37. Letter From the Ambassador to Vietnam (Taylor) to Prime Minister Ky1
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
We of the United States Mission were very much impressed with the spirit and substance of your twenty-six point statement promulgated on June 19,2 which we assume is to serve as the overall guideline for impending actions by your government. Because we have been involved in many of the past plans and programs of the government which bear upon the objectives stated in this proclamation, I have asked the chiefs of United States agencies to review the twenty-six point statement and indicate their judgment as to which of the on-going plans and programs should be given top priority to accelerate the attainment of the objectives which you seek. This letter records some of their views and my own as to what needs to be done first to get decisive results fastest.
As I see it, the basic problem facing your government in the coming months is to increase the military effectiveness of the Vietnamese Armed Forces in relation to that of the Viet Cong while building the national economy and the national morale. We are deeply impressed that security is the first essential for the political, social and economic progress of your country and that the most praiseworthy efforts to achieve progress in these fields are of marginal utility unless a minimum level of security is established. Hence, we would say that in establishing priorities, number one should go to those measures which will increase the relative military effectiveness in the next few months.
If this point of view is accepted, we would then place at the top of our list measures to remedy the critical lack of trained combat ready units in the RVNAF, particularly in the Army. The objective of the monsoon Viet Cong offensive is clearly to destroy as many ARVN units as possible; the countermeasures should be to punish the Viet Cong, to create new ARVN units and to rehabilitate those depleted in battle as rapidly as possible. Of the latter, there are presently 4 regiments and 9 battalions which are combat ineffective by reason of severe understrength which is the result of a high desertion rate as well as of enemy action. Hence, the great importance of the plans under way to increase the attractiveness of the military service and to bring down the desertion rate. The plans as we know them are well conceived, but the effect will depend upon carefully checked implementation. If the intake of manpower [Page 94] can be increased and desertion losses reduced, it may be possible, as General Thieu thinks, to increase the manpower goals for early 1966.
To one of your military training, I need hardly comment upon the importance of good leadership as a prerequisite to improve military effectiveness. Somehow we need to learn better how to identify and reward the competent leader and identify and replace the incompetent. With regard to the latter, I have heard with regret of instances of officer failure in the presence of the enemy during recent battles. It would seem to me consistent with the state of war which the government has announced to take drastic disciplinary action against the officers who misbehave on the battlefield. The punishment of a few flagrant cases should have a salutary effect throughout the Army.
It is important not only to find competent leadership but to keep it in place when found so that the presence of a strong leader may achieve a lasting effect on the unit which he commands, or on the post which he occupies. Since the fall of the Diem government, there has been a constant turnover of personnel both military and civilian which has had a most adverse effect upon the war effort. I would hope that your government would recognize the self-defeating nature of this practice and resolve to keep competent persons in place.
In closing these comments on increased military effectiveness, let me say that my government will in the future as in the past continue to help with air, advisory and logistic support, with military equipment and with United States combat forces, the latter to assist in meeting the manpower shortage during this coming period.
While recognizing the prime importance, in the short run, of increased military effectiveness, the correlated problems on the economic front bear heavily on both the short-and longer-term prospects for Vietnamese success in the present struggle. Like most countries in time of war, the South Vietnamese government is obliged to face a mounting budgetary deficit. Your experts and ours are in constant contact on this subject and have always worked effectively together. Thus far, they have protected the country from the potentially disastrous results of serious inflation, but I know that they are constantly concerned over its possibilities and will need your support in carrying out the anti-inflation measures which they may recommend from time to time.
As has been illustrated in the recent threatened shortage of rice, there is a serious and growing problem in the distribution of commodities within South Viet-Nam. This difficulty arises both from the operations of the Viet Cong in interrupting land and river communications, and also from the hoarding and profiteering operations which you have vigorously condemned. Thus, the problem requires attention on two fronts; first, in the improvement of sea communications out of reach by the Viet Cong, and second, in the form of legal and police measures to [Page 95] discourage and eventually to break up hoarding and black market practices. The rice procurement and distribution agency which you have in mind is an important measure of such a program which should also include the further development of port capacities as another essential element.
