Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

135. Summary Notes of the 557th Meeting of the National Security Council¹

Washington, May 10, 1966, 5:45 p.m.

Vietnam

General Wheeler gave a briefing on the military situation in Vietnam. The tempo of ground operations will continue at a low level until the monsoon arrives in two or three weeks in the south, at which time the tempo will step up.

In response to the Presidentʼs questions, General Wheeler gave these answers:

a. Infiltration from North to South Vietnam is estimated at about 4,500 men per month.

b. Air operations in the north have hurt the North Vietnamese. They are having transportation difficulties and are using at least 80,000 men to repair their LOCs. They are calling for more trucks and have stepped up their imports of POL.

c. Some 7,000 men have defected from the South Vietnamese forces since January 1. The rate has been high, but is now lower.

d. During the pause, the North Vietnamese repaired the damage to their LOCs which we did during earlier bombing, expanded their infiltration routes, and improved their road nets.

e. Morale is down in Viet Cong ranks and is uncertain in the North Vietnamese army. It is not yet at the breaking point.

Secretary McNamara read from a Rand report² on the extensive damage done to the Viet Cong and North Vietnam during the past three months.

General Wheeler: The effect of political events on U.S. troops is small, but the effect on the South Vietnamese forces is large.

We have no supply problems.

The President asked for a special report from General Westmoreland on Senator Mansfieldʼs allegations concerning drinking and irregular activities of our forces.

Ambassador Lodge³ praised the decision to deploy U.S. troops to Vietnam. The recent overthrow of the Communists in Indonesia is a direct result of our having taken a firm stand in Vietnam.⁴

Analyzing the situation in the past few months, he said the events of March were really a counterattack on U.S. successes. The Saigon Government is now almost paralyzed but we will have to learn to work in this atmosphere. Military activity can go ahead and pacification can proceed, apart from developments in Saigon. Complicated things cannot be undertaken now by the Saigon Government. The word for the future is evolution rather than stability.

Secretary Rusk: We base our support of South Vietnam on their desire not to have the Viet Cong take them over by force. A broad-based constituent Assembly is now required. It would be a real setback for us if this Assembly does not come out of the present political activity in Saigon. In order to ensure that Saigon will act, we may have to go so far as to use the threat to get out of Vietnam.

Our military assistance to Vietnam is based on the SEATO treaty and the Tonkin Gulf resolution of August. We must oppose the serious effort which is being made to downgrade these two commitments. We must staunchly support the SEATO treaty commitment. If they get us out from under these two commitments, then they get us out of our basic Southeast Asian policy.

The President: To those who are testifying on the Hill, we should give a summary of the speeches and Congressional reports issued at the time of the approval of the SEATO treaty and of the August resolution.

Secretary McNamara: Political events in Saigon are causing trouble in the military area. There are fewer Vietnamese casualties. We hope that heavy pressure by U.S. forces will carry us over the present period.

The President reviewed three years of involvement in the Vietnam problem, expressing doubt that an unusually large amount of time was spent considering new proposals or changes in policy. Our strategy has been the same for three years. There are island hoppers who jump from issue to issue and there are those who would put a bag of cement on the back of the man running the race. We are committed and we will not be deterred. We must accept the fact that some will always oppose, dissent and criticize. We want results.

It is acceptable that we referee some of the fights between General Ky and others in the Saigon government.

Robert Komer: There are three harmful effects arising out of our military effort in Vietnam.

a. Anti-Americanism.

b. Inflation caused by the military buildup of both the U.S. and South Vietnam.

c. Our pacification program has been out-run by our search and destroy capability.

If the United States is blamed for these effects, real harm will be done to us during the forthcoming election period in Vietnam. We must have a program to avoid runaway inflation, and we must limit the inflationary effect of our military buildup at once. We must double the number of those in the Rural Development cadres. The manpower needed a small claim on military resources.

Bill Moyers: Current press speculation is harmful. No comment should be made to the press until Ambassador Lodge completes his consultation here.

The President: There are 26 men in this room. There must be no comment to the press about our discussions. Donʼt make it more difficult for me to make a decision.

Bromley Smith

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File. Top Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. Prepared by Bromley Smith. The meeting, which ended at 7:32 p.m., was held in the Cabinet Room. (Ibid., Presidentʼs Daily Diary)
2. Not further identified.
3. Lodge returned to Washington in early May for consultations and departed on May 17. In a May 3 memorandum to Rusk and McNamara, Rostow forwarded an agenda of 19 Vietnam items for possible discussion with Lodge during his visit and requested briefing papers on each item. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Walt Rostow) Copies of the briefing papers are ibid., Meeting Notes File.
4. Responding to a Presidential request stemming from this statement, CIA produced an intelligence memorandum, May 25, on the “Relationship of US Stand in South Vietnam to Stability in Southeast Asia,” which found a direct relationship between U.S. firmness in Vietnam and the relative stability of some Southeast Asian countries, but not Indonesia. (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LIV)