Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

91. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, July 27, 1965, 9:05 p.m.

284. Deptel 237.² Johnson, Manfull and I had very satisfactory meeting with Ky, Thieu and Co (Quang of IV Corps was also present but did not substantively participate) and after considerable discussion noted below obtained their full agreement to draft contained reftel. Also obtained Ky’s agreement that he will seek make major address to nation, keyed to and immediately following USG statement.

(He promised submit text to us for comment thus we will not propose statement on this subject to Dept.) Therefore would be greatest assistance if we could let him know as far in advance as possible the timing of our statement and final text.³

Discussion primarily revolved around (1) paragraph on reference to UN, (2) paragraph on NVN and SVN working out relations by peaceful means, including especially last sentence on elections and (3) paragraph on Geneva agreements.

With respect to first point, they accepted our explanation that, although it was not likely constructive UN role could be found, it was important we demonstrate that we have exhausted every possibility to that end.

It was notable that Thieu, as well as others, accepted second point. On question of elections, they accepted fact that Communists never have accepted international supervision of elections and can be expected to oppose in future. However they were somewhat bothered by inclusion of last phrase “just as soon as the end of aggression permits” and it seems to us that sentence is just as strong with omission of this phrase.

Longest discussion revolved around Geneva agreements with Thieu making spirited exposition to effect that their “honor and political situation” did not permit them to recognize binding effect of document which French sought to impose upon them by signature of French General. We pointed out basic incompatibility of seeking to invoke Geneva Accords against the DRV on one hand while on other hand denying their validity. Thieu said they could accept the “factual situation” created in 1954 by the Geneva Accords but GVN could not change what had been consistent and basic position of all GVN’s since 1954. However Ky said that GVN could take position that, while GVN had not signed accords, they had always and would continue to respect their principles. Thieu concurred and suggested that there be added to any such public position by GVN that GVN had not and would not seek reunification of country by military means. We concurred that this was sound and defensible position for GVN.During course of discussion Ky and Thieu, as well as Co, concurred that best possible outcome of present struggle might be that the war would passively “fade away”, that is, there would be a return to the de facto 1954 situation and thus that “stronger and more lasting guarantees of 1954” which could presumably be obtained only through general conference were also not necessarily best outcome. We thus suggest consideration to deleting modifying sentence in which that phrase appears.

Although Vietnamese did not catch or raise point, we question next to last two sentences of third paragraph from end, that is, sentence reading, “The first business of such a conference must be to work out terms that can permit an end of fighting. Its final business must be peace.” Thus it seems to us these sentences unnecessarily raise spectre of “cease fire” without effective agreement from other side.

During course of discussion we also obtained Ky’s, Thieu’s and Co’s affirmation on points of public and private understanding essentially as contained in Embtel 266 as modified by Deptel 236.⁴

Additionally, we obtained Ky’s agreement that in his public address he will make specific reference to the Chieu Hoi program.

Throughout our discussion we strongly emphasized sensitivity of draft statement contained Deptel 237 and fact that it was still in draft stage.

Taylor

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received at 9:45 a.m.
2. Document 89.
3. At 7:57 p.m. on July 27, the Department of State instructed the Embassy, in telegram 251 to Saigon, to inform the South Vietnamese Government that the President intended to make a public statement on July 28 along the lines of the draft agreed upon in telegram 237 to Saigon. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
4. Documents 84 and 88.