Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

224. Intelligence Report¹

S-3690/AP-2F

Washington, August 1966.

AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM THROUGH 11 AUGUST 1966

Summary

1. (S/NFD) Air strikes against North Vietnam in July and early August have increased over recent months with particular emphasis on POL facilities, dispersed POL storage sites, lines of communications (LOCs) and transportation equipment. After the initial spectacular air strikes against the major bulk POL facilities, which began in late June, the campaign against NVN POL has steadied down to a slow and grinding effort to reduce the remaining bulk capacity and that of dispersed storage. This effort is slowing down and making difficult and costly the import and distribution of POL for the North Vietnamese.

2. (S/NFD) All five major rail lines were struck during the period. The Hanoi-Lao Cai and Hanoi-Vinh lines are interdicted for through service, the Hanoi-Dong Dang and Hanoi-Thai Nguyen lines are probably operational for through service, and the status of the Hanoi-Haiphong line is uncertain. With the exception of small water craft, the destruction of transport equipment in July was at the highest level to date. However, there are no indications that shortages in transportation have been serious.

3. (S/NFD) The North Vietnamese are placing emphasis on the development of alternate highway routing within the NVN Panhandle network. Highways in this area have been subject to extensive interdiction which has required heavy maintenance and the development of longer and lower capacity bypasses. Continued restoration and construction work on the LOCs throughout the country combined with the use of expedients have permitted the North Vietnamese to satisfy their logistic requirements and to continue their support of Communist activities in South Vietnam and Laos.

4. (S/NFD) Although there has been no noted change in VC/NVA military capabilities in South Vietnam which could be attributed to the air strikes in NVN, the recent B–52 strikes in the DMZ area disrupted support of the NVA 324B Division and have probably discouraged operations of this type in the immediate future.

5. (S/NFD) There is evidence that the regime is experiencing difficulty in implementing its urban evacuation program and that it has caused some popular dissatisfaction, but there is no concrete evidence that the air strikes have significantly weakened popular morale.

6. (S/NFD) Damage to the economy increased by almost $10 million,² the highest amount of economic loss measured during any reporting period in this series of reports. Total measurable direct and indirect losses to the economy and the military establishment are now estimated at $106 million. The loss of storage capacity in bulk petroleum facilities has presented Hanoi and its Allies with the necessity of improvising a makeshift storage and distribution system and conversion to this system has placed an additional heavy drain on economic resources. The cumulative debilitating effects on the economy are becoming increasingly apparent with the disruption of agricultural and industrial production. It is certain now that economic growth has stagnated. Shortages of economic goods and hardships are apparent among some parts of the civilian population but there have been no sustained and critical hardships among the bulk of the people.

[Here follows the body of the 23-page report.]

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LVII. Secret; Controlled Dissemination; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared jointly in the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency. The source text does not indicate a specific day of issue in August 1966.
2. US dollars are used throughout this report. [Footnote in the source text.]