152. Editorial Note
In JCS telegram 3086–66, June 2, 1966, General Wheeler notified General Westmoreland that he thought the time for decision on expanding the air campaign against North Vietnam was approaching. “It is quite clear authority to attack the POL system was within our grasp when the political turmoil in SVN rose to a height which caused many people here to take a second look.” Wheeler suggested that if the political situation remained stable Westmoreland submit a proposal the following week for attacks on POL targets. (Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files)
That same day a U.S. military officer, under arrangements made by Secretary McNamara, briefed Prime Minister Wilson at 10 Downing Street on pending air strikes against POL storage installations near Hanoi and Haiphong. Wilson responded in a message to President Johnson the next day that he would have to dissociate himself from such a move, which he believed would make settlement of the conflict more difficult, [Page 412] but he would continue his overall support for Johnsonʼs policy in Vietnam. (Telegram 7266 to London, June 3; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
In telegram 19218 to Admiral Sharp, June 5, General Westmoreland proposed strikes on eight POL targets. (Department of Defense, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9155 (18 Feb 65), Rolling Thunder 50–A Extended) Secretary McNamara told Under Secretary Ball in a telephone conversation the next day, Monday, that he was having an operational order for POL strikes drafted, since the President wanted McNamara prepared to move later in the week. (Telcon, June 6; Johnson Library, Ball Papers) In telegram 107 to Brussels, June 7, Ball passed this information on to Rusk, who was attending a NATO Ministerial Meeting. Ball pointed out several reasons for delay, among them Ruskʼs meeting with Prime Minister Wilson, scheduled for June 10, and Canadian diplomat Chester Ronningʼs peace mission to Hanoi starting June 14. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
In two memoranda dated June 8, Special Assistant Walt Rostow informed the President that Secretary Rusk was “firmly for postponement until we know the results of Ronningʼs mission,” while Secretary McNamara preferred to go ahead immediately. McNamara, however, felt that Ruskʼs request for postponement should be honored. Rostow estimated that a postponement would mean a 2-week delay, which he regarded “as unfortunate, but not necessarily a disaster.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 5)