Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

236. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson¹

Washington, December 19, 1965, 5 p.m.

I attach two papers which you commissioned yesterday afternoon.

At Tab A is a memorandum from Dean Rusk on alternative diplomatic actions. As he points out himself, the proposals are modest—not because of caution, but because there simply is not much more that we can do by diplomatic means alone.

At Tab B is a draft speech for your use in the United Nations.² It is very much of a first draft, and it needs a lot of cutting and polishing. There are three points worth making about it:

1. It includes an announcement of a pause. I know this is not something you are planning to do, but I thought it important to have a try at the right kind of language because Art Goldberg has told me most emphatically that he thinks it would be a great mistake for you to go to the UN if you do not have some sort of dramatic announcement to make. I can’t think of any other.

2. I have included a pretty full discussion of the international programs which are now being prepared by Joe Califano’s office in the fields of food, health and education. I have also drafted a pretty bold statement on population policy. I feel sure that Joe would recommend strongly against such a discussion of major elements of your 1966 program in the UN forum. But we have given all the general assurances before, and without something concrete, this part of the speech would have little interest.

3. I have reviewed your speech to the 20th Anniversary celebration in San Francisco, and I attach a copy at Tab C,³ because I think it shows the problem we are up against. That speech was thoughtful and eloquent, but it had little hard news in it, and it got a disappointing reception. Unless we go beyond it in some clearly specific way, we run the risk of a renewal of this same line of argument—that the Johnson Administration takes no real interest in the UN and has nothing of importance to tell it.

I think there may well be some way of stating our Vietnam position which is a little less precise about the pause but which still has some news and punch in it, and I will have another look at that problem this evening. But I send you these papers now because I know how hard and steadily you are thinking about this whole business.

McG. B.

Tab A

Washington, December 19, 1965.

Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson⁴

1. We have established the American position with regard to Viet Nam and have made known our position through all possible channels, public and private. The result has been a firm and repeated negative from Hanoi and Peiping.

2. We see no serious possibility of immediate diplomatic progress of a public nature unless we are prepared to change the conditions under which public diplomatic action could be undertaken. The principal change of condition available to us would be a pause in the bombing.

3. We have reexamined the question of a formal consideration of Viet Nam by the United Nations Security Council or General Assembly. I have discussed this today with Ambassador Goldberg. We both believe that the results would be negative. There would not be general and strong support, in the votes cast, for the United States position, and there is a high probability that a majority in the Security Council or in the Assembly would call for a unilateral termination of the bombing by the United States. We believe that the Soviets would bitterly resist any constructive action by the United Nations and would veto any resolution in the Security Council acceptable to us. The point remains that a bitter debate in the United Nations would further freeze the Soviet public position and reduce their options for the future.

4. Private diplomacy. I do believe we should continue our discussions with the Soviet Union, Hungary, Yugoslavia and others to make sure that at least the Eastern European Communists fully understand our position and understand that Hanoi’s insistence upon their four points (amounting to victory in South Viet Nam) is the central obstacle to peace. I am attaching a copy of a memorandum of conversation between Mr. Zinchuk of the Soviet Embassy and William Bundy which you will find of interest.⁵ From this memorandum it appears that Hanoi’s attitude toward a pause would be negative, but that the Soviets themselves would be much interested in one.

5. I believe that we should send a new circular on Viet Nam to all of our Missions abroad giving them an up-to-date recapitulation of peace efforts and our understanding of the present position of Hanoi, as a basis for full discussion of the problem with other governments.

6. The Vice President, after attending the Philippine inauguration, should visit Korea and Japan and make a special effort in Japan to explain the Viet Nam question.

7. I should think, also, that Averell Harriman might take a trip after the Christmas holidays and combine interest in Viet Nam with a number of other matters, visiting, for example, Paris, the North African Arab countries, Saudi Arabia and Iran. There are a number of other questions which he could usefully take up in a number of these capitals. While in Paris he could get a full report from Chauvel’s trip to Hanoi and Peiping.⁶

8. The above proposals are rather modest. The central point is, however, that diplomacy cannot produce miracles if Hanoi remains determined to seize South Viet Nam. I have no doubt that this remains their objective. The reason they do not come to a conference table is that they know that we would not agree to the attainment of their objective at such a conference. What is true of Hanoi is even more true of Peiping. In this instance diplomacy is working within the limitations imposed by Hanoi’s objectives in South Viet Nam, which are still in fundamental conflict with our own, and Hanoi’s continuing hope that they can somehow succeed on the battlefield.

Dean Rusk

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XVII. No classification marking. There is an indication on the source text that the President saw the memorandum.
2. Not printed. (Ibid.)
3. For text of the speech given on June 25, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book II, pp. 703-706.
4. Top Secret.
5. Dated December 16, not printed. A copy is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S.
6. Reference is to French diplomat Jean Michel Henri Chauvel’s visit to Hanoi and Peking. No record of Harriman receiving a briefing on the trip while in Paris has been found.