Office of the Historian

43. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson1

Washington, July 1, 1965, 8:20 p.m.

I attach four documents which are for consideration at the 11:00 o’clock meeting tomorrow.2

At Tab 1 is Dean Rusk’s four-page statement of the basic issues.

At Tab 2 is George Ball’s paper on a compromise solution.

At Tab 3 is Bob McNamara’s recommendation for expanded military action.

At Tab 4 is my brother Bill’s program offering a middle course for the next two months.

The positions within the government are roughly as follows: McNamara and Ball honestly believe in their own recommendations, though Bob would readily accept advice to tone down those of his recommendations which move rapidly against Hanoi by bombing and blockade.

Dean Rusk leans toward the McNamara program, adjusted downward in this same way.

The second-level men in both State and Defense are not optimistic about the future prospects in Vietnam and are therefore very reluctant to see us move to a 44 battalion force with a call-up of reserves. So they would tend to cluster around the middle course suggested by my brother. They would like to see what happens this summer before getting much deeper in.

The Joint Chiefs are strongly in favor of going in even further than McNamara. Specifically they want now to take out the SAM site, the IL-28s, and the MIGs in the Hanoi area.

My hunch is that you will want to listen hard to George Ball and then reject his proposal. Discussion could then move to the narrower choice between my brother’s course and McNamara’s. The decision between them should be made in about ten days, which is the point at which McNamara would like a final go-ahead on the air mobile division. I think you may want to have pretty tight and hard analyses of some disputed questions like the following:

1.
What are the chances of our getting into a white man’s war with all the brown men against us or apathetic?
2.
How much of the McNamara planning would be on a contingency basis with no decision until August or September?
3.
What would a really full political and public relations campaign look like in both the Bundy option and the McNamara option?
4.
What is the upper limit of our liability if we now go to 44 battalions?
5.
Can we frame this program in such a way as to keep very clear our own determination to keep the war limited? (This is another way of stating question 4.)
6.
Can we get a cold, hard look at the question whether the current economic and military situation in Vietnam is so very bad that it may come apart even before this program gets into action? (I don’t believe that it is that bad, but no one seems to be really sure of the facts today.)

Friday’s meeting3 is not, repeat not, for decisions, but for sharpening of the issues that you want studied.

McG. B.
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XII. Top Secret.↩
  2. Documents 38–41.↩
  3. July 2; see Document 44.↩