Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

160. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, June 22, 1966.

5684. Herewith my weekly telegram:

1. Many congratulations on the statement which you made at your Saturday news conference.² It was impressive in its solidity, its broad base, and its well balanced view of the situation.

A. Hue back under GVN

2. Hue, the countryʼs most persistent political trouble spot, has been brought back under government control during the past week after having been effectively in disloyal hands for the past three months.

3. Under the direction of National Police Director, and Ky intimate Colonel Loan, four battalions of loyal government troops plus about [garble] riot police dispatched from Saigon removed from the streets the thousands of Buddhist altars which have blocked traffic throughout the city. They also arrested many agitators including several prominent student and Struggle force leaders; and they dispersed a spate of small anti-government demonstrations.³ First Division Commander General Nhuan, who has been mouthing his loyalty to the government while giving aid and comfort to the dissidents, has been relieved; and former I Corps Commander and dissident leader General Dinh has been taken out of Hue and sent to Saigon. Commercial activity is gradually returning to normal.

4. These operations were accompanied by a heavy outpouring of pro-government propaganda designed to bring the city back under control with a minimum of opposition. Partly because of this propaganda, but mostly because the majority of people in Hue never have supported Tri Quang during this Struggle movement. Opposition was not serious. During the operation of the last few days, the Buddhists had been able to gather only small bands of civilian demonstrators and a few First Division troops, largely from service rather than combat units, who had responded to Tri Quangʼs appeal. Tear gas sufficed to bring the dissidents under control. There were only rare instances of gunfire, producing very few casualties with no more than five persons believed to have been killed. Most people in the city were happy to see bright prospects for ending the turmoil. Once again, Ky had shown his skill in the use of force—a useful talent for anyone trying to run a government in this part of the world.

5. Tri Quang remains on his so-called “hunger strike” (15 days as of June 22, although he has been taking many types of nourishment in liquid form and can probably live indefinitely at this rate). His rabble-rousing activities, however, have been effectively stopped. He has almost certainly lost the considerable popular support he once commanded. He has now been brought to Saigon, reportedly at his request—some say to protect him from being assassinated by the Viet Cong.

6. I hope that the return of Hue to government control, and the failure of the Buddhist Institute to arouse mass popular support in Saigon mean that we are now at the end of the political crisis in Viet-Nam, which began with the relief of General Thi on March 10. Although Ky did not see the trouble this would make for him, he must be given credit for his wise and restrained application of force once the crisis had started. This allowed the opposition extremists to overplay their hand. Now the government has regained its power and can resume the many tasks which need doing.⁴

B. Much governmental activity

7. Over the last weekend, there was more governmental activity than at any time since Ky became Prime Minister a year ago. On June 18, Minister of Economy announced a broad range of tough anti-inflation measures which we and the IMF have been urging. It looks as though Ky has shown real courage and decisiveness.

8. Sunday, June 19, was the first anniversary of the Ky government, making it the government which has held office the longest since the overthrow of Diem in 1963. Instead of making it an occasion for self-congratulation, Ky and his colleagues made the wise decision to designate the anniversary as armed forces day with an impressive two-hour parade, a torch light ceremony and display of fireworks, which, for the first time since I have been here, could be described as creating festive atmosphere.

9. It is good for Vietnamese to think about the armed forces who are still the one disciplined, anti-Communist and nation building element in the country. During the last few months, the armed forces have been attacked by the Viet Cong; they have had their prestige injured by the antics of certain political Generals; their unity has been a target for the Buddhists and their chaplains; and the “Struggle” movement has put a strain on their unity and morale. It was wise not only to have this celebration on June 19, but to have used it as the occasion for announcing promotions and a pay raise.

10. The so-called “Unified Buddhist Church” is in considerable disarray. Its “Young Turk” bonzes who are associated with the Struggle in Saigon appear unwilling to accept the moderate leadership of Thich Tam Chau. He, on the other hand, sent a letter informing them that he still regards himself as chairman of the Buddhist Institute. It would be wonderful if out of all this wreckage, a sober, responsible Buddhist church might emerge.

