Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

224. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, December 8, 1965.

2065. Literally eyes only for Bundy from Lodge.

1. I called on Palmas because I wanted to make it absolutely clear that I would be willing to meet his “former Minister”.

2. I brought up the matter of the so-called “Ambassador’s” credentials and how to judge their value. He did not answer this, but he did say that he vouched absolutely for the seriousness and respectability of the “former Minister”.

3. Comment: I do not know how to judge the so-called letter of credentials and am disposed to go ahead on the basis that Palmas vouches for the “former Minister” and that the “former Minister” in turn vouches for the “Ambassador”.

4. I said that I was absolutely opposed to any kind of a trick whereby we would be lulled to sleep while the Viet Cong went ahead and gained ground. Also would I be opposed to using talks as a device to get me in wrong with the Government of Viet-Nam. Palmas absolutely vouched for the fact that there would be no trickery of this kind.

5. He then read me what purported to be the entire text of his telegram to the Vatican. Some of the points which became very clear from what he was reading and which I did not cover adequately in my previous telegram were as follows:

6. The entrance into South Viet-Nam of the troops of the Hanoi regime changes the nature of the war completely. Palmas recalled the change in the psychology in Italy during World War II when the Germans came into Italy. The Viet Cong is frightened of North Viet-Nam taking over the entire country and defeating the Americans. They no longer wish help from Hanoi. They had used Hanoi when they were trying to conquer South Viet-Nam but had never wanted to be taken over by them. One reason they want the American troops to stay is to guarantee the independence of South Viet-Nam.

7. It was also made clear in the telegram to the Vatican that the Viet Cong recognized that at the proper time I would have to tell the GVN. I suggested that I do this after the first meeting and he agreed. He also agreed with my judgment that it would be better to tell Tran Van Do in the first instance rather than Ky. It was Tran Van Do who had said to Palmas that he could not conceive of the nationalist element of the Viet Cong defecting but that it would, of course, be wonderful if it happened.

8. Palmas believes that the so-called Liberation Front is distinct from the Viet Cong High Command. He believes that a majority of the Front are nationalist, but that the military command is controlled by Communists.

9. His “former Minister” had said last Wednesday that he would be in touch with Palmas within ten days. One week went by today.

10. Palmas suggested that when the “former Minister” was with him that he could call me up and I could come over and have my talk at the Apostolic Delegate’s house.

11. Comment: Upon reflection, I think that would be a good thing to do. In fact, I would not object to having all the discussions in the house of the Papal Delegate. They would know everything, which might be just as well.

12. Your view of para. 11 would be appreciated.

13. If I may turn to another matter, I hope you will read Embtels 1931 and 1997.² Approving these telegrams would be a tremendous boost to morale here, which badly needs it. Only about 30 women are involved. American women are constantly arriving here to fill places which could be filled by men.

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Nodis; Priority. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at 5:24 a.m.
2. In telegram 1931, November 29, and telegram 1997, December 3, Lodge recommended allowing spouses to return to Saigon for the Christmas holiday. (Ibid., PS 7-6 US-VIET S)