Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

234. Draft Papers¹

Washington, December 18, 1965.

The following draft papers have been prepared for discussion at 11:45 AM, December 18:²

1. An outline of the U.S. public position. (Tab 1)

2. A draft message to Ambassador Lodge (Tab 2)

3. A one-page scenario of initial diplomatic action (Tab 3)

4. A draft statement by Secretary Rusk or Ambassador Thompson to Ambassador Dobrynin (Tab 4)

5. A draft circular telegram to selected capitals. (Tab 5)

Tab 1³

OUTLINE OF U.S. PUBLIC POSITION DURING A SUSPENSION OF BOMBING

1. Assumptions

(1) Bombing would be suspended from December 22 and the U.S. must keep free to continue or end the suspension as the President determines. An internal planning assumption is that suspension might last through Vietnamese New Year, which comes on January 21, 22 and 23.

(2) The U.S. will make absolute minimum of official public comment on the suspension of the bombing, as such. The U.S. instead will emphasize during the suspension the overriding need for unconditional peace talks and will make it clear that all of its actions at every level—political, military, and diplomatic—are directed at achieving a peaceful settlement.

2. Official Public Statements

(1) Within the next few days, and not later than December 22, the Secretary of State makes a major statement on peace in Vietnam. He rehearses the full list of our efforts to start negotiations. He re-states and re-emphasizes our readiness for free elections and Geneva agreements and the other elements of our strong diplomatic position as last developed by the President on July 28. He rededicates the U.S. to this search for peace and hails the readiness of Prime Minister Wilson to do his best. He announces on behalf of the President that Vice President Humphrey and Governor Harriman will be proceeding to friendly and neutral capitals right after Christmas to explain in full the U.S. position and to enlist the help of all concerned in moving toward peace.

(2) On December 22 bombing is suspended in the North, but without comment. This position of “no comment” is rigorously sustained at every official headquarters, and there is no comment on background either, until the President gives the word.

(3) At a time determined by the President, the White House Press Secretary responds to questions on the suspension by saying that every action of the U.S. is related to two purposes: first, to turn back the aggressor in the South, and second, to open the way to peaceful settlements. This comment is echoed precisely by all U.S. officials. All officials continue to draw attention to the statement of the Secretary of State and to the diplomatic missions of the Vice President and Governor Harriman.

3. Background comments

At times directed by the President, the following background comments will be made by officers of the appropriate departments:

(1) Our military effort in the South is being sustained and intensified. The deployments continue and the aircraft not being used in the North are being redirected against Laos and South Vietnam where they have work to do. The South is where the contest will be decided. (Defense)

(2) The fact that there is no bombing is directly related to the desire to create a favorable environment of response for the Secretary’s speech and the Humphrey/Harriman missions. We do not wish to have this series of peace appeals punctuated by the sound of bombs exploding in the North. (State)

(3) The suspension of the bombing carries no serious military risks because

• —the aircraft are doing their job elsewhere;
• —the weather is bad over North Vietnam this month anyway;
• —reconnaissance continues over North Vietnam;
• —if no progress is made toward peace, we can catch up later in the North (Defense).

(4) the whole peace effort, including the suspension of the bombing, has two purposes: to open the way for peace if possible, and to prove to men of good will in every country the good faith of the U.S. in its commitment to a peaceful settlement. (State)

(5) If this peace effort does not work, the prospect of more and heavier fighting is real, because the determination of the U.S. is unchanged. (every one)

4. Very deep background or off the record

(1) This effort is the necessary peace punch to go with the military punch which is coming in January. We face a big budget, larger reinforcements, and possibly other drastic measures in the field of taxes and controls. The President cannot ask the American people to join in united support of these hard measures until we have given complete proof of our determination to move toward peace, if possible. (Defense)

(2) This peace effort, including the suspension of bombing, is designed to give an opening for debate and pressure for a peace conference within the Communist world. We make no comment at all about what one Communist capital may be saying to another, but we do know that it has been hard for any of them to speak of peace while a Socialist country was being bombed. We hope they are making the most of the suspension. (State)

Tab 2

Draft Telegram⁴

Literally eyes only for Ambassador from President.