C. Elections

11. On June 19, the government issued the election decree law setting forth the regulations for candidates and voters in next Septemberʼs election for Deputies to a National Assembly which aims to produce a constitution. A decree was also issued dealing with the organization of the Assembly. The election law represents the work of the drafting committee as modified by the enlarged Directorate (containing 10 military and 10 civilians). I believe it compares well with the election laws and regulations in one of our states. To organize elections in a war torn country, which has only had a very slight experience with elections, and which has never had elections in a national framework, is quite a job.

12. For this reason, I advise officials in Washington who speak about the Vietnamese elections not to over-praise what has been done. While it is as certain as anything can be that elections are going to be held, it is not at all certain that they will be held without intimidation, and that the results will command widespread respect. It would be imprudent for our spokesman in Washington to say what a great thing these elections are going to be, and then to have disappointing news. It is much better for us to say very little, and then if the elections turn out well (a possibility which is not excluded), public opinion at home will be entitled to feel really encouraged.

D. Military

13. Our forces continued to enjoy significant successes in their operations against the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese army forces during the week. A total of 928 enemy troops were killed and some 232 were captured. These figures are down somewhat from the preceding week. Contrasted with these totals, friendly forces lost 239 killed in action (including 44 U.S.). The wounded figure was 725 (including 306 U.S.), but we count all slight wounds and Vietnamese only count hospital cases.

14. Our Coast Guard units made a significant catch in the night of June 19–20. While on patrol duty in the China Sea, they picked up a steel-hulled coastal transport about 125 feet long. The vessel refused to respond to their challenge. They pursued it, ran it ashore and discovered that it contained 250 tons of Chinese war material destined for the Viet Cong. The Vietnamese Government is lodging a protest with the International Control Commission and an inspection team of Canadian and Indian officials has already gone to the site.

15. Despite the important gains we have made on the purely military front over the last several weeks, we still seem to be having great difficulty in dealing with the Viet Congʼs systematic campaign of terror. Two nights ago in the vicinity of Hue, the Viet Cong summarily executed a district chief. Last week in Binh Long, a village chief was murdered. This terror tactic which has been a Viet Cong trademark is still terribly effective in demoralizing the population and breaking down the governmentʼs administrative machinery. Since the turn of the year, there has been some slight improvement in the number of local officials killed or abducted, but it is still running at the rate of seventy per month.

16. The “village guerrilla” is the responsibility of regional and popular forces, which are under the Vietnamese military and, for the U.S., pertains to MACV. And the “village guerrilla” is also the responsibility of the police which, for the U.S., pertains to USAID and its police advisers. Finally we hope that our revolutionary development cadres will make life unbearable for local terrorists.

17. I doubt that Hanoi will conclude that it cannot win in South Viet-Nam as long as they can do so well with local terrorism.

E. Chieu Hoi

19. We still get no Chieu Hoi figure from I Corps. I, therefore, have analyzed Chieu Hoi figures since January leaving out I Corps (which is 7 percent of the total) so that we can see how weʼre doing in the rest of the country. It looks as though it is starting up again. These figures are as follows: January 1005; February 1862; March 2141; April 1444; May 1458.

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 7:36 a.m. and passed to the White House.
2. At his news conference on June 18, the President made a statement on Vietnam and answered questions about the war. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book I, pp. 625–636.
3. On June 10 Ky sent several hundred special riot police to the Hue area under Colonel Loanʼs command. The riot police took control of the local police force. On June 15–17 two airborne and two marine battalions joined the police and carried out a 4-day campaign against disorganized opposition. By June 19 open resistance from Buddhists and military dissidents had collapsed. (Clarke, Advice and Support: The Final Years, p. 143; The New York Times, June 11, 16, 17, 19, 1966)
4. Telegram 5712 from Saigon, June 23, provided a detailed summary of developments in the “GVN-Buddhist confrontation” during the previous 4 days. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)