Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

218. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, August 25, 1966.

SUBJECT

• Proposed RT Program, and Escalation Generally

I understand Defense has sent over a proposed RT program that would include strikes against the Haiphong docks, a steel plant, and other sensitive targets.² Since I will be away just overnight I am setting down my grave reservations about this proposal and about anything on our part which smacks of escalation at the present time.

There are three reasons for my concern:

a. I am very worried about the apparent escalation in which we have been engaged over the past six weeks As you may know, the number of our sorties over North Viet-Nam has substantially increased in this period.³ Moreover, while I think the other side understood what we were doing on the DMZ business, they—and certainly third countries—may have interpreted this as escalatory. Thirdly, although I think your refusal to exclude the possibility of land action against the north totally or for all time at your press conference⁴ was a right basic position, you probably have noted the Periscope item in this weekʼs Newsweek—just the sort of thing other governments, including the other side, pick up—that we are seriously making plans for such action.⁵ (I was asked at my Congressional briefing about this and said flatly we had no such plans.) These specific problems exist in a background of general comment to the effect that sentiment in the country is becoming more hawk-like. Thus, I think we have to be terribly concerned with both the fact and the appearance of our actions in the present.

b. The real convulsion in Communist China still defies assessment, but at the very least it means that any escalatory action on our part might be construed in Peking and Hanoi as a sign that we thought we could get away with something because of the political confusion in Communist China. This could trigger irrational action by one or both of these capitals. In other words, while I think an unsettled Chinese leadership will not take any initiatives, this is the time to be very careful in not appearing to take advantage of their troubles.

c. On any reading we can make, Hanoi remains firm in its basic position, and our guess is that they are watching the September and November elections. There may come a time for extra pressure to bring about the right decision on their part, but there is no indication that that time is now.

I would suggest that not only the RT program but our whole pace of action against the north be discussed with these factors in mind, and my own feeling is that we should reach high level agreement that we will maintain the present pace, perhaps even cutting back on the possibly excessive sortie rate in the north, which I doubt to be effective in the margin in any event, and avoid anything for the present that could be construed as a significant escalation.

1. Source: Department of State, EA/VN-Vietnam Working Group: Lot 72 D 219, Rolling Thunder Memos, 1966. Top Secret; Exdis. Copies were sent to Ball, U. Alexis Johnson, and Unger.
2. Presumably a reference to Rolling Thunder 52, which was approved by the JCS on August 19 and presented to McNamara by Wheeler on August 22. An August 18 memorandum for Wheeler outlining the proposal for RT 52 is in Department of Defense, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9155 (18 Feb 65), Section 13, Rolling Thunder 52. The proposal included strikes against the Phuc Yen and Kep POL storage facilities, a steel plant, a cement plant, two thermal power plants, four locks, the Haiphong, Cam Pha, and Hon Gai ports, and other targets. CINCPACʼs recommendation of August 8 for strikes against some of these targets was analyzed in an August 17 memorandum to Ball from Hughes. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
3. Under cover of a memorandum dated August 16, Read sent Bundy a report on U.S. “Escalatory Signals in July,” which indicated that “10,198 attack sorties were flown against NVN [in July] compared with a previous high 7,398 in June.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LVII)
4. For text of Ruskʼs statement, see Department of State Bulletin, August 22, 1966, pp. 259–260.
5. “Many top-level civilian analysts predict that sometime this fall the U.S. will invade North Vietnam.” (“The Periscope,” Newsweek, August 29, 1966, p. 9)