Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

158. Memorandum From the Ambassador to Vietnam (Lodge) to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow)¹

Saigon, undated.

SUBJECT

• General Taylorʼs Memorandum for the President of April 27, 1966, entitled “Assessment and Use of Negotiation Blue Chips,”² concerning which you asked my opinion

1. Your attention is first invited to:

a. Saigonʼs 1377 of October 21, 1965,³ notably to suggestion for an opening negotiating position and for definition of a “Satisfactory Outcome”;

b. Letter to Leonard Unger of November 30, 1965,⁴ commenting on the State Department paper, “A Settlement in Vietnam” dated November 3, 1965;⁵ which includes

c. a paper by me entitled, “Negotiating with the Communists” (based on experience at the UN and study of negotiations elsewhere);⁶

d. Saigonʼs 2343 of January 1, 1966;⁷

e. Saigonʼs 2376 of January 4, 1966.⁸

2. General Taylorʼs paper is of great value and he is to be congratulated on it. There are some observations of his which are particularly wise. They should be a guide to anyone who represents the United States at a negotiation and are as follows:

a. The initiation of discussions does not mean the advent of peace. Probably more people were killed after the Panmunjom talks started than would have been killed had we kept the military initiative.

b. There must be an incentive for the enemy to come to a prompt settlement. Without such an incentive the talks could drag on indefinitely. Therefore, military pressure must be maintained while the talks are taking place.

c. The bombing must not be stopped without a quid pro quo. To do so solely for the purpose of getting talks going would seriously prejudice the success of any subsequent negotiations.

d. Moreover, we should never give up any one of our assets in advance as a precondition for discussions. We should only concede one step at a time.

e. Orthodox troop withdrawals, such as the US can make, are very easy to verify. Infiltration on the communist model is so elusive that an effective detection system of a “ceasefire” is not feasible.

f. There should be an analysis by competent experts in Washington as to how our assets should be played.

3. In his last paragraph, at the bottom of page 3, General Taylor affirms that the United States must never give up any of its assets without achieving an equivalent gain. I agree emphatically. He also says that his specific “estimate of assets and values may be challenged,” which I take as a gracious invitation to comment—and possibly to suggest variants—on his assessment of the “blue chips.” In this spirit I make the following observations:

4. The Essence of the Taylor Proposal

a. General Taylor proposes for the first phase of diplomatic negotiations that, in exchange for the US stopping its bombing and its offensive military operations in South Vietnam, the Viet Cong stop their incidents and their military operations.

b. For the second stage, the US would stop its force increase and the Viet Cong would cease its infiltration.

c. After this, would come withdrawal by the Viet Cong and by the US and dissolution of the Viet Cong (which the Viet Cong would agree to). In exchange, the GVN would give amnesty and civic rights to the Viet Cong.

d. General Taylor adds that if the Viet Cong performance is bad as regards cessation of military operations, we can resume bombing.

e. He also says that under his plan the US and GVN would retain the right to use weapons to protect the civil population outside of the Viet Cong territory.

5. My General Comment on the Taylor Proposal

a. General Taylor, in effect, proposes a general ceasefire as a substitute for unilateral ending of United States bombing.

b. If this becomes our policy, we should never reveal the fact publicly because the pressure of so-called world opinion would probably force us to stop the bombing first, after which we would be committed to a general ceasefire. Then, when we came to working out the all-important specific provisions of a ceasefire, we would be without some very valuable bargaining power.

c. I also question whether we could readily resume bombing if the Viet Cong performance is bad, given the influence of organized propaganda against the bombings. Whether we like it or not, bombing the North is in a special propaganda category. But we could, to be sure, resume operation on the ground.

6. My Comment on the Substance of the Taylor Proposal Regarding “Blue Chips”

a. The Taylor proposal does not reach terrorism in the Viet Cong areas, even though it does enable us and the GVN to retain the right to use weapons to protect the civil population outside of the Viet Cong territory.

b. But it is very difficult to define Viet Cong areas geographically and this makes it equally difficult, if not impossible, to define prohibited US–GVN “offensive” military operations therein. This would lead to continual charges that we are violating the ceasefire. For example, many large segments of the countryside are “controlled” by whichever side happens to be physically present at any given time. With a ceasefire, would we be able to use arms to protect the people in such areas from the VC? Other extensive areas of the countryside are controlled by the GVN by day and the VC by night. Would friendly forces be able to patrol such areas at night? Could GVN officials stay in rural areas at night with impunity from the VC? These considerations call into question the practicability of arranging a ceasefire in isolation from a more general political settlement.

