Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

149. Memorandum From William Leonhart of the White House Staff to President Johnson¹

Washington, May 30, 1966.

SUBJECT

• Report on Visit to Vietnam: May 17–29, 1966

1. I returned yesterday from a ten-day visit—my first in fourteen years since a 1950–52 tour of duty in the Saigon Embassy.

2. Three general impressions from this quick trip:

a. Our key programs have not been materially hampered by the recent political disorders. These programs may not be bounding forward but they are moving ahead—in revolutionary development, nationwide self help projects, and politico-military coordination. On the military side, the recent ARVN disaffections have largely involved rear support troops and headquarters units. The combat forces, even in I Corps, have kept up far better than press reporting from Saigon indicates.

b. Kyʼs ability to cope with the intestinal discords of Vietnam remains in doubt, but since his original political blundering against Thi, his touch has improved. There are additionally strong possibilities that Vietnam will look considerably brighter by late September. The controlling factors: (1) a reasonable chance for substantial progress in our arms, on which all else chiefly depends, if Westmoreland finds, as he expects to do, the new VC regiments and their built-up supplies; (2) better prospects for healthier politics that the September Constitutional Assembly elections should bring; and (3) the political impact of the completion of the first village assignments by the 100 new RD cardre teams which graduated on May 25.

c. To increase the new momentum in RD programs and to exploit these favoring possibilities, we have much to do over the next few months.

3. The original Komer priorities, as seen on the ground in Vietnam, seem sound and essential. Immediate requirements are:

a. Anti-inflation. The problem is as bad as—or worse—than we had thought it. Retail prices continue to rise at 5% per month. In one year local construction materials have skyrocketed: lumber up 600%, rock 500%, sand 300% (USAID is now letting a 610,000 ton tender for sand to Taiwan—61 unbudgeted Liberty ships). Last week in Saigon the black market in US $10 bills reached an all-time high at 182 piasters. We should hit hard, and early. The GVN is now softened up by the visit of the IMF team. Delay in devaluation will only involve it more in the elections. We can try for the deeper range of devaluation around 120 or the lesser around 80 with special exchange surcharges. The IMF appears to favor the latter and it is important to keep it out in front. But a deeper devaluation would be cleaner, simpler to administer, and less subject to subsequent unravelling. My own view is that the door should be held open for a negotiating entry at about 110 and an exit at about 100.

b. Port Congestion. At the end of May the number of non-military ships waiting off Saigon for their turn at unloading was 36. Average waiting time was 26 days. Civilian cargo clearances have been overstated through errors in reporting methods by about 20% or 50,000 tons a month. Westmoreland now seems to favor military operation of the Saigon port jointly with ARVN units which will provide some cushion for political sensitivities while letting the US do the real work. He will need full authority over US civil employees at the port, improved arrangements to remove warehoused goods, and a system to schedule and control outbound cargo from the States. Lack of such control is one of the basic deficiencies of the present AID system. He should be given what he needs to make the port function.

c. Cadres. The new 59-man RD cadres are the most promising element in the country. The first 100 teams were graduated at the end of May. A second class of 115 teams will graduate in September. The decision to double the cadre this year was of basic importance. By June 1967, if the program goes well, 10,000 cadre will be trained each thirteen weeks. Westmoreland is now prepared to convert PF troops into cadre providing no villages are left uncovered in the process and CIA auspices can be reasonably concealed. We must work to insulate the cadre from changes in GVN regimes; hold the existing training facilities at Vung Tau at least until the new camp at Long Hai is fully operational and its surrounding area secured; improve our infiltration security as numbers increase rapidly; and keep a close cross-check on our training methods against cadre performance and experience. But if there had been imagination enough to form these teams fourteen years ago, Vietnam would be much different today.

4. The next steps are well understood as between Washington and the Saigon mission. We should aim for next-phase decisions in June on:

a. A manpower survey, decently done, as a basis for overdue judgments on new allocations of increasingly scarce Vietnamese manpower. The Mission will need help, and we should get a manpower team out to Saigon soonest.

b. Priorities guidelines for the pacification and developmental phases of rural reconstruction based on NSAM 343.

c. Redefinitions of roles and missions to rationalize the hodgepodge of present security forces. The critical area is the 350,000 man agglomeration of RF, PF, Police, Police Field Forces, CIDG, special force units, and RD cadres now competing for money, manpower and material.

d. Land Reform. A mission interagency group is now working on feasibility, but will probably favor a selective and gradual approach.

5. Ahead lie further priority actions. The most important of these seem to me:

a. Urban Programs. We have tended to ignore urban areas and then find time and again that our political difficulties arise from the cities. Each of the eight districts of Saigon increased in population by 60–70,000 last year. Another 500,000 will probably be added in the next twelve months. Some form of political action team or an extension of the RD cadres to urban areas may be useful. Measures to repair the breakdown in urban services—particularly public health and refuse disposal—are urgently required. This is one of the few areas susceptible of visible results before the September elections.

b. USAID Vacancies. Of a total of 3931 approved positions, USAID has 2991 on board. In its field operations staff, it is authorized 203 positions and had 128 present on May 23. Obviously recruitment programs need to be pressed, and there is an urgent need to fill certain vacancies at once—in auditors and commodity analysts, where weaknesses in control procedures are attracting adverse comment. In general, the USAID personnel structure needs reexamination (Lodge would favor a 25% cut). My own view is that reform and slenderizing should be undertaken against the new decisions on revised priorities.

c. Joint Operations. We may need to move more toward joint boards and commissions with the GVN. In the period immediately ahead, the GVN seems unlikely to improve administratively quickly and sufficiently enough to carry out its programs with only liaison guidance. In the military area, we need to find a more effective means for advance consultation on plans and political actions. Westmorelandʼs project for joint operations of the ports and storage facilities seems promising. For the cadres, some adaptation of the JCRR, which did effective work on Taiwan, may be useful. Its key provisions were a direct appropriation of Congressional funds and the appointment of its members (three Chinese, two Americans) by the respective Presidents for fixed terms. Independence of tenure and funds may be needed to insulate the cadres—and to preserve the present dynamic chief, General Thang—from GVN politics.

6. Finally, press relations. The resident Saigon press corps by and large is young, inexperienced, and sensationalist minded. It will be a difficult group to work with at best, but I am convinced that more can be done. Barry Zorthian, the head of JUSPAO, will be in Washington for two weeks in mid-June. I strongly recommend that Mr. Moyers and Mr. Komer meet with him and that we work out an informational strategy and operational plan for the next several months on story lines, press treatment, and greater emphasis on third country programs in behalf of Vietnamese freedom and development.

William Leonhart²

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LIV. Secret. Copies were sent to Rostow and Taylor. Leonhart was Komerʼs deputy in the White House office established by NSAM No. 343 (Document 102) to oversee pacification and other non-military programs in Vietnam.
2. Printed from a copy that indicates Leonhart signed the original.