1. I am determined to leave no stone unturned in pursuit of a peaceful settlement of the war consistent with our objective of an independent and secure South Viet-Nam. But over the past few weeks we have been repeatedly told by the Soviet Union, representatives of various Eastern European countries, our Western Allies and various significant leaders of American opinion that effective steps toward peace are difficult if not impossible while North Viet-Nam is under air bombardment.

2. None of us has illusions that a suspension of bombing would be likely to lead to acceptable peace moves by Hanoi. But before taking the critical next steps that I now face, I must satisfy myself, the American people, and the world that every opportunity has been provided for peaceful initiatives. If it did nothing else we have reason to believe that a suspension could add to the strains and dissensions in the Communist camp and make it easier for Moscow to avoid deep involvement.

3. These next steps include budget increases of many billions of dollars which will become public in January, the deployment of large numbers of additional men during 1966 and the acceptance of stepped-up casualties associated with such increased deployments.

4. I am confident the American people will be prepared to do whatever is necessary to see the struggle to a successful conclusion and that our additional efforts will have the support of most of our friends around the world. But it appears to me that sustained support for these very difficult undertakings can be best assured by one further measure to satisfy the world that America is doing everything possible to create the conditions that will facilitate progress toward peace.

5. With these considerations in mind—and after an exhaustive balancing of all implications and consequences—I have decided to order the suspension of air attacks on NVN beginning December 22 in order to permit opportunity for both Communist and friendly countries to exercise all diplomatic initiatives they can and will undertake. For the moment no decision will be made as to precise duration of suspension. This will depend on progress of diplomatic efforts being undertaken by our friends and on both the words and the actions of Hanoi. We will, of course intensify our efforts in the South, and continue our actions against infiltration routes in Laos. We will also continue unarmed reconnaissance over DRV.

6. I do not contemplate any public announcement of suspension. At the beginning, the stand-down may hopefully be related to weather conditions. As attention becomes focused on continued suspension we shall publicly explain it as a step in the search for peace. At the same time the press can be informed on background basis that suspension is taking place during period when weather conditions in Viet-Nam limit effectiveness of bombing. Press will certainly draw its own conclusions about relation of suspension to the Christmas season.

7. But while there will be no public announcement we do plan quietly to inform various key governments, including certain Communist governments, which have indicated interest in some diplomatic initiative. Moreover I shall dispatch various emissaries to key capitals to explore possibilities of probing intentions and encouraging diplomatic initiatives.

8. I know of your own reservations regarding any suspension of bombing and am fully aware of possible costs and dangers. Nevertheless, I feel that this action is a necessary preparation for the difficult days that lie ahead.

9. I also recognize the delicate and complicated problem you will face in handling this matter with the GVN. This will draw on your best diplomatic resources. We must emphasize to the GVN that the American determination is unswerving but that before entering into a new and more costly phase of the conflict requiring a very much greater US effort we must satisfy our people and the world that all measures are being exhausted to bring about peace on a basis consistent with the objectives for which we are both fighting. Our stake is so large in this enterprise that we cannot permit the GVN to veto this essential measure.

10. I leave it to your best judgment how to approach GVN. I know you will bear in mind the serious problem of premature leaks. You carry a very high responsibility and I know I can trust you to do everything possible in bringing off this difficult but essential undertaking.