c. Whatever steps we might take to protect ourselves after the “ceasefire” was in effect would put us in clear violation of the ceasefire.

d. On the other hand, the Viet Cong method of operation, being unorthodox from a western military viewpoint, makes it easy for them to keep below the threshold of the proposed “ceasefire” agreement. The term “ceasefire” cannot reasonably apply to such things as sabotage, assassination, terrorism, propaganda, impressment, kidnapping, torture, subversive action, VC tax collection, infiltration from the north, and direction of strategy and tactics. None of these things necessarily involve the use of firearms.

e. In the areas now embracing about 25 per cent of the population and which are presently controlled by the Viet Cong, the forces of law and order would thus be prevented from using weapons, but the Viet Cong would be free to go on using the methods which they traditionally use.

f. A general ceasefire would legitimize Viet Cong areas, thereby leading to partition or to irresistible demands for a coalition government.

g. To end the military pressures against presently hard-pressed Viet Cong units, as a ceasefire would do, would also enable them to regroup and launch operations later under more favorable conditions, as happened very often in the Chinese civil war.

h. If a ceasefire permits unimpeded access by the government to the entire country it will be unacceptable to the Viet Cong, but we would be committed to a ceasefire without a political settlement.

i. If a ceasefire leads to the recognition of Viet Cong safe areas, a political outcome will have, in effect, been imposed by the formalities of the ceasefire.

7. My Alternative Proposal

a. Instead of linking the cessation of bombing to a cessation of Viet Cong incidents and military operations, I would rather link the bombing to stopping infiltration by North Vietnam into the South and to an agreement to establish control posts along the Ho Chi Minh trail and along both sides of the Vietnamese-Laotian and Vietnamese-Cambodian borders.

b. This has the advantage that it would not be necessary for Hanoi to admit that it has infiltrated. Hanoi could maintain a public posture of non-intervention and control posts could be established without loss of face.

c. Also, this scheme has the advantage of relating the end of bombing to the interdiction of supplies—a logical thing to do since the purpose of bombing is precisely to interdict supplies. For Hanoi publicly to fore-swear infiltration would be a heavy blow to the morale of the Viet Cong. It would enable us to continue the bombing until a satisfactory inspection mechanism is worked out. The issue of a general ceasefire could be left to the general political settlement, where it belongs.

d. I recognize that General Taylor doubts the feasibility of an effective detection system for infiltration. Concerning this very important objection, I make two observations: A. It should be promptly studied by the best experts we have; and B. We should, under my proposal, continue bombing while a detection system was being worked out—assuming that such a system was not ready when negotiations began.

8. Probable Consequences

a. My trade looks somewhat less dramatic than General Taylorʼs, but I wonder whether it would not put us in a stronger position.

b. If Hanoi refuses to cease infiltration—or to establish control posts to verify that it is not infiltrating—it will be in a difficult position to mobilize world opinion against an end of the bombing.

c. Also, my proposal would not force us to stop military operations in the South during negotiations. We would thus remain in a position to maintain maximum incentives for a flexible communist attitude.

d. Also, the trade which I propose would enable us to tie a “cease-fire” to a political settlement or at least to the outlines of it. And “cease-fire,” as regards the Viet Cong, is much more political than military.

9. “Satisfactory Outcome”

a. I renew my recommendation that we be clear in our minds as to what constitutes a “satisfactory outcome.” Without a dependable standard of measurement we run the risk of yielding to the pressures of the moment to such an extent that we actually find that, immediately upon the conclusion of the negotiations, we have lost the war and thus all that we have fought and sacrificed for. See Saigonʼs 1377.

b. The negotiator must not be made to feel that if the negotiations break down, he has failed. I have known negotiations at the UN where on three separate occasions the US representative said in effect that he was being asked to make such impossible concessions that there was no point in continuing the conversation—and left the room. Yet an excellent understanding finally resulted. The other side was simply trying to see how far we could be pushed.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LV. Secret. Lodge forwarded the memorandum to Rostow under cover of a memorandum dated June 17. (Ibid.)
2. Document 127.
3. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. III, pp. 470–473.
4. Not found.
5. Not found, but see footnote 7, Document 115, regarding a later version of this paper.
6. Attached but not printed. Lodge sent a copy of this undated memorandum to the President on January 17, 1966. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Box 212, Negotiation)
7. Document 1.
8. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)