206. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Acting Secretary of State Ball and Secretary of Defense McNamara1
McN said he had talked to the President about one aspect without consulting B because McN felt he knew how B stood. The Chiefs have been coming to a boiling point on bombing Haiphong. McN felt it would be wise to insure that Chiefs’ views got to the President if Wheeler saw the President. Wheeler saw the President the day before the [he?] left. Wheeler got the impression from the President he favored bombing (POL?) and asked that Wheeler and McN come forward with a joint recommendation. McN said that he had briefly warned the President not to do it at this time. However, because of this feeling, McN thought he had better talk to the President himself. McN told the President on his own long-run program it would be some time in February and didn’t see any objection in bringing it forward at the present time. He told him he knew State felt strongly opposed; that he thought McG leaned against it; and that he (McN) was not prepared to recommend it at this time. He didn’t feel strongly about changing it from February to December. Said he would be willing to wait until Rusk’s return, at which time they would discuss it. McN said that he did not tell the President his own recommendation— [Page 580] an installation of four to six weeks, with several bridges (7-9) and let them hit four of them, plus the surface-to-air missile support facilities. B replied that he would look at this with Bill.
McN continued we have to decide what to do in Phase II. He believes we should put the troop strength and financial requirements into our budget; and, assuming the President does not want to make a firm commitment to the end of Phase II, we should begin shipping the troops in the battalion against that schedule in January, without commitment to go beyond a month—unless the President wants to make a stronger recommendation. B replied that this was his interpretation. McN said on this basis, he would be stopping in Saigon on his way back from Paris.2 He had spoken briefly to the Secretary on this before he left. He was in favor; and the President is in favor of it. McN said he didn’t know when we wanted to get Lodge back; since we face the decision to make it would be helpful to sit down with Westmoreland. The President doesn’t want a Honolulu meeting or Lodge and Westmoreland both in Washington at the same time. For this reason, the best substitute would be for McN to visit Saigon on the way home. He would plan to be there 24 hours. This raises the problem of transportation. Does B want him to send a plane to pick him up in Paris? B replied that he would plan to go to Paris with McN (from London) and from there come back to Washington commercially.
McN asked if B wanted to meet tomorrow or Thursday to talk about our approach to Wilson. B replied this could perhaps be done on the plane going over. However, he is available should McN wish to do it before that. McN replied they could decide this tomorrow.
McN said he would draft a cable to Lodge telling him of his plans; would let B see it before it is sent.3
- Source: Johnson Library, Papers of George Ball, Telephone Conversations, Vietnam. No classification marking.↩
- McNamara was in Paris for the November 27 meeting of the Special Committee of NATO Defense Ministers. He was in Saigon November 28-29. For McNamara’s recommendations to the President after his trip to Saigon, see Document 212.↩
- Not further identified.↩