Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

227. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson, in Texas¹

Washington, December 10, 1965, 11:55 a.m.

CAP 65864. Secretary Rusk asked Francis Meloy, a senior Foreign Service officer, traveling with the Mansfield party,² to seek the Senator’s reaction, very privately, to a possible early pause in the North Vietnam bombing. The exchange of cables follows:

(Repeat Manila 1132 and Deptel to Hong Kong 762 attached)³

For Meloy from Secretary.

Would you inform Senator Mansfield we have been having some discussion here about the various public proposals for a limited possibility of an early pause in the bombing of North Viet-Nam. Although we have no significant indication that there would be any constructive Hanoi response, it can be argued that such a pause would at least open the way to Soviet activity and at the very least might persuade people that we were exhausting every reasonable avenue to peace. On the negative side, we have been somewhat concerned at the possibility of misinterpretation in Saigon or even in Hanoi, and Senator Mansfield may have had relevant discussions or observations in Saigon.

I would be most grateful if you could discuss this privately and quietly with him, so that his reactions could be conveyed to me at once.

For the Secretary from Meloy.

Your message was received and discussed with Senator Mansfield just prior departure Hong Kong for Manila. Senator Mansfield has given careful thought to the question and has consulted Senator Aiken privately. Following is substance Senator Mansfield’s views:

1. American officials in Saigon made little reference to subject of bombing North Vietnam or its expansion or suspension, taking the position they have no responsibility for it. Neither was matter discussed in detail by Vietnamese authorities during Saigon visit. However, it could be expected that Ky and his colleagues might well look with disfavor and concern on any action which would appear to be letting up of our military pressure on the enemy. On other hand bombing of north is now less of a psychological factor in south in view of the reassuring presence of large U.S. forces.

2. Influx of men and material from North Vietnam will probably continue whether bombing is suspended, maintained or extended. Senator certainly received the impression that present bombing of the North was not an insuperable impediment to such a flow and holds view that it is probably hardening the North Vietnamese will to continue conflict.

3. In conversations with Rumanians and particularly with Poles and Soviets the point was repeatedly made that they could do nothing as long as bombing of North Vietnam and “U.S. aggressive actions” continued. They were especially emphatic regarding bombing of the north. Conversely, however, none indicated what, if anything, they could or would do or what would happen if bombing were stopped. Suspension of bombing for an appreciable period could perhaps smoke out whether there is any real disposition on part of Eastern Europeans and Soviets to be helpful, although in this connection Senator observed no indication on the part of the Russians of willingness to take action at this time.

4. Although originally opposed to bombing, Senator not at all persuaded that an isolated act of suspension at this point would prove fruitful, particularly if it is intended as a measure which, if it fails to produce negotiations, will be followed by a resumption and extension of the bombing.

5. Senator feels that if it is attempted at all at this time, it ought to be not “a wait and see” gesture but, rather, coupled with other direct U.S. initiatives, with Poles, Rumanians and, perhaps, even with Chinese in Warsaw.

6. Senator suggests, further, that consideration be given not solely to question of suspending North Vietnamese bombing, which involves only a unilateral forbearance on our part but also to a call for a suspension of all hostilities throughout Viet Nam in connection with recent reported Viet Cong offer of a 12 hour cease-fire over Christmas.

He believes thought should be given to the practicability of calling upon the Viet Cong to extend this period of cease-fire from Christmas through the important Vietnamese New Year holiday (Tet) which is generally observed for approximately three days beginning January 21 or 22. If it works, this would have virtue of providing substantial period of about one month in which possibility for negotiations may be thoroughly tested. If it does not, it would still be a significant initiative for peace from our side which should have considerable effect on world and domestic opinion.

7. In sum, Senator feels that pause in bombing of itself would likely be of doubtful utility in bringing about negotiations at this time unless coupled with broader U.S. initiatives in other fields.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, Senator Mansfield’s Trip (Southeast Asia). Secret; Nodis. Received at the LBJ Ranch at 12:50 p.m.
2. Senators Mansfield, Aiken, Boggs, Muskie, and Inouye, along with three staff aides, were in South Vietnam December 2-5. Memoranda of conversation between this delegation and Generals Thieu, Ky, and Foreign Minister Tran Van Do, all on December 3, were transmitted as enclosures to airgram A-356 from Saigon. (Department of State, Central Files, LEG 7 MANSFIELD) A briefing of Mansfield’s delegation by the U.S. Mission in Saigon, December 2, is in the University of Montana, Mansfield Library, Mansfield Papers, Series XXII, Box 99, Fld 4.
3. Copies of these telegrams are in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S.