Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

93. Summary Notes of the 553d Meeting of the National Security Council¹

Washington, July 27, 1965, 5:40 p.m.-6:20 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Deployment of Additional U.S. Troops to Vietnam

The President: Before formalizing decisions on the deployment of additional U.S. forces to Vietnam, he wished to review the present situation with Council members present. Secretary Rusk will deal with the political situation and Secretary McNamara will describe the military situation.

Secretary Rusk:

a. The Chinese Communists are most adamant against any negotiations between the North Vietnamese and the U.S./South Vietnamese. The clash between the Chinese Communists and the Russians continues.

b. According to the Yugoslav Ambassador, Tito got the impression during his visit to Moscow that “things would happen” if we stopped the bombing of North Vietnam. We have asked many times what the North Vietnamese would do if we stopped the bombing. We have heard nothing to date in reply.

c. There appear to be elements of caution on the other side—in Hanoi as well as in Moscow. Our purpose is to keep our contacts open with the other side in the event that they have a new position to give us.

d. The U.S. actions we are taking should be presented publicly in a low key but in such a way as to convey accurately that we are determined to prevent South Vietnam from being taken over by Hanoi. At the same time, we seek to avoid a confrontation with either the Chinese Communists or the Soviet Union.

Secretary McNamara: Summarized the military situation in Vietnam:

a. The number of Viet Cong forces has increased and the percentage of these forces committed to battle has increased.

b. The geographic area of South Vietnam controlled by the Viet Cong has increased.

c. The Viet Cong have isolated the cities and disrupted the economy of South Vietnam. The cities are separated from the countryside.

d. Increased desertions from the South Vietnamese Army have prevented an increase in the total number of South Vietnamese troops available for combat.

e. About half of all U.S. Army helicopters are now in South Vietnam in addition to over 500 U.S. planes.

The military requirements are:

a. More combat battalions from the U.S. are necessary. A total of 13 additional battalions need to be sent now. On June 15, we announced a total of 75,000 men, or 15 battalions.

b. A total of 28 battalions is now necessary.

c. Over the next 15 months, 350,000 men would be added to regular U.S. forces.

d. In January, we would go to Congress for a supplementary appropriation to pay the costs of the Vietnam war. We would ask now for a billion, in addition to the existing 1966 budget. (Draft plan is attached as Tab A.)²

The attack on the SAM sites in North Vietnam was necessary to protect our planes. Attacks on other priority targets in North Vietnam are required.

Ambassador Lodge: Asked whether the ratio of government to guerrilla ground forces had to be 10:1. During his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he had been asked this question. Comment had been made about the astronomical size of U.S. forces required if this traditional 10:1 ratio was valid.

General Wheeler: The mobility and fire power of U.S. and South Vietnamese forces has put an imponderable element into the traditional ratio of 10:1. Perhaps 4:1 is the right ratio.

With the additional forces to be sent to South Vietnam, General Westmoreland believes we can hold our present position and possibly move back into areas now contested. The one exception would be in the Fourth Corps.

Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara expressed differences of view concerning a map brought to the meeting by Secretary McNamara which purported to show the amount of territory in South Vietnam controlled by the Viet Cong. Secretary Rusk thought the map overstated the size of Viet Cong controlled areas. Secretary McNamara said it understated the area they control. At least 26% of the population of South Vietnam is controlled by Viet Cong, according to Secretary McNamara’s figures.

(The meeting was interrupted briefly to permit the photographers to take pictures.)

The President: The situation in Vietnam is deteriorating. Even though we now have 80 to 90,000 men there, the situation is not very safe. We have these choices:

a. Use our massive power, including SAC, to bring the enemy to his knees. Less than 10% of our people urge this course of action.

b. We could get out on the grounds that we don’t belong there. Not very many people feel this way about Vietnam. Most feel that our national honor is at stake and that we must keep our commitments there.³

c. We could keep our forces at the present level, approximately 80,000 men, but suffer the consequences of losing additional territory and of accepting increased casualties.⁴ We could “hunker up”. No one is recommending this course.

d. We could ask for everything we might desire from Congress—money, authority to call up the reserves, acceptance of the deployment of more combat battalions. This dramatic course of action would involve declaring a state of emergency and a request for several billion dollars. Many favor this course. However, if we do go all out in this fashion, Hanoi would be able to ask the Chinese Communists and the Soviets to increase aid and add to their existing commitments.

e. We have chosen to do what is necessary to meet the present situation, but not to be unnecessarily provocative to either the Russians or the Communist Chinese. We will give the commanders the men they say they need and, out of existing materiel in the U.S., we will give them the materiel they say they need. We will get the necessary money in the new budget and will use our transfer authority until January. We will neither brag about what we are doing nor thunder at the Chinese Communists and the Russians.⁵

This course of action will keep us there during the critical monsoon season and possibly result in some gains. Meanwhile, we will push on the diplomatic side. This means that we will use up our manpower reserves. We will not deplete them, but there will be a substantial reduction. Quietly, we will push up the level of our reserve force.⁶ We will let Congress push us but, if necessary, we will call the legislators back.

We will hold until January. The alternatives are to put in our big stack now or hold back until Ambassadors Lodge and Goldberg and the diplomats can work.⁷

Secretary Fowler: Do we ask for standby authority now to call the reserves but not actually call them?

The President: Under the approved plan, we would not ask for such authority now.⁸

There was no response when the President asked whether anyone in the room opposed the course of action decided upon.⁹

Bromley Smith

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. 3. Top Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. Drafted by Bromley Smith. According to an attached list, the following attended the meeting: President Johnson, McNamara, Wheeler, McNaughton, Raborn, Helms, Rusk, Ball, Thompson, William Bundy, Lodge, Fowler, Rowan, Marks, McGeorge Bundy, Valenti, Busby, Goodwin, Moyers, Cater, Smith, and Katzenbach. Valenti and McGeorge Bundy also prepared notes of the meeting. (Ibid., Meeting Notes File, Box 1)
2. Not attached and not found.
3. According to Valenti’s notes of the meeting, Johnson also said at this point: “Ike, Kennedy and I have given commitment.”
4. Valenti’s notes indicate the President said at this point: “You wouldn’t want your boy to be out there and crying for help and not get it.”
5. Valenti notes that Johnson added at this point that the United States should say to Thieu: “You and your military help us there and make what gains we can. Meanwhile, we will explore ways to find peace.”
6. Valenti notes that Johnson added that the United States could not draw down its reserves for long if challenged on another front.
7. According to Valenti’s notes, Johnson said that the decision narrowed down in his mind to the options he outlined in paragraphs d and e.
8. Valenti notes that Johnson added: “If Russia, England, etc. wouldn’t get all excited about calling up reserves, I would do it right now.”
9. In his memorandum of the meeting, prepared on November 2, 1968, from his handwritten notes dated July 27, 1965, McGeorge Bundy included the following statement: “The notes also record my own feeling that while the President was placing his preference for alternative five [e.], as against alternative four [d.], on international grounds, his unspoken object was to protect his legislative program—or at least this had appeared to be his object in his informal talk as late as Thursday and Friday of the preceding week—July 22, and July 23.”