasibility that must precede execution or commitment of resources.

4. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that the barrier concept, as set forth in your memorandum, dated 3 September 1966, is not offered as a substitute to any major US or Free World military effort in North or South Vietnam. They concur. It is important that logistical support for the barrier be of a scale that precludes diverting critical munitions and strike forces from other combat operations.

5. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the system deployment date given to General Starbird is optimistic. However, they recognize that the concept may have the potential of shortening the war and that proceeding in the manner directed will provide a quick determination of concept validity and accelerated development of associated hardware.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 4662, VIET 385 BARRIER. Top Secret. In an earlier memorandum to McNamara, CM–135–66, April 18, Wheeler recommended against construction of a barrier and forwarded “A Study of Feasibility and Requirements for a Counter Infiltration Barrier” in support of his view. (Ibid.)
2. In this memorandum McNamara stated that he was “inclined to believe that the proposal has sufficient merit to warrant a decision that we will accept the plan or some modification thereof in principle.” (Ibid.) Attached to McNamaraʼs memorandum was a 6-page excerpt from the study noted in footnote 2, Document 233.
3. Document 233.
4. In telegram 130705Z, September 13, Sharp devoted eight paragraphs to questioning the barrierʼs practicality, doubting that it “would impede infiltration, even initially” or “appreciably improve the U.S. position in SVN.” He emphasized, among other things, that its establishment and maintenance would likely involve tremendous amounts of time, effort, manpower, and material and require either the “introduction of large numbers of additional forces” or the diversion of land and air forces needed for revolutionary development and ongoing air operations. In addition, the considerable force required to man the static barrier would be vulnerable to attack by a mobile enemy from both north and south. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, SVN Trip, October 1966)