We are of the opinion that a great deal can be done to improve the tax collection system by bringing about a more effective collection of existing taxes and instituting certain additional taxes and customs levies. Such measures would be exactly in line with your announced intention of imposing an austere wartime regime upon the country.
I believe the political value of longer-term economic and social development objectives which your government could espouse and support can be very great indeed. The key people in your economic and social ministries are well aware of the need for realistic but imaginative planning in these fields. Our people would welcome the opportunity to collaborate and assist in all possible ways. The timing of our efforts is most important because we should not attempt too much too fast to the detriment of the immediate war effort. But we should be ready to take action at the appropriate time on such an important matter as land tenure which could provide the theme for a most important reform program. I have been impressed with the complexity of this problem and the requirement for adequate time and careful preparation before embarking upon extensive measures. While most authorities seem to be in agreement that many improvements are possible and necessary, I believe they would also recommend against the diversion of the necessary administrative effort in a nation-wide reform program at this time. However, it is entirely possible to initiate certain pilot operations in a few selected provinces from which much experience could be drawn for future use. Such limited actions appear worthy of inclusion in your priority list in order to keep this idea alive.
Now may I say a few words about the need to maintain the national morale in these critical times? Military and economic successes are not likely to occur or be sufficient in themselves if the national morale should begin to fail. While no one would argue this truism, it is not easy to decide what specific measures should be taken in first priority to maintain morale. Personally, I would be inclined to recommend focussing attention on the public relations field at the start. Most American observers would say that there has long been a basic problem of how to effect better communication between the government on the one hand and the people, the international world and the Viet Cong on the other. Better communication in turn is divisible into two parts, the technical and the substantial. On the technical side, we have and are continued to be prepared to assist in improving the equipment and organization in the radio and press fields. Also, when the time is propitious, we are ready to work [Page 96] with you at the problems incidental to the introduction of television. However, these technical improvements are of little avail unless you find persuasive spokesmen for your government able to communicate persuasive themes effectively to the three audiences which I have mentioned above.
In communicating with the international world, your government has long been suffering from a dearth of official representation. At the present time, I am told that you have only seven Ambassadors in place in overseas posts. Certainly this reduced representation obliges Viet-Nam to labor under serious disadvantages in defending its case before the outside world. I have several times discussed this matter with Foreign Minister Tran Van Do and am sure that he shares my views of the importance of recruiting and placing able Ambassadors as soon as possible.
In speaking to the Viet Cong, a revitalized Chieu Hoi program might accomplish significant results in detaching the increasing number who are becoming uncertain of the outcome of the struggle. The month of May was the most successful in the history of Chieu Hoi, when over 1,000 rallies came over to our side. It is important to act quickly to take advantage of this trend and also to offset any impression that the importance of Chieu Hoi has been downgraded in losing its ministerial status.
Apart from this matter of better communication with the people, there are a number of other areas which you have mentioned in your twenty-six points which will bear importantly on national morale. A nation-wide anti-corruption program is not only possible but most important for purposes of morale. We have some very practical ideas on ways of raising the ethics and conduct of the public service particularly with regard to corruption which we would be happy to put at your disposition.
You have shown a keen awareness of the need to help the war veterans, widows and orphans, a concern which all of us applaud. Justice toward these sufferers of the war will not only raise morale but will also supplement the programs for increasing the Armed Forces and controlling desertion.
The last morale-building act which I should like to mention is one which I have raised before. It is the simple matter of cleaning up Saigon and other principal cities. Cleanliness is a mark of pride and self-respect, qualities which normally go with good morale. Could we not demonstrate these two qualities in a practical way by cleaning up the streets and the alleys of this beautiful capital and of the other principal towns of Viet-Nam?
This has been an overly long letter, Mr. Prime Minister, but I wanted to convey to you some of our serious thoughts on the priorities which are required in the present emergency to meet the goals you have set for your government. We have resources available to support most of the measures [Page 97] suggested herein and are most anxious to be of help in any respect. Please let me know if there is any action which you would like from me or other members of the United States Mission.
Sincerely yours,
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 VIET S. Secret. Transmitted to the Department of State as Enclosure 1 of airgram A-6 from Saigon, July 2.↩
- See footnote 3, Document 12.↩
- Printed from a copy that indicates Taylor signed the original.↩