Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

34. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, June 30, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Comments on the Secretary of Defense’s 26 June 1965 Memorandum, “Program of Expanded Military and Political Moves with Respect to Vietnam”²

(Comments are keyed to the numbered sections in the subject memorandum)

1. We are in general accord with the main thesis of the basic paper that something like his “Course 3” is necessary if US objectives in Indochina are to be achieved or, indeed, if the US and its South Vietnamese allies are to avoid the real risk of a major political-military defeat in the next several months. We have reservations about some of the assumptions on which the argument of the memorandum seems to be based, as well as about certain specific actions advocated therein.

2. (Introduction) US objective as stated in the first sentence of the basic paper Introduction is very limited—“to force the DRV to the conference table.” On its face, this seems to fall far short of US objectives since the holding of a conference itself gives no indication of the settlement that might come out of the conference. We wonder whether it was intended actually to narrow previously stated US objectives, or whether the formulation is simply a foreshortened statement. It is our understanding that US policy in Vietnam has had the three-fold end of (1) inducing, or forcing, the DRV to reduce the level of Hanoi-instigated, supported and directed insurgency in South Vietnam (this will require a combination of suasion, punitive pressure on North Vietnam itself and inflicting defeats on its insurgent forces in the field in the South) and, (2) building up the political and military strength of a non-Communist government in South Vietnam so that, (3) the US can eventually curtail its extraordinary commitment to and involvement in Vietnamese affairs but, when it withdraws, can leave behind a regime capable of coping with the level of politico-military pressures and problems likely to be prevailing at that time. At some point a conference may be a useful step in this process, but it is not an end, in itself, and probably negotiations when and if they take place will only ratify an equilibrium established by military and political power.

We agree the VC may now be winning. They clearly believe they are. We doubt if it will be possible to demonstrate “to the DRV/VC that the odds are against their winning” unless and until they are in fact losing—which, as the memorandum rightly notes, is not now the case. We cannot realistically hope “to prove to the VC that they cannot win in SVN and therefore to turn the tide of the war” except by actually beginning to turn the tide against the VC. Obviously we cannot do this if US/GVN forces sustain a series of shattering setbacks during the next few weeks. To have any hope of turning the tide we must, at a minimum, avoid defeat and, under present conditions, some actions along the lines recommended in the memorandum are patently essential if defeat is to be avoided. If we succeed in not losing the war during this monsoon season (through October, say), what we will have won is a chance to settle down to a protracted struggle to contain Communist pressures from the North and help build a stable, viable independent South Vietnam.

3. (I-A) It appears obviously essential to provide a breathing spell in South Vietnam while the government of South Vietnam and its armed forces can prepare themselves to once again apply the political and military counter-insurgency measures necessary to put the VC on the defensive. It follows, therefore, that the augmentation and deployment of US forces in South Vietnam must be adequate beyond question to prevent an ARVN collapse this year.

The total in-country military effect of this added US force commitment would of course depend largely on the effective use of the 49 ARVN battalions freed for other duties as well as on the use of the additional US and other foreign battalions. If foreign troops are given extensive pacification duties in heavily populated areas, the military results will probably be negligible and the political results adverse. If these troops are used to provide basic strategic defense (hence reassurance against total defeat), to assault fixed and certain concentrations of Communist regulars, and to bail out Vietnamese troops in difficulty, the results should be good. The more directly and effectively US forces can be used in combat against major concentrations and base areas of the Viet Cong, the sooner can it be demonstrated that VC/DRV efforts to win a decisive victory this year are fruitless. It should not be expected, however, that the Viet Cong will necessarily stand and fight against superior forces. Rather they may drop backward a step to smaller-scale harassment and hit-and-run raids in which they do not encounter superior US combat units. Not until they themselves are being hounded, harassed and hurt in many areas without prospect of relief will there be a likelihood of the VC/DRV seeking a respite via the conference table or by any other device.

We would not normally presume to comment on the exact level and composition of forces required but we are inclined to side with MACV’s views on the undesirability of tying too many US forces to the static defense of base installations. The added forces proposed would be of obvious value in giving the thinly stretched ARVN a strategic reserve it does not now have, screening the DMZ, and generally boosting Vietnamese morale, capabilities, effectiveness and fighting spirits. The net effect of the proposed B-52 sorties could, in our opinion, have a significant influence if promptly and thoroughly followed up on the ground in the areas attacked.