Tab 3⁵

SCENARIO
1. December 21, P.M.	Speech at the UN.
2. December 21, P.M.	Following speech Goldberg informs U Thant of plan with regard to suspension.
3. December 21, P.M.	Following speech Ambassador Thompson and/or Secretary Rusk informs Ambassador Dobrynin along lines of attached draft
4. December 22	Delivery of personal message from Secretary Rusk to Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter similar to message given Ambassador Dobrynin.
5. December 22, A.M.	UK requested to deliver oral message to Hanoi informing Hanoi of suspension and willingness of UK to act as channel of communication and otherwise to hold itself in readiness to do anything possible that will move situation toward peaceful solution.
6. December 22, A.M.	Instructions transmitted to US Ambassadors following countries for delivery to the Chief of Government personal message from the President along lines attached draft: United Kingdom, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, Korea, Canada, India, Japan, Philippines (both Macapagal and Marcos).
7. December 22, P.M.(December 23 A.M. Saigon Time)	Initiation of suspension.
8. December 26	Vice President departs for Japan and inauguration of Philippine President. Following Philippine inauguration he visits Australia, New Zealand and India.
9. December 26	Gov. Harriman departs for European capitals.

Tab 4⁶

DRAFT STATEMENT TO DOBRYNIN

I wish to inform you confidentially in advance that on December ___ we will suspend our bombing operations against North Vietnam. We are taking this step fully conscious of the risks involved. One of these is that the other side may take advantage of our action to step up the intervention in South Vietnam. We will, therefore, continue our reconnaissance of North Vietnam. Another risk is that the authorities in Hanoi and Peiping may interpret our action as a sign of weakness or lack of determination to carry out our commitment to the Government and people of South Vietnam. This risk is heightened by the fact that as always is the case in a society such as ours when controversial issues are under public discussion, a small minority has come out in opposition to our policy in Southeast Asia. I am sure that on the basis of reports from you and other sources your government can put these manifestations in their proper perspective. I am not so sure that this is the case in Hanoi and Peiping.

The resistance to the North Vietnamese controlled and directed hostilities in South Vietnam will continue but can quickly be brought to an end either by formal negotiations or by the simple cessation of North Vietnamese intervention. I realize that we do not have a common view of the past history of this affair but I am hopeful that we do hold in common a desire to see peace restored in that unhappy land; to see the killing and the terrorism ended and the long-suffering people of this area given the opportunity to devote their lives to peaceful pursuits in which we stand ready to assist them. As we have repeatedly stated, we seek no military bases or other advantages in this area and we believe that the Geneva Accords of 1954 could furnish the basis for a settlement.

I can assure you of our sincerity when I tell you that we are determined to live up to our commitments but that peace is our objective and that the action of which we are informing your Government has no other purpose.

Tab 5⁷

DRAFT CIRCULAR TELEGRAM TO U.S. AMBASSADORS IN SELECTED CAPITALS

The President requests that you call on Chief of Government before the close of business on __________ to give him the following personal message from the President.

“I want you to know that in pursuit of the objective set forth in my address at the UN, I have instructed the Secretary of State to conduct a renewed and intensive effort to move the problem of Vietnam to the peace table. I have asked the Secretary to coordinate a number of efforts of all sorts, public and private, to persuade the Government of North Vietnam of the importance of moving in this direction.

“In order to insure the most favorable possible environment for this effort, I have agreed with the Government of Vietnam that there will be a suspension of the bombing in North Vietnam beginning on December ______.

“In all its actions in Vietnam, my Government has aimed from the first for a peaceful settlement. These new actions are a part of this same policy and purpose. It is my hope that the climate that should result will make it possible for your Government to take initiatives of its own in furtherance of the objective of a peaceful settlement. I have asked my Ambassador to be available to you at any time for further discussion of these matters.”

For the Ambassador’s information: Unarmed reconnaissance of North Vietnam will continue and we will be alert to and reserve full freedom of action to deal with any aggressive actions that the DRV may take which are clearly contrary to our objective of peaceful solutions. We also expect to maintain and even accelerate the pace of military action in South Vietnam. In your discretion you should insure that these elements of our policy are understood.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLIII, Memos (B). Top Secret. There is no drafting information on the papers.
2. For a record of the December 18 White House meeting, see Document 235.
3. Top Secret; Sensitive.
4. Top Secret; Nodis.
5. Top Secret.
6. Top Secret.
7. Top Secret.