Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

79. Memorandum From John Kenneth Galbraith to President Johnson¹

Cambridge, Massachusetts, undated.

How to Take Ninety Percent of the Political Heat out of Vietnam

I assume the following to be true, much official crap to the contrary.

(1) Vietnam is of no great intrinsic importance. Had it gone Communist after World War II we would be just as strong as now and we would never waste a thought on it.

(2) No question of high principle is involved. It is their rascals or ours. Both sides would lose in free elections!

(3) The basic issue is that we must show that we can’t be thrown out—that we don’t give up under fire. This would also be bad here at home.

(4) It is right to consider the politics of the problem. A great many people who make policy do not have to take the political heat. Rusk ran the Korean War and his career was made by it. Stevenson ran for office during the war and was destroyed. The same would have happened to Harry Truman had he been up.

(5) Political questions are partly what we make them. Despite all of their efforts the Republicans could not make mileage last autumn out of Cuba. That was because nothing was happening there; it wasn’t in the news and people couldn’t be aroused.

I urge we:

(1) Instruct officials and spokesmen to stop saying the future of mankind, the United States and human liberty is being decided in Vietnam. It isn’t; this merely builds up a difficult problem out of all proportion. It is also terrible politics. It directs maximum attention to where difficulties are bound to be greatest.

(2) Stop saying that we are going to reconquer the whole country. We are not going to pacify Chicago or Harlem. The easiest way to have a failure is to set one up for ourselves by promising to do what can’t be done.

(3) Let us apply a policy of political patience in the area. That is a technique you understand. It means quietly marking out areas (including of course Saigon) which we can hold, protect and feed if necessary for years. Then we hold these and worry very little about the rest. This proves our main point which is that we can’t be thrown out. There is a safe haven for Catholics and anti-communists.

(4) The Viet Cong will not attack these areas frontally. Casualties will be low. High level trips and other contrived publicity should be kept to the minimum.

(5) Stop or gradually suspend the bombing north and south. This has slight military value, alarms our people and other countries and, above all, keeps the place at the top of the news with maximum attention there and minimum attention where it belongs. (I think it may harden resistance to negotiation also—but on this no one can be sure and I am confining myself here to facts.)

(6) Keep open the offer of negotiations. But we should not count on this policy forcing them to the table anytime soon. But someday they will come.

Results:

(1) Unless they attack head on, which we can rule out, we will prove our staying power. We won’t be playing their game by sending our forces out into the jungle where ambush works.

(2) The whole place will go on the back burner. Public attention will come back to areas of sound achievement of the Administration where it belongs.

(3) The Republicans will bleat as Keating did about Cuba. That will hurt them more than us.

(4) It will take the Russians off the hook and enable us to make progress there.

Final Observations:

I would think it worth running some risk of criticism to avoid calling up reserves. This will add to the publicity and wrong emphasis on Vietnam. I hope searching questions are asked on the need for these men. (Why not some from the divisions in Korea?) But after the initial flurry of publicity, this is still the right policy after a call-up.

In the past there were two difficulties with this program. It would have undermined the South Vietnamese government and required the commitment of our troops. Now there isn’t any Vietnamese government worth worrying about and our forces are committed.

The great problem is our own eager beavers who do not consider the mood of our own people come the next election, and whose political teat is not in the wringer.

J.K. Galbraith²

1. Source: Johnson Library, Confidential File, ND 19/CO 312. Confidential. Sent to President Johnson by Galbraith under a covering memorandum dated July 22, which states: “This is meant as a sympathetic suggestion on a problem that I know is worrying you.” The covering memorandum is marked with an indication that the President saw Galbraith’s memorandum.
2. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. The covering memorandum is signed “Ken.”