4. (I-B) The proposed expansion of aerial attacks on North Vietnam is probably broader than necessary, in view of our conviction that the issue must ultimately be settled in the South, and in view of some of the risks involved. The economic effects of mining the approaches to northern ports, in particular, are not in our view sufficient and in any case not likely to be quickly enough felt to warrant the awkward international political complications such action would entail. There is a better argument for choosing targets whose destruction would immediately put domestic political pressure on the Hanoi regime, e.g., dock facilities and harbor dredges, power plants and industrial targets, as well as do economic damage to Hanoi’s military effort. Destroying the Haiphong harbor dredges alone would, in a short time, have a constricting effect on operation of the port, and in about six months make it virtually unusable because of silting. Moreover, if we increase the pressure on NVN as visualized, one of the quickest ways to signal our serious intent as well as protect our attacking forces would be to destroy the SAM sites and major airfields. While a major Chinese and/or Soviet response cannot be totally ruled out, the risk will not necessarily be increased by pressing our limited-objective attacks on NVN.

5. (II-A) While we approve of political gestures indicating our willingness to make a reasonable settlement in Vietnam, most of the initiatives mentioned have been tried to no avail. A serious, official high-level approach to the Soviets would almost certainly be rebuffed since it would expose them to such severe Chinese Communist criticism. This kind of approach could not be successful until we have demonstrated we can stop and turn back the VC/DRV attack and are able to face down Chinese Communist threats. Whenever this has been done and the Communist side has had enough in Vietnam, it will find a variety of doors open to a conference room and the Soviets may then assist them to pass through. We stand to gain by keeping the doors open, as we have, but not by over-stressing our anxiety to confer.

6. (II-B) The need for this type of initiative within South Vietnam is well established. The two proposals suggested are good starters but of themselves hardly scratch the surface. We feel far more attention must be devoted to the kind of civil and political programs which will be required not only to bring the insurgency under permanent control (even assuming military success), but also to permit South Vietnam to stand successfully against the Communists in the event that a negotiated settlement could be reached and the bulk of US forces withdrawn. It is certain that, in the wake of any such settlement, the Communists would continue their efforts against the Saigon government, either by political means or through outright violation of agreements. There is little point in spending US lives and treasure to obtain a conference or settlement which, in the absence of a viable non-Communist state, must lead either to US re-intervention or a subsequent Communist takeover.

7. (III) Over the longer term we doubt if the Communists are likely to change their basic strategy in Vietnam (i.e., aggressive and steadily mounting insurgency) unless and until two conditions prevail: (1) they are forced to accept a situation in the war in the South which offers them no prospect of an early victory and no grounds for hope that they can simply outlast the US and (2) North Vietnam itself is under continuing and increasingly damaging punitive attack. So long as the Communists think they scent the possibility of an early victory (which is probably now the case), we believe that they will persevere and accept extremely severe damage to the North. Conversely, if North Vietnam itself is not hurting, Hanoi’s doctrinaire leaders will probably be ready to carry on the Southern struggle almost indefinitely. If, however, both of the conditions outlined above should be brought to pass, we believe Hanoi probably would, at least for a period of time, alter its basic strategy and course of action in South Vietnam.

It might do so in several ways. Going for a conference as a political way of gaining a respite from attack would be one. Alternatively Hanoi might reduce the level of insurgent activity in the hopes that this would force the US to stop its punishment of the North but not prevent the US and GVN from remaining subject to wearying harassment in the South. Or, Hanoi might order the VC to suspend operations in the hopes that in a period of temporary tranquillity, domestic and international opinion would force the US to disengage without destroying the VC apparatus or the roots of VC strength. Finally, Hanoi might decide that the US/GVN will to fight could still be broken and the tide of war turned back again in favor of the VC by launching a massive PAVN assault on the South. This is a less likely option in the circumstances we have posited, but still a contingency for which the US must be prepared.

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, 7/65 SVN Trip and Memos—Misc. Papers. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent to McNamara by Raborn, under cover of a memorandum indicating that the comments were in response to McNamara’s request.
2. McNamara circulated a June 26 draft of his memorandum, prepared by McNaughton, to several senior Presidential advisers for comment. For text of the memorandum, as revised by McNamara and sent to the President on July 1, see Document 38.