Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

96. Memorandum From Senator Mike Mansfield to President Johnson¹

Washington, July 27, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Meeting on Viet Nam

Subsequent to our telephone conversation, I met with the following Senators in my office at 3:30 this afternoon:

• Russell
• Fulbright
• Sparkmant
• Cooper
• Rusk

I opened the meeting by reporting fully on the Leadership discussion of Viet Nam this morning. There was a general sense of reassurance that your objective was not to get in deeply and that you intended to do only what was essential in the military line until January, while Rusk and Goldberg were concentrating on attempting to get us out. A general desire to support you in this course was expressed. It was felt that one of the best ways this could be done would be by communicating the feelings of some of the senior Members of the Senate to you in this fashion.

Among the major points which were raised by various of the Senators in attendance during the discussions were the following:

1. The estimate of 100,000 men by the end of the year was probably short, that the more likely figure would be 150,000.

2. The Russians feel that they have an obligation to aid the North Vietnamese not unlike ours towards a Western European country which might be attacked and if we expect them to help in getting negotiations started before this situation gets out of hand we have to provide them with some basis for helping.

3. The United Nations may be an important link in a way out of the situation but this possibility is clouded by the issue of Article 19; it may not be opportune to insist upon enforcement of the Article at this time; but heat is already being generated on the issue in the House and some prompt Presidential initiative on the point in public may be desirable.

4. Bridges to Eastern Europe need to be kept open and continued encouragement of the evolution of these nations (Yugoslavia, in particular) towards full independence, political and economic, under their own unique forms of organization is of the greatest importance.

5. The Russians are deeply concerned that we are abandoning the policy of peaceful co-existence; some tangible reassurance that we are not, perhaps through the consular convention, is desirable.

6. The country is backing the President on Viet Nam primarily because he is President, not necessarily out of any understanding or sympathy with policies on Viet Nam; beneath the support, there is deep concern and a great deal of confusion which could explode at any time; in addition racial factors at home could become involved.

7. The main perplexity in the Vietnamese situation is that even if you win, totally, you still do not come out well. What have you achieved? It is by no means a “vital” area of U.S. concern as it was described by Lodge at a hearing this morning.

8. There is reason for concern and irritation at Cao Ky’s statement that we should fight on the perimeter while the Vietnamese military is organizing the rear.

9. The President was ill-advised to begin the bombing of North Viet Nam in the first place and the error was then compounded by the limited character of the bombing.

10. In clarification of what would follow a failure of the Goldberg-Rusk effort between now and January, it was pointed out that it would mean that we would probably have to add very substantially to manpower at that time.

11. The military concept of a greatly extended bombing in Viet Nam is sound.

12. Another cessation of bombing of longer duration than the previous one might be desirable as a means of getting discussions underway.

13. Underground contact might be sought not only with the Russians but with the Chinese as well; it could be particularly useful in bringing about talks in the event another pause in the bombing is attempted.

14. France, who has the best contacts in Indochina, has been virtually ignored as a possible avenue of approach to negotiations.

15. The situation at Pleiku is highly dangerous; if the U.S. garrison is attacked it could be another Dien Bien Phu and it could mean increased pressure for our deeper involvement.

16. The French parliament, at no time, permitted conscripts to be used in Indochina.

17. The Viet Cong are highly skilled and formidable fighters; the South Vietnamese forces are of dubious quality and larger and larger desertions can be anticipated.

18. The important thing in a situation like this which is clearly detrimental to us is to concentrate on finding a way out; a possibility might exist in a combination of the coastal enclave strategy, a cessation of aerial bombardment and the use of all possible contacts to get negotiations underway.

19. McNamara has been a disappointment in his handling of this situation, probably because he is being used in a way in which he ought not to be used.

It should be noted that there was obviously not a unanimity among the Members present on all of the points listed. But there was a very substantial agreement on many of them. Moreover, there was full agreement that insofar as Viet Nam is concerned we are deeply enmeshed in a place where we ought not to be; that the situation is rapidly going out of control; and that every effort should be made to extricate ourselves.²

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 1266, #14. No classification marking.
2. At the President’s request, McNamara prepared a memorandum commenting on Mansfield’s first 18 points, which the President forwarded to Mansfield on July 28 under a covering letter that reads: “With respect to the 19th point, as I have often said, I consider Bob McNamara to be the best Secretary of Defense in the history of this nation.” (University of Montana, Mansfield Papers, Series XXII, Box 102, Folder 13)