190. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1

1788. 1. I allowed enough time for Lewandowski to leave and then talked with DʼOrlandi again.

2. He said that after I had left, Lewandowski made it clear that he was “much distressed.” He had walked up and down the room, saying how distressed he was.

3. DʼOrlandi said that Fanfani had called him to Rome and that there was now no reason to stay if this was the kind of line that Lewandowski was going to expound. He was, therefore, going to leave immediately for Rome.

4. Lewandowski asked him when he would be coming back, and DʼOrlandi replied by August 15.

5. According to DʼOrlandi, Lewandowskiʼs great preoccupation was China. He was terribly worried about China. DʼOrlandi thought it was Chinaʼs influence which was making Hanoi so intransigent, but he also feared that China might take some sort of action which would “mess [Page 529] up the situation.” Lewandowski was certainly worried about Chinese pressure.

6. It is clear, said DʼOrlandi, that three or four weeks will go by during which nothing will happen and, DʼOrlandi surmised, this may explain Lewandowskiʼs remark on Saturday2 morning that the entire conversation between Lewandowski and me would take about six months altogether.

7. Fanfani is going to Warsaw tomorrow and will be back in Rome on Thursday. DʼOrlandiʼs telegram describing todayʼs meeting will reach Fanfani before he goes to Warsaw.

8. DʼOrlandi intends to ask Fanfani how much the Italian Government is interested in this whole procedure, and how long he, DʼOrlandi, should stay in Saigon. He said that Fanfani had had the idea of replacing DʼOrlandi as Ambassador and of sending him to Saigon on specific trips. Both DʼOrlandi and I felt that this would pretty much destroy the present arrangement. It appears that the minute anyone goes on a special trip connected with Viet-Nam the ensuing publicity causes failure. The advantage of the present situation is that DʼOrlandi, Lewandowski and I all have regular jobs in Saigon, which serve as cover for our conversations.

9. Lewandowski told DʼOrlandi that he would not spend more than a week in Hanoi which would get him back here around the 10th or the 12th of August. DʼOrlandi felt that Lewandowskiʼs trip to Hanoi might be “quite pointless” and that Lewandowskiʼs instructions were coming from Warsaw, with Warsaw undoubtedly telling Hanoi what it was doing. On the other hand, DʼOrlandi felt that the original demarche had come as a result of one of Lewandowskiʼs visits to Hanoi.

10. One thing is sure and that is that Lewandowski and Warsaw—and probably Hanoi—wish to maintain the current contact between Lewandowski and me.

Lodge
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 9:45 a.m. During a telephone conversation at 11:10 a.m. on July 24, Rostow told Rusk that he had “left the negative Marigold cables upstairs for the Pres. to read”; Rostow also said that “his reflection this morning had been re press leak” and he wondered “if on next round it wouldnʼt be wiser for direct approach.” (Ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telcons)
  2. July 23.