Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

52. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson¹

Washington, July 6, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Senator Morse’s Proposals for UN Action on Viet-Nam

The papers Senator Morse has given you² raise two basic questions:

(a) Whether it makes sense to use the UN to help bring about a conference on Viet-Nam; and

(b) Whether an effort should be made to get a UN peace force into Viet-Nam.

With regard to (b), there has not been, and there is not now, a remote possibility to get a UN peacekeeping force into Viet-Nam except as a part of a settlement with the communists.

With regard to (a), I personally have discussed this further with Senator Morse, Ambassador Dobrynin and Ambassador Stevenson.

Senator Morse seemed personally relaxed during my conversations with him³ and also was unaware of the information which I could give him about the influences which we thought the Russians were trying to exert to bring about some sort of negotiation or discussion of Viet-Nam. He indicated that, at a recent dinner meeting with Drew Pearson and Ambassador Dobrynin, the Ambassador had been asked point-blank what the Soviet Union’s attitude would be toward a Security Council call for a conference of the Geneva powers to take up the question of Southeast Asia. He reported that Dobrynin had answered that the Soviet attitude would depend upon prior talks between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. as well as on the manner of presentation to the Security Council. Senator Morse seemed to think that this left some opening.

As you know from my memorandum of conversation with Dobrynin, I explored this with Dobrynin last Saturday.⁴ He flatly denied having made any such statement and reiterated that the Soviet Union did not think that the Security Council was the proper forum to take up any such proposal. We must anticipate, therefore, that the Soviet Union would not only oppose such a Security Council resolution but would be cast in the position of a harsh advocate of the Hanoi position. There is obvious disadvantage in our forcing the Soviet Union into an even more extreme position than they have taken, since we know there is still some flexibility in the Soviet view of negotiation.

Today I discussed further UN action with Ambassador Stevenson.⁵ He has the same reservations which we in the Department have about the value of an all-out vindictive debate in the Security Council at this time. However, we agreed to recommend for you the following steps involving the UN:

(a) Stevenson will consult with U Thant about the desirability of a Security Council resolution calling for a conference of the Geneva powers; U Thant could then sound out the Soviet Delegation and ascertain directly whether there is any possibility of a Soviet abstention rather than a veto.

(b) We might well now present in writing to the members of the Security Council a periodic report on events since February (the date of our last report).⁶ In this way we could recapitulate the various efforts which have been made to seek a peaceful settlement, their rejection by the other side, and a summary of the situation as we see it. There could be some value in a document of this sort which would be circulated to all the members of the UN.

(c) We would say to U Thant that if he wished himself, as Secretary General, to call for a meeting of the Geneva powers, at which meeting the question of a cessation of hostilities would be the first order of business, we would indicate our readiness for such a conference. This would be entirely consistent with our basic view that we are prepared for discussions without conditions.

(d) We would also say to U Thant that we could see some advantage in his undertaking any private exploration which he could make with Hanoi, Peiping or Moscow to ascertain whether there are any openings for a peaceful settlement. Such explorations might at least indicate that he had been a possible channel if any of the parties had anything of interest to say.⁷

On July 8, Stevenson reported, in telegram 31 from Geneva, that in view of U.S. opposition, U Thant would not put forward a negotiating formula that included the Viet Cong as a separate party. In response to the possibilities outlined in telegram 41, Thant said that he would talk with the Soviet delegation concerning a Security Council resolution calling for a conference of the Geneva powers, but he anticipated that the Soviets would insist on including the Viet Cong or would veto the resolution. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

If you approve, we will proceed on points (a), (b), (c) and (d) above. I would recommend that I give the gist of the above to Senator Morse orally,⁸ unless you believe that he should be provided a written reply to his informal memorandum (Tab A).⁹

Dean Rusk

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXVII. Secret.
2. Presumably reference is to the Attachment to Document 10 and to Morse’s June 29 memorandum to President Johnson in which Morse proposed that the United States ask U Thant for a Security Council meeting on Vietnam. (Ibid., Confidential File, ND 19/CO 312)
3. Rusk met alone with Morse at 9:25 a.m. on July 2 for approximately 25 minutes. (Ibid., Rusk Appointment Book)
4. Rusk met with Dobrynin at 11 a.m. on July 3. A memorandum of the conversation, together with McGeorge Bundy’s memorandum forwarding it to President Johnson on July 4, is ibid., National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XII.
5. Rusk had a luncheon meeting with Stevenson on July 6. (Ibid., Rusk Appointment Book)
6. For text of this report, dated February 7, see Department of State Bulletin, February 22, 1965, pp. 240-241.
7. In telegram 41 to Geneva, July 7, Rusk informed Stevenson (who was in Geneva for the meeting of the U.N. Economic and Social Council) that he had sent these four recommendations to the President for approval. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) During a telephone conversation on July 7, Stevenson told Rusk that he had talked that morning to U Thant, who said that the Soviet Union was “out of the Viet Cong business” and Federenko had instructions not to discuss the matter with him. Thant said that any suggestion for negotiation hinged initially on U.S. acceptance of Viet Cong representation. Thant indicated that he would transmit a message to Hanoi proposing negotiations. Rusk responded to Stevenson that the United States would not support such an initiative. (Ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations)
8. My preference. [Footnote in the source text handwritten by Rusk.]
9. Not printed.